

The Review of Metaphysics

A PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

ARTICLES

- Richard Kroner, *What is Really Real?* 351
José A. Benardete, *On Being and Nothing* 363
Laurence J. Lafleur, *A Dialectical Dissolution of Psycho-
logical Hedonism* 368

KANT: IN COMMEMORATION, 1804-1954

- Lawrence Friedman, *Kant's Theory of Time* 379
Nathan Rotenstreich, *Kant's Dialectic* 389

CRITICAL STUDIES

- George Lindbeck, *A Great Scotist Study* 422
Isabel Stearns, *Feibleman's Ontology* 436
T. A. Goudge, *Physical Cosmology and Philosophical
Physics* 444
Oliver Martin, *The Philosophy of Human Nature* 452
Morris Weitz, *Symbolism and Art* 466
Jacob Taubes, *The Realm of Paradox* 482

DISCUSSIONS

Newton P. Stallknecht, *Opto Ergo Sum: A Reply to Mr. Eddins* 492

A. H. Johnson, *Hartshorne and the Interpretation of Whitehead* 495

EXPLORATIONS

Richard H. Popkin, *The Sceptical Crisis and the Rise of Modern Philosophy, III* 499

NOTES AND OBSERVATIONS

Robert S. Brumbaugh, *Aristotle's Outline of the Problems of First Philosophy* 511

ANNOUNCEMENTS 522

BOOKS RECEIVED 524

ARTICLES

WHAT IS REALLY REAL?

RICHARD KRONER

WHEN Plato conceived of the realm of Ideas as the realm of the "ontōs on," or of that which is really real, he introduced an immortal distinction into philosophical thought.¹ To be sure, he was preceded by Parmenides who had also spoken of what is truly real and had separated it from that which merely seems to be real, but is not real at all. However, there is a vast difference between Plato and Parmenides, for according to Parmenides, no degree of reality is conceded to the seemingly real; this is, rather, deprived of any truth. It is the realm of error and illusion while the realm of reality alone deserves the assent of the thinking mind; it alone represents being and truth. Plato, on the contrary, wanted to "save" the phenomenal world. This world has its own truth by participating in the realm of the Ideas, though a truth of lower degree. It has a phenomenal reality.

This distinction between something that is really real and something that is seemingly real is of great moment. It cannot be dismissed, even though the Platonic scheme in its historical form might be abandoned. There are degrees of reality in the contents of our experience. Fleeting impressions or emotions are less real than the eternal nature of things. Errors, falsities, illusions and deceptions are less real than truth. And yet it cannot be denied that the fleeting impressions and emotions, that even erroneous statements, illusions and deceptions have their own mode of reality, though on a lower level.

Plato united reality and truth. Parmenides simply identified them. According to Parmenides the real is the true, the false is not real; this majestic dictum underlies his whole philosophy. Plato was more subtle; although he preserved the substance of the

¹ This paper was presented before the Metaphysical Society of America, in New York City, in March 1953.

Parmenidean thesis, he differentiated the degrees of truth when he differentiated the degrees of reality. I agree with both Parmenides and Plato that truth and reality cannot be separated from each other.

The really real is the truly real. The sensations and emotions of my soul are less real than are the Platonic Ideas or the laws of nature. The four elements are less real than the atoms of modern physics, because modern physics is more true than was ancient speculation about nature. The chemical relations between elements as conceived by modern chemistry are more real than the same relations as conceived by medieval alchemy. The activity of the stars as discovered by astronomy is more real than that accepted by astrology. In all these cases reality and truth are inseparably united. To the degree to which there was a certain truth, though distorted or obscured in ancient speculation or in medieval science, to that degree there was also reality in the objects as defined by them. And to the degree to which there is still some obscurity in modern science, to that degree the chemical elements or the astronomical relations are not really real themselves. What is really real is absolutely true, and what is not true at all is absolutely unreal. The degree of reality depends on the degree of truth and conversely.

Modern science can define what is real only to a certain degree, or in a certain sense. Two reasons may be given for this thesis. First, the natural sciences are never finished, but are at all times on the way towards the discovery of the full and absolute truth. There is, therefore, always truth and error mixed up in scientific theories, as the presence of hypothesis shows. Second, the natural sciences need an interpretation of the sense in which they are true and in which their objects are real.

There is truth and there is therefore reality outside the modern natural sciences. The fleeting impressions and emotions are not completely unreal, as they are not completely untrue. On the contrary, they can claim a reality and a truth never to be "saved" by the sciences. The artist can and does "save" them to the degree to which he is a real or a true artist. Paintings do preserve his impressions, and lyrics or music his emotions,

so that we feel there is a universal truth and a universal reality in these fugitive phenomena.

The example taken from the fine arts shows that reality is bound up not only with truth in the scientific sense, but also with the truth revealed and presented by the painter, the poet, the composer or the artist in general. And it might be bound up with other realms of human life and activity, too. In this respect we can no longer rely upon the ancient heritage—be it of Parmenides or Plato; both were more convinced than we are that science or scientific investigation of whatever kind is the only, or at least the best, way of finding truth and reality, and therefore of discovering what is true and real to the highest degree. If we call such a conviction rationalism, we must state that we are less rationalistically minded than they were. We must insist that the real is not to be found only in the exclusively logical realm—neither in the realm of the natural sciences, nor in the wider realm of ontology, as we will see. The beautiful also is real. It reveals a certain truth which cannot be expressed in any other way.

As error and falsity exist only in the logical sphere, though on a lower level than the truth, so also the ugly and the trivial exist in the aesthetic sphere only as the counterpart of the beautiful and the sublime. They exist only where the measure of aesthetic values is applied or applicable. In fact, as error and falsity are real only to the degree to which they are logically relevant, so also the ugly and the artistically, or aesthetically, imperfect are real only to the degree to which they are still aesthetically pertinent. Both the false and the ugly borrow their reality from the true and the beautiful; they live only in a secondary way, by the grace of the positive values. In a paradoxical fashion one might say, that the false and the ugly do not exist, wherever truth and beauty reign, and yet that they do exist only where truth and beauty reign. This paradox points to a problem we have to discuss later.

What has been said about the logical and the aesthetic sphere can also be said about the moral values. Moral goodness alone makes morality real. Acts of the will which disagree with the moral standard are not really moral acts as they are also not morally

real. And yet they exist only in the moral realm; they borrow their reality from the morally good. They are morally less real as they are also really less moral than morally positive acts. They follow the good as the shadow follows the object on which the sun shines. The good is creative and has a lasting power while the bad is destructive and annihilates itself eventually. Like the false and the ugly so the morally bad, too, has only a negative existence; it derives what existence it has from the negation of the good.

II

The term "negative existence" raises a hard and important problem indicated by the paradox we have encountered. Does the false, the ugly, the bad really exist? Has the term "negative existence" any meaning at all? Is not Parmenides right after all in insisting that Being alone is, while Non-being is not? Is it not true that truth, beauty and goodness annihilate their opposites, that they negate the very existence of the false, the ugly and the bad? Is it not true, therefore, that nothing can exist in the logical, the aesthetic, the moral realm which does not fully agree with the standards of these realms? Parmenides was driven to this conclusion in order to avoid the paradoxical idea of "negative existence."

The Kantians of the 19th century also ruled out negative existence and maintained that negation always rejects falsity or error. In other words, they dealt with negativity only in an epistemological and logical way and denied its ontological meaning as they denied ontology altogether. Consequently, they also denied any gradation of reality. Negativity, they thought, has only a subjective function; reality itself cannot be negative, it is always and entirely positive. In that way the Kantians ironically were nearer to Parmenides than to Plato, although on the whole they rightly believed themselves to be nearer to Plato than to Parmenides.

There is a sense in which Parmenides and the Kantians are right. The really real is thoroughly positive, because it is thoroughly true. It does not tolerate negativity as it also does

not tolerate falsity. If the opposition of truth and falsity is occasioned by human thinking, that is to say by the finite mind, and if the real and the true are inseparably connected, then indeed negative reality is rooted in finite subjectivity. But finite subjectivity itself has its own reality and so has the world in which we live, this world of ours in which truth and falsity, beauty and ugliness, good and bad are strangely mixed up. This world is not really real, precisely because of this mixture, but, nevertheless, it is real in a sense and to some degree. And since it is real only to some degree, we must conclude that the negative also has some reality or that there are lower stages of reality which contain negativity, and finally that negativity is not only caused by the rejection of the false, but that the false itself has a negative existence. And so Plato is right in the last analysis.

But Plato did not see that this finite world of ours has a subjective root. Although negativity is not merely the rejection of the false, it is, nevertheless, a symptom of falsity. Only in a world in which negativity exists can falsity also exist, for the false is itself the negative of the true. Since there is truth and falsity mixed up in this world of ours, there is also gradation of reality and value in it, and consequently there is positive and negative existence. Gradation of reality and value imply approximation to the really real which as the top of the hierarchy is above and beyond the alternative of truth and falsity.

Our world and we ourselves are finite precisely because of the antagonism of positivity and negativity which govern the reality as well as the validity of everything that exists in this world including ourselves and all that we perform. Since the contrast of truth and error is generated by our own thinking, finiteness is subjective and everything belonging to our world has consequently a subjective tinge and taint. Only the really real is exempt from this destiny. It is, therefore, not only above and beyond the antagonism of value and disvalue, of positivity and negativity, but it is also beyond and above all finite existence. It is absolutely infinite, as it is also absolutely real and positive, absolutely true, beautiful and good. It is thus separated by an abyss from our existence and from our world. It is beyond the reach of our knowledge, our creativity, our will and our intentions.

But the paradox of negative existence reappears when we put the question: how is the really real compatible with the finite, the phenomenal, the subjective, the relative, if it is true that the really real is free from falsity, ugliness and badness? Compatible it should be with this its antagonistic existence, since this existence, though negative and finite, nevertheless participates in reality as it also participates in truth, beauty and goodness. It is real to the degree to which it does participate in the really real, although on a lower level and only to a certain degree.

If the really real represents the full and perfect truth, it must itself contain the reason of that antagonism; it must conceal the precondition of negativity and subjectivity; it must be the key to the riddle of finitude and of its own counterpart, the realm in which the true is mixed up with the false, the beautiful with the ugly, the good with the bad. We may be so bold as to say even that the really real must be the ground or the cause of the partly and relatively real, the source of the negative, the origin of the finite and so of falsity, ugliness and badness. Or to put it even more boldly: we must conclude that the really real partly negates itself, inasmuch as it has to account for this finite world and our finite existence. But if we have gone thus far, we would be justified in being frightened by our own boldness, because we have met the abyss of incomprehensibility, even of absurdity. How can the Infinite, the truth, the really real negate itself? Does this not imply that it contradicts itself? And how can we ever hope to understand that contradiction taints what is above and beyond the whole sphere in which the antagonism of the negative and the positive prevails?

However, we cannot give up our own boldness, since consistency and not caprice leads us to this conclusion. If we do not abandon the idea of the really real altogether, we are logically coerced to accept the contradictory statement that truth contradicts itself, that reality pure and unalloyed negates itself, that the Infinite is the ground of the finite, the self-sufficient cause of the insufficient and the perfect the origin of the imperfect. With great admiration but also with emphatic disagreement we remember again the proud thesis of Parmenides who avoided the absurd by denying the reality of the negative, the finite, the

deficient and imperfect altogether. But even Parmenides could not help bringing in the excluded sphere through a back-door under the title of a second-class truth which nevertheless persuades the human mind.

If we avoid the rigorism of Parmenides, we are ultimately driven to the extremity of Hegel who introduced contradiction into his system of ontology, but insisted that this procedure leads to a solution, if the system is made a perfect circle ending where it begins. I do not believe that this can be done. It offers not so much a solution, as an acute and accurate formulation. Taken as a solution it is as ingenious as it is desperate and self-destructive for it really destroys the whole metaphysical adventure. If this is the only possible way of building up an ontology, then Hegel has but shown in practice what Kant demonstrated in theory, namely that ontology is an impossible possibility; its problem transcends the range of the human mind. If there is no other possibility of attaining knowledge of the really real than Hegel's, we have to renounce ontology altogether.

III

Even if ontology dealt with insoluble problems, it still might point to an important truth and harbor the most worthy of all philosophical topics. Even if ontology cannot be carried out the way Parmenides and Plato thought it could, the problem of ontology is real and cannot be avoided. There is the gradation of reality in this world of ours: at the top of its scale is the really real, no matter how hidden it may be and how great the obstacles in the way of ascertaining it.

The really real is also the standard of all truth, beauty and goodness; in some way, too, it is the source of all that exists, at least of the positive, the constructive, the creative, the lasting values. This at least we know about the really real. But it is true that even this knowledge is hedged about by our inability to define the nature of what I have called "source" or the nature of the activity by which the really real generates the finite, relative and forever partly unreal world to which we belong. And our

knowledge is even more seriously endangered by the insight that any attempt to comprehend this generation or production leads inevitably into the impasse of contradiction, even of a contradiction that threatens to destroy all positive value of our ontological knowledge.

But a more careful study of the nature of contradiction may give us a clue to some further clarification. I said that the ultimate conclusion at which we arrive when we try to think through the relation between the really real and this world would be the self-negation and finally the self-contradiction of the really real. But this conclusion was too rash. We can speak about self-negation only if we are permitted to conceive of the really real as a kind of self. Such a conception is not warranted by the data. The unity of the really real with the absolutely true beautiful and good is, I admit, difficult to understand as long as we do not attribute to the really real a kind of selfhood. We are tempted to attribute selfhood to the really real because it is our subjectivity, i.e., our own selfhood, which alone secures us an access to the true, the beautiful, and the good. But even so, all our real and potential acts of actualizing truth, beauty and goodness, are finite, relative and to that degree mixed up with falsity, ugliness and badness. It is very risky and adventurous to transfer our self and our actions to the really real which is infinite, absolute and self-sufficient.

We may, therefore, abstain from attributing selfhood to the Infinite; and we must state that we ourselves in trying to think through what is meant when we conceive of the Infinite as the source of the finite, fall into the trap of contradiction. After all, contradiction originally and ultimately means that we contradict ourselves or that the human mind contradicts itself, whereby the human mind represents the thinking self which is always the self of a concrete individual person. Only in this sense is subjectivity the source of negative existence and of the finitude of the world in which we live. This world is finite, because the human self is finite and can never attain to absolute truth, beauty and goodness, but only to their broken copies. We contradict ourselves, therefore, the very moment we aim at the understanding of the unbroken, undisturbed, absolute real. We fail in grasping the

nature of the Infinite, because we ourselves are finite in thinking, creating and acting—finite, too, in the logical, the aesthetic and the moral fields of our activity.

The contradiction is, as it were, the wall that separates us from the free and unencumbered sight of the really real. This contradiction of ours we can understand very well. In fact, we could not understand ourselves, we could not understand the broken status of our existence, if our knowledge did not lead into this impasse that prevents us from seeing the Infinite in all its purity, splendour and glory. From the outset we conceive of the really real from our own point of view. Only because we live in a broken world, only because we ourselves are entangled in the relative and the finite, do we conceive of the really real as the Infinite and the Absolute, as the Self-sufficient and the Self-existent. We can never take the place of the Infinite itself and look from that place upon the Infinite. Contradictions are therefore the necessary, the inevitable restrictions laid upon our knowledge of the really real.

This knowledge finds its clarification in and by our self-understanding. In fact, only our self-understanding can grant us the right perspective in which we have to assess and to interpret our knowledge of the Infinite. Ontology is reasonable only on the ground of "heautology" (if I may use a word that I first used about 30 years ago), i.e., a doctrine or logic of the self. Contradiction is always in the last analysis our own self-contradiction. Only a self can contradict itself, and only the human, i.e., the finite self does contradict itself, because it cannot arrive at the absolute and perfect truth, beauty and goodness. Logic is rooted in the last analysis upon the self-identity of the thinking self. The so-called law of contradiction is a law for the sake of the self-preservation of this self.

Falsehood, ugliness, and badness negate not only the positive values, they also negate the reality and the integrity of the self. The self, therefore, is always concerned, wherever reality and truth are concerned. The human self being a finite self is involved in a life and death struggle as long as it is entangled in negative existence, for negative existence means that the self exists only on a lower level and to a lesser degree; its existence is encumbered

by contradiction in the logical sphere, by disharmony or disproportion in the aesthetic sphere and by wickedness or depravity in the moral sphere. Negative existence means with respect to the self that it is not really real itself. Its own reality is at stake together with its integrity, logical, aesthetic and moral.

One might thus rightfully state that the human or finite self negates itself, as long as it lives and acts in this world for in that world the really real is no longer really real but partly negated. The human self, not the really real as such, is therefore the real source of negativity. Error, insensitivity, and faultiness diminish the reality and the value of the world in which we live. They degrade the really real by their imperfection. They make man's existence altogether negative and finite.

Negativity thus necessarily leads to contradiction and self-contradiction. The merely formal negation of a proposition or the negative proposition which the Kantians took as the model and pattern of all negation, as rejecting falsity, is itself based upon the ontological negativity of falsity; formal negation contradicts the false in order to rectify thinking and to approach the truth. Contradiction in the merely formal sense is nothing but gainsaying. But we would not have to gainsay, if it were not that the ontological contradiction which is originally self-contradiction alarms us and provokes action for the sake of the self's integrity and its very reality.

Ontological negativity or the negativity of existence is, therefore, always at the same time ontological contradiction, i.e., self-contradiction of the thinking self. Heautology is not merely the logic, it is the ontology of the finite self.

All ontology is finally ontology of self. We cannot establish an ontology of the really real, because as we have seen, such an ontology leads into the impasse of unavoidable and insoluble contradictions, and because it would be absurd to ascribe these contradictions to the self-contradiction and self-negation of the supremely real. It is true, the ontology of the self also leads to unavoidable contradictions, but these contradictions constitute the very essence and substance of the finite self which being finite is bound to be only partly real or positive and partly unreal or

negative; it is bound to contradict itself ontologically or heauto-logically.

The world in which we live is the world of this finite self and is, therefore, finite, broken, contradictory and imperfect itself. We cannot mend it without mending ourselves by reconstruing the wholeness of our self which is degraded and debased by our own deficiency and insufficiency. But being what we are, namely finite and deficient, we can never hope to mend ourselves and our world sufficiently so that our and the world's deficiencies would be completely erased and compensated. We can never hope completely to escape ignorance, illusion, fallacies and deceptions in the logical realm as we can never hope to make up for our lack of sensitivity and imaginative creativity or for our faultiness, negligence and frailty in the moral realm. We are definitely self-contradictory beings who participate in the really real but partly negate it in thinking, creating, and acting.

We contradict ourselves down to the very root of our existence. If we state that our finite nature is the source or precondition of our deficiencies, we contradict ourselves, because we presuppose that being what we are we cannot help doing what we do, i.e., diminishing our selfhood, our value, our reality and thereby magnifying the distance between ourselves and the really real. But on the other hand we morally know that the really real cannot and should not be made responsible for this diminution and degradation but that rather we ourselves, or more precisely each of us in his own way and to his own degree, brings about this diminution and degradation. At the bottom we thus have a self-diminution and self-degradation, and, therefore, we can say paradoxically, the effect produces its cause or the consequent its ground.

But this contradiction is just the root and the origin of our selfhood, as it is also its nature and substance. We are what we are because we are not really real, or because our existence is negative in its ultimate constitution and, therefore, self-contradictory, so that no statement about ourselves can be made that does not contain this stigma. I am not what I am, for I am not a real self, but always only on the way toward or away from the goal of full and true selfhood. My real status is not Being but

Becoming, which implies the alternative of positivity and negativity, construction and destruction. And even when I act positively, still a portion of negativity is immanent in the action. No finite ego can ever get rid of this portion altogether. No finite ego can ever hope to become a really real ego or self. Only an infinite self, should such a self exist, can say about itself: I am who I am. Every finite self has always to admit that it is not what it is, namely a self in the unstinted sense of the word.

Of the three realms of self-contradiction the moral realm comes nearest to the root of the finite self, because the self is there concerned with its own integrity directly. Therefore, moral self-contradiction is not only the most personal, or should I say, the most central contradiction, but it is also the most original. It interprets and illuminates the contradictions in all the other realms of life and world. Only in the moral realm does the self know itself, while in the logical and the aesthetic spheres the self contemplates objects that exist outside itself. Only the moral experience gives the clue to the nature of the original and constitutional self-negation and self-contradiction of the finite ego.

We must conclude, therefore, that, if there is any solution of this basic problem, it has to be of a moral kind. Only what morally resolves the basic self-contradiction, resolves the basic ontological problem concerning the relation between the really real and ourselves.

Union Theological Seminary.

ON BEING AND NOTHING

JOSÉ A. BENARDETE

WE are launching in this essay an inquiry into first principles, in an endeavor to answer, if only in part, the presiding question of all metaphysics: What is it to *be*? Metaphysics is here projected as a *demonstrative science*, demonstrative in the strictest of senses, quite as Aristotle and Spinoza, to name but two philosophers, envisaged the discipline.

Metaphysical inquiry is indebted to the sceptical dialectic for the earlier moments in its investigation. Through that dialectic the field is cleared of the dubitable. We shall here install Descartes' first *Meditation* (an ancient *aperçu*) as the initial moment in our program. What if all is a dream? Hume supplies our second moment. Immediate experience, such as sensations of color, is undeniable, and (touching matter of fact) that alone. Our third moment is the familiar retrenchment of Hume to a solipsism of the present instant. The past, like the external world, being removed from our direct perception cannot be verified.

We shall refer to the following as the "first principle of empiricism": all matter of fact is disclosed in immediate experience. At the present stage in our inquiry the foregoing principle may or may not be insisted upon as true *simpliciter*. In any event, we affirm that it cannot be known to be false.

As the "second principle of empiricism" we install the following: all matter of fact is contingent. There seems no reason why instead of the red circle and the black square which I am now confronting, I might not be perceiving a red square and a black circle, or two red squares, or two black circles. Neither red nor black, neither circularity nor squareness, would seem to be necessary matters of fact. Again, we insist merely that the second principle of empiricism cannot be proved false. In establishing the two principles of empiricism, we consummate the preliminary moments in our inquiry.

From here on out we propose to break new ground. The two principles of empiricism jointly constitute a contradiction. If all matter of fact is contingent, then it is possible that nothing might exist. This possible state of affairs—total non-existence—we shall designate as the Void. The Void, then, is a possible matter of fact. But if the Void prevailed, it would defy the first principle of empiricism. For, clearly, the Void as a matter of fact, could not be experienced or perceived. The disclosure of the empiricist contradiction affords the fourth moment in our inquiry.

One or the other of the two principles of empiricism must be modified. In our fifth moment we investigate the first alternative: holding fast to the first principle of empiricism and thereby denying the intelligibility of the Void. Every matter of fact remains contingent, but the limiting case of total non-existence is eschewed.

At least one of the possible existents must then be enacted, though every candidate in the schedule of possible existents is contingent. There must, then, be an act of election which enacts at least one of the candidates. It is true that any one of the candidates might enter into existence by sheer accident. But then again, equally exercising their privileges of contingency, all of the candidates (in default of a necessary act of election) might decline enactment. The Void, however, has been removed from the schedule of possible matters of fact. In consequence, there must be a necessary act of election. This act is a necessary matter of fact. The second principle of empiricism is thus refuted.

We are now, in our sixth moment, to investigate the second alternative: holding firm to the second principle of empiricism and thereby accrediting the Void as a possible matter of fact. After all, if *esse est percipi*, then *non-percipi* is surely *non-esse*. The argument of the fifth moment now repeats itself. At least one of the possible matters of fact must be enacted. That is, either something exists or it does not. Again, each of the candidates in the schedule of possible matters of fact is contingent. Any one might, of course, enact itself by accident. But, equally, all might prefer to remain mere possibles. There must, then,

be an act of election to coerce at least one of the possibles into enactment. This act of coercion is a necessary matter of fact. The second principle of empiricism is thus twice refuted.

Both alternatives have issued in a necessary act of election. This act is the ground or source of all being and of all non-being. Why one possible should be preferred over against another, we do not know. The substantive character or essence of the ground is inaccessible to us. Here, then, in the supreme matter of fact is a matter of fact which is not disclosed in experience. The first principle of empiricism is thus refuted. But if matter of fact need not be experienced, then we can have no objection to enrolling the Void in the schedule of possible matters of fact.

It is to be noted that the Void and the ground can both be jointly. The one might be an actual matter of fact, the other must be an actual matter of fact. Neither is or can be a case of *existence*, in the usage adopted by us of the term *existence*.

In our seventh moment we have established the fact of a necessary ground to all being and non-being, and the possibility of the Void.

In our eighth moment we demonstrate that there is no contingent or possible matter of fact whatever. Let us consult any instance of a "contingent" fact: a red circle, for example. Now, either the red circle exists or it does not. However, one or the other (and only one) of those "possibles"—the red circle existing and the red circle not existing—*must* be the case. Again, either might enact itself by accident, but, equally, both might as accidentally remain unenacted *unless* there were a necessity that some definite one of the two must be coerced into enactment. To us the two appear equally patient of and recalcitrant to enactment. There must then be a necessary act of election in virtue of which one of them becomes necessary and the other impossible.

What appeared earlier in our inquiry as contingent fact, now proves to be an abstraction from necessary being and necessary non-being.

It may seem from our eighth moment that there are as many necessary acts of election as there are "contingent" matters of fact. We are here to prove, in our ninth moment, that there is only one act of election.

First, let us compile a comprehensive schedule of all possible *existents*. For the sake of simplicity we shall pretend that there are only three candidates: a red square, a black circle and a green triangle, which we designate as *a*, *b*, and *c* respectively.

Now, on the strength of that assumption, let us draft a portfolio of all possible *worlds*. The entries in our portfolio are exhausted by the following:

1. the Void, i.e. neither *a* nor *b* nor *c* is enacted.
2. *a* alone is enacted.
3. *b* alone is enacted.
4. *c* alone is enacted.
5. *a* and *b* are alone enacted.
6. *a* and *c* are alone enacted.
7. *b* and *c* are alone enacted.
8. *a*, *b*, and *c* are enacted together (we might denominate this the plenum).

There are seen to be eight *mutually-exclusive* possible worlds in our portfolio, one (and only one) of which must be enacted. There is thus only one act of election, and hence a single ground of all being and non-being.

The argument is not materially altered even if there were an infinite number of possible worlds.

Although we do not know the substantive character or essence of the ground of all being and non-being, we certainly do know at great length what the ground is *not*. However we may understand mind or matter, for example, we know that the ground cannot be constituted by either. Mind and matter are envisaged by us as possibles. The ground is necessary. It cannot be constituted by a mere possible. Our tenth moment instructs us that, apart from a few transcendent terms such as "necessary" and "matter of fact," we are entitled to predicate only negative terms of the ground.

Finally, we shall contrast the membership in our schedule of "possibles" with that of those older cosmologies which spring from the *Timaeus*. We have seen that the analysis of possibility holds a commanding position in metaphysics.

Positive and negative matters of fact (both actual and

possible) are distinguished by us. The existence of a black square constitutes a positive matter of fact, the non-existence of a red square a negative matter of fact. The enactment of a negative matter of fact entails the non-enactment of a positive matter of fact, and vice versa. Matters of fact thus fall into pairs which are jointly impossible. With one exception, a cosmograph need never have recourse to negative matters of fact. It is enough to record that *a*, *b*, *c*, and *d* exist, with the subscript "and that is all," without including as supernumerary entries *e*, *f*, and *g* as not existing. The one exception is the critical case of the Void.

By including only positive possibles in the realm of forms or essences or universals, the older cosmologists were challenged by the following as the decisive metaphysical question: Why is there Being at all? Why not far rather Nothing? Under the premiss that all actual positive "contingent" matter of fact requires a cause, they were led to a necessary agency of enactment.

We adopt Hume's position as our own, that the premise of universal causation had not been demonstrated. Hume argued that any of the (positive) possibles might or might not enact itself by sheer accident, and, indeed, it appeared to him possible that nothing at all might exist, since "the contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can never imply a contradiction."

We have seen, however, in the sixth moment that once one admits total non-existence as a possible state of affairs (and, in the fifth moment, even if one does not admit total non-existence as a possible), then it does entail a contradiction for all possibles to remain unenacted. For us the decisive question is not, Why is there Being at all? Why not far rather Nothing? Our question is: Since some (but not all) possibles must be enacted, why this possible and not that one? The answer to our question cannot be found in the schedule of possibles itself where all the entries are equally indifferent to enactment. The agency of coercion must be sought outside of the mere possibles, in a necessary ground of all being and of all non-being.

Gunnison, Colorado.

A DIALECTICAL DISSOLUTION
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
HEDONISM

LAURENCE J. LAFLEUR

IN embarking upon an analysis of ethical terms, it is necessary to choose some starting-point, and I hope the reader will forgive me if for this purpose I choose hedonism and utilitarianism. It is possible that some historical justification may exist for the choice, but none is claimed here, and the choice is made solely because my own thinking on this matter took its departure from hedonism. I trust that the conclusions that may emerge from this consideration will not be warped by the necessarily arbitrary choice of starting-point.

What does a Utilitarian mean by happiness when he says that it is the good? Specifically, pleasure. But how many different kinds of experiences are included under this term? It appears that as the word was used by Bentham, and indeed by almost all other hedonists, it had so wide an extension that it included all experiences not properly termed "unhappiness." Partly, however, because of the identification of happiness with pleasure and the absence of pain, and partly because of a failure to emphasize by frequent explanation the difference between the meanings of terms as used by hedonists and the same terms in common usage, there has existed at all times a disposition to assume that hedonists intended a narrower meaning than they actually did. Even in hedonistic writings there has been a tendency to make a distinction between the usages accorded "pleasure" and "happiness," the former as used more frequently to refer to pleasures of the moment, and the latter to a long continued state of felicitic feeling; or a distinction is made between "pleasure" as used when referring to happiness which has an immediately obvious physiological origin and "happiness" to felicitic feeling of all types. Nevertheless, the terms are not used consistently in this way, and on the whole it would be better to

think of "pleasure" and "happiness" as interchangeable in the writings of Jeremy Bentham and many others.

It is quite clear, and may be readily documented, that Bentham included pleasures of companionship, friendship and sympathy, either with individuals or with the world at large, within the denotation of "happiness." He also included pleasures arising from intellectual and aesthetic pursuits, from memory, from anticipation, and from rest. For almost a century after Bentham's death it was common for critics of hedonism to assume that Bentham excluded many of these sources of pleasure or gave them insufficient attention: an assumption which could arise only from the failure to read what Bentham actually wrote or from reading it in a blind state of unreasoning prejudice. It was even possible for a group of philosophers to call themselves "eudaimonists," discarding "hedonism" as based upon mere "pleasure" and substituting "happiness" as a supposedly broader term. Other, more careful writers, observing that Mill or Bentham did not have the narrow conception of pleasure which they were accustomed to attribute to hedonists generally, assumed that this narrow view was properly attributable to earlier writers, perhaps to the Epicureans. Students of the Epicureans, observing that this did less than justice to the men with whom they were concerned, attributed the view in question in their turn to the Cyrenaics, but an investigation of the latter will show clearly that many of them had quite broad conceptions of pleasure.

What sort of thing is this pleasure or happiness? Something mental, surely, but it does not fit readily into the categories we provide for the mental; it is neither a cognition nor a volition, nor does it quite belong with moods or emotions. It would appear that there are at least two different interpretations to be found in the history of hedonism. For Bentham meant by pleasure or happiness and their opposites a quality of all experience, whereas Mill meant the experience so qualified. Quite clearly and obviously, pleasures in Mill's sense are qualitatively distinct, one from another, as the various elements of the experiences differ. Bentham's terminology equally clearly implies that all pleasures are qualitatively alike, since he is abstracting a common element from all pleasurable experiences. It is perhaps

not appropriate to argue here that Mill, if he had carried his analysis further, would have found it necessary to supply some term to mean that common element in the various experiences which he called pleasures, and consequently to agree in effect with Bentham.

When we try to identify more clearly this broad meaning of pleasure and happiness, we find ourselves in some difficulty. It is no more possible to identify by description the pleasant quality of experience than it is to describe the red quality of the sensation of red. We can, in either case, point out the kind of situation in which we ourselves experience "red" or "pleasure" most intensely, and hope that our companions have qualitatively similar experiences in similar circumstances. We can notice that they report having a quality of experience in such cases, which is generally but not invariably most intense in those situations in which our own pleasure is most intense, and we therefore identify them by hypothesis, and give them the same name. For the rest, we can discover certain associations between pleasure and other psychological factors, which may be either identities or causal connections, and observe that similar relationships exist in our fellows.

We *like* pleasant experiences, we *dislike* unpleasant ones. Pleasant experiences are usually biologically *useful* to the preservation of ourselves or our type: unpleasant experiences are usually *harmful* to the individual or the type. When experiences are intensely pleasant or unpleasant, they are important to us, they attract our *attention*; and we are *interested* in them. As a consequence of this, we are more apt to be aware of the experiences introspectively, or to be self-conscious about them, and we are more apt to remember them in the future. We *wish for* or desire future pleasant experiences, *will* or *determine* to achieve them, and act accordingly by *seeking* them in a behavior pattern that can be called *adient*. We wish to escape future unpleasant experiences, *will* to *reject* them, and act accordingly to avoid them in a behavior pattern that can be called *abient*.

Introspection indicates that at least in some cases the pleasure we find in certain experiences is the conscious reason, *motive*, or *drive*, for seeking those experiences, and the painful

nature of some other experiences is the reason for avoiding them. There is an immediate suggestion that pleasure is the cause of action, a theory so ancient that it is embedded in our language. It is supported by the biological facts already cited, that pleasant experiences are useful and painful ones harmful. Exceptions to this rule occur principally where the source of the experience is new in the environment of the race, where adaptation of the organism's felicity-response to its biological needs has not had time to occur. The doctrine here suggested is expressly formulated as psychological hedonism, which maintains that an individual always acts for his own greatest pleasure. As this doctrine is frequently offered as the justification for ethical hedonism, and is no doubt even more frequently the unacknowledged basis for the latter, it must here be analyzed.

The simplest formulation of psychological hedonism would read somewhat as follows: "we always act in such a manner as to produce our own greatest future pleasure." It is apparent, however, that if any mechanism exists by which a choice of possible actions is made, this mechanism does not exist in a world transcending our own, but is part of our own nature, bodily or mental. No possible course of action could be chosen, then, if it were not known to us as a possibility at the time of choice.

We are therefore brought to another formulation: "there exist in our minds alternative courses of action, from which we consciously and deliberately choose that one which is most pleasurable to us." Do we in fact choose a course of action, or do we choose the goal which that action is to attain? If we consider the intentions of the subject, either may be the object of choice, but it is the goal which is more frequently the object of choice. If, on the other hand, we consider the result of choice, it is clear that we have no control over the goal but only over our actions, and this, unfortunately, in a regressive manner. Looking out of the window I see someone and choose to have him do some work for me. As he may refuse, perhaps I had better say only that I choose to ask him. I go out into the street, but when I arrive I find that he has gone. Did I choose then to ask him or only to go out of the building? In starting to go I might slip and fall and be taken to the hospital. Must we say that all our

choices are only to activate our muscles? We may be paralyzed so that we cannot do even that. So we only choose to activate the different nerves or the motor area of the brain? In cases of hypnosis or hysteria, even this may be impossible. It is evident that the action resulting from choice is not identical with the object of choice. Yet it may be that they are psychologically equivalent, for we are accustomed to make equivalences out of causal relationships. Thus we ordinarily "feel" in our finger tips, but if we regularly use a tool, we soon feel at the working end of the tool. We must understand, then, that we mean the same thing whether we say that we choose a goal or an action, and that the object of conscious choice is a whole range of psychological equivalents. In those cases where the psychological equivalents are not causally related, the person fails to achieve what he has immediately in mind or is disappointed after achieving his immediate purpose. From now on, this is to be understood in interpreting the meanings of the various formulations of psychological hedonism. With this understood, then, let us return to the current formulation.

"There exist in our minds alternative courses of action, from which we consciously and deliberately choose that one which is most pleasurable to us." But the courses of action are alternative ones, of which only one is to be actualized. Consequently, only one of them can exist at a given time, and at the time in question no one of them has been selected for actualization.

We must rephrase our definition of psychological hedonism once more, to read: "we think of alternative courses of action, and deliberately choose that one which will be most pleasurable." If pleasure, however, is correctly identified as a quality of consciousness, the pleasure of a future state of consciousness is a future pleasure, and hence a presently non-existent one. The *object* of a state of consciousness does not *per se* have felicitic value. If, then, a present thought is of a future act, or even of a future state of cognition, the only existent pleasure is that of the present thought of the future act, i.e., a pleasure of anticipation. The pleasure of the future act itself does not as yet exist and cannot, therefore, be a causal agent.

For our fourth formulation, therefore, we select the fol-

lowing: "we think of alternative possible courses of action. Each such thought is qualified by a pleasure or pain of anticipation, and we deliberately select the most pleasing anticipation. As a pleasure of anticipation is a reflection of a future pleasure, this results in choosing a course of action which normally produces our own greatest future pleasure." At this point we have perhaps clarified the situation in as far as we are concerned with the identification of the pleasure considered to be the cause of choice, but there are other elements in the hypothesis to which one may fairly find objection. It seems to be a mistaken description of the actual situation to say that our choice is deliberate. Most of our actions are not deliberate at all, and when we consider what we are to do, we are not ordinarily concerned with the pleasures of anticipation which may be involved. To be aware of these and to evaluate them consciously requires a refinement of self-analysis that would be found occasionally in psychologists and philosophers, but not often even in them. Pleasures of anticipation, then, may be causally responsible for our choices, but they are certainly not the object of choice, and if this is correct, such a choice cannot be said to be deliberate, or even conscious, in respect to its cause.

And so we are forced to a fifth formulation of our doctrine: "we think of alternative possible courses of action, and make deliberate choice of the possibility which we judge will be most pleasant in the future." This interpretation is one that was formerly attributed to Bentham, particularly by John Stuart Mill, who pointed out quite justly that pleasure is rarely the conscious object of choice, and that to make it so is in fact self-defeating. When pleasure is our conscious goal we find pleasure shallow, we become progressively more dissatisfied and bored, we are forced to seek new sources of amusement to replace those we are tired of, and wind up with no memories that we are content to live with, and no sources of pleasure that we have not exhausted. At that point we call pleasures hollow, or say that they have turned to ashes in our mouth. This characteristic reaction is not only a reason why we should not make the pursuit of happiness our conscious aim, it is a clear proof that we do not ordinarily do so.

It now becomes necessary to modify our formulation so that

pleasure does not appear as the object of conscious choice. For our sixth formulation, therefore, we choose the following: "from the possibilities presented to us, we deliberately select that one which is associated with the greatest future pleasure." According to this formulation the pleasure is not thought of as desired, but as the causal agent in determining our choice of some other object. But if the pleasure involved is not an object of awareness, it must be an entity which exists *per se*: yet it is declared to be, *per se*, a future pleasure, i.e., one that does not yet exist. And the non-existent is hardly to be accepted as the cause of anything.

Consequently we alter our position for the sixth time, and accept for our seventh formulation the following: "we do not deliberately select the greatest pleasure, but we deliberately choose that action which is associated with the greatest pleasure of anticipation." It is understood, of course, that the pleasure of anticipation is merely concomitant with choice, and not the object of choice. Another criticism may now be brought up: many actions, even actions which apparently represent a choice, are not deliberate, according to the introspective report of the agent.

We therefore modify our position, and state: "in cases of deliberation, we consciously select an action which is subconsciously associated with the greatest pleasure of anticipation, without consciously attending to the latter. Where no deliberation occurs, we subconsciously select the action which is associated with the greatest pleasure of anticipation." Here and elsewhere we are assuming that "deliberately" and "consciously" are equivalent terms as far as choice is concerned, and that whenever a choice is consciously made, there is some element of deliberation. If this is not so, then we would have, as an additional step in our analysis, the substitution of "conscious choice" for "deliberation."

This gives, for our ninth formulation, the following: "in cases of conscious choice, we consciously select the action which is subconsciously associated with the greatest pleasure of anticipation, without consciously attending to the latter. Where there is no conscious choice, we subconsciously select the action associated with the greatest pleasure of anticipation." By sub-conscious, we mean an actual consciousness which is not self-

conscious, or is not self-conscious to the primary consciousness. The existence of the subconscious and co-conscious is well attested in the phenomena of multiple personality, amnesia, dreams, hypnosis, and the like; but we are probably stretching it much too far to assume not only that all behavior is conscious, but that each such element belongs to a co-consciousness sufficiently developed to be capable of anticipation. We would do better, therefore, not to rely on such extensive co-consciousness, and to admit the existence of unconscious behavior, activity of the organism which is purely biological and unconscious, including unconscious activity of the nervous system.

We now come to our tenth formulation: "in cases of conscious choice (including co-conscious or subconscious), we consciously select the action which is subconsciously associated with the greatest pleasure of anticipation, without consciously attending to the latter. Where there is no conscious choice, the physiology of the nervous system is such that it brings about the action associated with the greatest pleasure of anticipation." Two difficulties are now apparent. In the first part of this formulation we talk about a subconscious selection based on pleasure, at a time when the primary consciousness is concerned with the available courses of action. The pattern which we are proposing as a law, therefore, involves the operation of pleasure at a lower conscious level than the consciousness making the choice. But the level involved in the choice may be as low as possible, so that if there is activity at a still lower level, there is a strong suggestion that it is unconscious rather than co-conscious; unless, indeed, we are to accept an ontological monism and assume that everything is conscious. The second difficulty lies in coupling pleasures of anticipation with completely unconscious phenomena. If we are to assume that there is a physiology of the nervous system which is completely divorced from consciousness, we have no business talking of anticipation, or of pleasures of anticipation, as though they were part of that physiological process.

Our eleventh formulation will then be the following: "there is a physiological parallel to pleasure which always occurs when pleasure does. In cases of conscious choice (including co-conscious) we consciously select the action which either is sub-

consciously associated with the greatest pleasure of anticipation or else is accompanied by the greatest intensity of the physiological parallel to pleasure. When there is no conscious choice, the physiology of the nervous system is such that it brings about the action accompanied by the greatest intensity of the physiological parallel to pleasure." An obvious simplification of this gives us our twelfth formulation: "there is a physiological parallel to pleasure which always occurs when pleasure does. When a number of courses of action are possible, that one occurs which is accompanied by the greatest intensity of this physiological parallel." It should be noted that this physiological parallel is a hypothetical entity. It might be identified as the tendency of neurons to grow towards one another under electrical stimulation, but this fails to account for the distinction between adience and abience, or for the physiological correlate of the distinction between pleasant and unpleasant experiences. And there is something peculiarly illogical in using an unknown as an explanation, something that has all the disadvantages of a *deus ex machina*. If a man chooses A rather than B or C, it may be because A has more of an unknown quality x than B or C. On the other hand, for all we know, B or C may have more x than A. The hypothesis is completely unconfirmable: no empirical evidence can serve to support or discredit it. A further objection may be made to the assumption that the only element causally efficacious is the physiological one, and that any mental concomitant is purely epiphenomenal. This is hardly in accord with evolutionary principles, nor with experience. The admonition to "stop and think" appears to be a meaningful one which can result in a changing one's decisions, and it is not at all equivalent to delaying action so that physiological activity can be carried on over a longer period.

Thus we find that a series of modifications intended to make sense of psychological hedonism have only succeeded in rendering it meaningless without making it satisfactory. To overcome all the difficulties we have met we must change our theory so much that it can no longer be considered an interpretation of psychological hedonism. Freed from this limitation, the best statement of psychological causation that we can make is perhaps something

like the following: the nervous system is basically a physiological mechanism of a conservative type; conservative, that is, in the political sense. Certain forms of behavior are easier to energize than alternative forms, and these occur again and again, and every occurrence of a particular behavior pattern makes it easier for the whole or part of that pattern to be activated in the future. This basic conservation of the nervous system is modified by two factors, intelligence and pleasure.

The function of reason or intelligence is to bind together two types of behavior, one of which we may be in the habit of performing and the other of which we may be in the habit of not performing, and consequently to force a readjustment of behavior-patterns. This binding may be either internal or external. Internal binding results from the perception of similarities between the behavior patterns concerned, and their subsumption under a single category. Thus a man has acquired the habit of drinking wine, and also the habit of viewing beer-drinking with disapproval. Reflection shows him that the elements he likes and dislikes in either are common to both, and he is therefore apt to abandon either the drinking of wine or the disapproval of the drinking of beer. The effect of this function of intelligence is to build up ever more generalized habits. These generalized habits, being more frequently exemplified than particular ones, become firmly ensconced in the character of the individual, and usually prevail over particular habits in case of conflict.

External binding takes place through the perception that two events towards which we have different attitudes are inseparable, or that one causes the other, or that two events towards which we have the same attitude are incompatible. Thus a man wants the United States to sell goods to the rest of the world for gold, but does not want anything to be imported; or he wants to spend money for a luxury today, but realizes that if he does so he will not have enough for necessities in the near future; or in deciding where to live, he decides upon a cold dry climate, but he also insists upon luxuriant vegetation.

The function of reason is thus not to create values, which are merely discovered in experience. Values can be the object of rational contemplation just as can anything else whatsoever, and

through this contemplation they are criticized. The function of reason in connection with values is only to modify or correct pre-existing values through internal and external binding. In some cases, such as in the case of the ethical *summum bonum*, the modifications introduced by the processes of reason are so extensive that the result may be characterized as principally rational, though it originates in psychological drives which are pre-rational.

The second factor tending to confirm or suppress an activity is the pleasure or displeasure with which we experience it. This hedonistic factor is coordinate with the factor of habit, and no general rule can be given as to which one governs conduct: the results depend upon the relative strength of the two factors. Thus, when a moderately well-established habit becomes only slightly unpleasant, we generally continue the habit; if it becomes fairly unpleasant, we stop it. Habits of a generalized type, such as honesty, loyalty, or devotion to an ideal, are often strong enough that men will die or endure torture for them. Pleasure and displeasure apply to generalized habits as well as to particular ones: social disapproval, which is unpleasant, often changes even those generalized habits which constitute character.

The view here expressed is, we stated before, sufficiently far removed from psychological hedonism that it is not offered as an interpretation of that doctrine. It clearly abandons much of what psychological hedonists have claimed in the past; on the other hand, there is at least a residue of psychological hedonism in it. Whether this residue is enough to serve as a basis for ethical hedonism is something that must be considered elsewhere.

University of Akron.

KANT'S THEORY OF TIME

LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN

I

THE most common interpretation of Kant's theory of time (that of Kemp Smith, Paton, Vaihinger) has suffered a decisive setback at the hands of George Schrader who has demonstrated the impossibility of a psychologically necessary connection between space and time and the sensed manifold.¹ The objection to the standard interpretation is perhaps expressed most succinctly in this way: time cannot rest on individual conditions, since individuation requires space and time (as well as objects and categories). Therefore the convenient handle by which commentators have tried to grasp Kant's time theory, namely the dictum that "time is the form of internal sense," must itself be subjected to subtle interpretation; it can no longer be considered obvious enough to control interpretation.

Although Mr. Schrader states that "it is beyond the scope of [his] paper to examine Kant's argument in the *Analytic* that our empirical knowledge rests upon a priori knowledge of space and time," he does offer a hint as to how he would go about this: "[Kant] seeks to show that the categories are necessary in order to cognize events in one space and one time, and that all empirical judgments rest upon the assumption that space and time are unitary." This is undeniably the foundation of Kant's theory of time. It shows, however, a bias for the special manner of the objective deduction, where emphasis falls on the unity of consciousness as the basic premiss, instead of on the conditions of representations in general, which is how the basic premiss is stated in the subjective deduction in the first edition. The two

¹ This journal, IV, pp. 507-536.

are equivalent, as Kant insists, but the formulation in the subjective deduction wears a bolder, more radical countenance, since it stresses what is less explicit in the objective deduction, that all the Analytic is derived from nothing more than the nature of a representation. For most purposes the two transcendental deductions are interchangeable, but for the theory of time we turn most profitably to that deduction which dwells more meticulously on the earliest stages, and elaborates the most primitive steps of the deduction of the categories. Accordingly we will now examine the subjective deduction in the first edition.

II

After a preliminary remark, Kant opens the subjective deduction with the following passage:

Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be represented as a manifold only in so far as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression upon another; for each representation, *in so far as it is contained in a single moment*, can never be anything but absolute unity (A 99).

This passage is making the extraordinary claim that manifoldness can, *by its very nature*, be grasped only as spread out in time. Most interpreters do not read the passage in this way. According to them² the reason why the manifold must be distinguished in temporal order is simply that time happens to be an independently necessary part of experience (established in the Aesthetic). But this interpretation overlooks Kant's immediate elaboration of the passage which does not mention time, does not refer to the Aesthetic, and is an absolutely self-sufficient argument:

In order that unity of intuition may arise out of this manifold (as is required in the representation of space), it must first be run through and held together. This act I name the synthesis of apprehension (A 99).

² For example, Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 244-45.

Kant begins by saying that a manifold can be represented as such only by distinguishing its temporal order, and he *grounds* this on the fact that, in general, a manifold can be intuited only by running through it and holding it together. In first expressing the synthesis of apprehension in terms of time-consciousness he was not imposing on it a modification from outside, since time has no existence apart from the synthesis.³ That the "running through and holding together" takes the form of distinguishing the *time* in the sequence of one impression upon another must mean that the argument for the necessity of a synthesis of apprehension is simultaneously an argument for the necessity of time-consciousness. It is this argument which we will now examine.

Why must a representation, "in so far as it is contained in a single moment, never be anything but absolute unity"? If a representation is not absolute unity it is differentiated in some respect. This "respect" can be considered as a dimension or a series of loci. A representation is something as it is known. Therefore a manifold, in order to be brought into a representation, must have a series in it which is known or knowable.

Now, a series cannot be known by something which includes the same series; a dimension cannot be grasped by something spread out in that same dimension, because understanding, knowing, grasping or awareness of a series must consist at least in part in the comparing or relating of the elements of the series or of the parts of the dimension, and comparison or relation is a kind of bringing together; but the bringing together cannot occur in the same series whose elements are being compared, since in that series the elements are distinct and separate by hypothesis.⁴ Hence, in that which does the comparing, there must be a different series wherein the comparison takes place, and ultimately some series must be compared in something which is not at all a series

³ "For without it [the synthesis of apprehension] we should never have a priori the representations either of space or of time" (A 99).

⁴ "Now, since every appearance contains a manifold, and since different perceptions therefore occur in the mind separately and singly, a combination of them, such as they cannot have in sense itself, is demanded" (A 120). "Perceptions" and "sense" must be interpreted with the cautions provided by Mr. Schrader, *op. cit.*

or an extension, in order to avoid an infinite regress. This last process is time-consciousness, as Kant indicates in our first quotation. Kant is saying that when a representation occurs, *a manifold is being grasped in a unitary awareness by means of time-consciousness*. This function of time is called the synthesis of apprehension.

Thus we behold time performing a synthesis of apprehension by representing a series in a unity! How is the trick carried off? Kant tells us first what form that "squashed" series takes: it is memory, described as a synthesis of reproduction in imagination.⁵ What we call memory is the grasping of the temporal spread in the temporal point. Next Kant tells us how memory is related to the remembered series: it is by virtue of concepts of objects, for an object serves to arrange instantaneous intuitions into a memory of a sequence of intuitions of the single enduring object, and conversely, the sequence of otherwise unrelated and therefore unrepresented events gains, through concepts of objects, relatedness in a momentary consciousness and, with it, representation.⁶

In summary, we see that consciousness requires manifoldness grasped in unity, and this is equivalent to time-consciousness, which is therefore the most general form of consciousness. We see also that manifoldness is represented in unity as memory. And we see finally that concepts of objects give to memory its reference to the remembered, and also give to the manifold a means of being grasped in a momentary memory. Therefore objects serve the cause of consciousness in general by making time-consciousness possible. So much Kant tells us explicitly.

What does this indicate about the nature of time? According to this theory, time may be artificially analysed into two elements, one emphasizing the manifold which is grasped in a "point," the other emphasizing the unextendedness of the "point." (1) The model for the first is memory, but a memory in which we ignore reference to pastness, presentness, and futureness, since these have special reference to the "point" consciousness which is doing the grasping, rather than referring to the grasped extension.

⁵ A 102.

⁶ A 103-104.

(2) The second is the element of past, present, and future. This relates especially to the momentariness of the knower.

Memory minus past, present and future might be called pure sequence, and since it comprises the series which is grasped in time-consciousness, may be called a sequence-series. The complex of past, present and future, referring to the momentariness of the consciousness grasping that series, does not constitute a series. It is best thought of as a perspective. In the complex of past, present and future, it is the present which contains existence. The pure sequence-series, on the other hand, lacks such distinction by definition. Yet it must refer in some way to existence since it stands for that which is grasped in consciousness. Therefore this pure sequence-series partakes to some extent of the quality of presentness in *each* of its members, an aspect of eternity in consciousness, and a possible mooring for the Ship of Induction.

III

There are several puzzling questions about time in the *Critique* which a sound interpretation may be expected to answer. How can time both be and have a manifold? Why should the categories necessarily be illustrated by organizations of time (remembering that time as the form of internal sense is an opaque description until analysed)? In what sense is time contingent and in what sense is time necessary? We shall indicate the answers that follow from our interpretation.

How can time both be and have a manifold? As all phenomenalist interpreters have recognized, a manifold is not an unorganized mass awaiting organization. Rather it is an abstraction from certain conditions of experience. The metaphysician might say that it represents the *possibility* of a given representation, lacking, but allowing for, the conditions that would make it actual (i.e., a representation). Seen in this way, as the product of analysis, various kinds of manifold may be found at various levels: for example, a chair considered apart from the perspectives an observer must have on it, is actually a very gross, superficial manifold, while itself an organization of many more

primitive manifolds. Time is the most basic manifold save one; it is the most basic manifold that remains a representation. It is this because it is manifoldness as it is represented in a unitary consciousness; everything else will be an organization of this, which means that this is an abstraction from every condition of representing an object, except those conditions which are required by representation itself. But since time is a representation, according to Kant, it too must organize a manifold. What is the manifold of time? If at last we abstract even the conditions necessary for a representation, we have left the pure sequence-series, which we will remember contains no past-present-future element, and which, in virtue of missing this element, stands for manifoldness in which the conditions for representation are ignored. In non-Kantian terms, then, it is the sequence-series which is the manifold of time: pure sequence is the closest we can come to a pure, basic manifold. It is not very close, unfortunately, since it is an abstraction that yearns violently in our imagination for its estranged brother, the past-present-future complex. But he who objects that sequence must necessarily be conceived in terms of past, present and future, is ignoring the fact that even in common usage, the objective locus of the individual consciousness must be sought somewhere outside the past-present-future complex. The concept of "now" does not distinguish our position in time, since there are any number of "now's" belonging to other people and to ourselves at different times. Our "now" has to be translated into some common co-ordinate, e.g., three o'clock, March 12th, 1954. It may be difficult to accept an objective sequence-series from which past, present, and future have been abstracted, but it is a kind of difficulty that will be encountered in any account of time.

Why are the categories expressed in terms of time? Obviously, if time is the condition of knowledge of manifoldness, containing synoptically the entire deduction of the categories, the relationship between time and categories is very close. But we must try to specify it exactly. Mr. Schrader has shown that the categories cannot be conceived as independently derived and then applied to foreign experience by way of the schematism. Kant himself frequently observed that, apart from the schemata, the

categories had no meaning. And, on the other hand, the schemata are not special organizations of time (as many commentators believe), but simply emphases on several different intrinsic aspects of time. Time is nothing more than the set of these organizations. If, then, the meaning of the categories is only to be found in the schemata, and the schemata are nothing more nor less than an analysis of time, we must conclude that the categories are simply the *names* of the aspects of time analysed. They are not themselves aspects of time or of conditions of consciousness, for then they would be identical with the schemata. The categories are solely the names of the schemata. Consequently, as Kant fully realized, by themselves their only significance is the structure of language which has resulted from the facts that they name; alone they are merely grammatical rules.

What is contingent and what necessary in time? As Mr. Schrader says, time is a contingent necessity. It is a necessary presupposition of any knowledge of manifoldness; it can be deduced from the existence of this knowledge (and is so deduced in the *Critique*). Therefore it is contingent in just the way that consciousness is contingent. There need not have been any time if there were no consciousness, or rather no possibility of consciousness, i.e., no existence.⁷ Both are brute facts but necessarily interconnected. This, however, is not the only surdness in time, according to our interpretation. For time is an intuition. If we start our analysis from unanalysed experience, which is the only way we can begin, our initial datum, with regard to time, will be the acquaintance with it, and what we will notice first in this acquaintance is the subjective feeling resulting from it. It may be a compound of associations regarding perishing, an impatience of duration, an anxiety about vanishing opportu-

⁷ This must be qualified. If our interpretation is correct, there are several ways of looking at time. According to one of them, time expresses the conditions of a knowledge of manifoldness. Whether or not the knowledge exists, time continues to express the conditions. Even if nothing exists, time can still signify the conditions of a knowledge of manifoldness—in the absence of manifoldness. I am inclined to believe that this is what the common man means by "time."

nity, a feeling of the unalterability of the past and the uncertainty of the future, together with the unavoidable, unconsciously lurking metaphors of the endless line and the relentless river. All these, compounded in the mortar of the non-conceptual part of our mind, constitute a unique feeling which will be, as are all feelings *qua* feelings, utterly brute and undeducible. This feeling will be the most general feeling in experience since it corresponds to manifoldness which is the most general fact. Therefore, in so far as time is deducible from the premiss of experience, it represents the ultimate and arbitrary fact of the *existence* of experience, while the feeling content of its intuition represents the most general and pervasive, ultimate and arbitrary fact in the *content* of experience.

IV

The theory of time we have found in Kant has several remarkable virtues. It indicates a possible solution of the problem of induction, suggests an answer to John McTaggart's "refutation" of time, revises Emile Meyerson's description of the necessary elimination of time in science, and demonstrates a possible definition of metaphysics. We have already hinted that induction might be grounded on the eternal "presentness" of the sequence-series, and in any case, causality, which Kant shows to be implied in objects, is therefore intrinsic to time. The usefulness of the theory of time in the other problems will be only briefly indicated.

McTaggart's criticism of the concept of time. At least one of McTaggart's two main arguments against the significance of the concept of time depends on the assertion that what we have called the past-present-future complex and what he calls the "A-Series" is contradictory, because what is (at one time) present is also (at another time) past, etc. According to the theory we have developed, the complex of past, present and future do not form a series but is expressed best as a perspective, a fact which the plain man would recognize in the assertion that any past event is just as past as any other past event. Past, present and future

are an emphasis on the unity of the consciousness comprehending the manifold; which is to say that they emphasize relativity to the knower. Time, considered as purely objective—as the manifold which is grasped, in short, as the time in which the percipient is *located*—is the bare sequence-series, which, lacking distinction of past, present, and future, is immune to McTaggart's argument.

Meyerson's account of the "burial" of time. Emile Meyerson argues that science, whose *raison d'être* consists in its having something temporal to explain, is paradoxically forced to proceed by detemporalizing as much as it can. Now, science seeks objectivity, and according to the theory of time here presented, would therefore try to eliminate only the past-present-future complex (which expresses relativity to the knower), without however, trying to destroy the sequence-series, which would indeed be to bite the hand that feeds it. Our interpretation of Kant's theory has the double virtue of giving some reason for the mysterious "de-temporalizing" tendency admirably documented by Meyerson, while at the same time erasing the paradox attributed to it.

Definition of Metaphysics. Let us assume that the problem of time is a metaphysical problem. We should expect that the nature of a science will be revealed in the nature of its problems and the nature of its solutions. Let us see what the proposed solution to the problem of time suggests about the nature of metaphysics. We know time intuitively (George Schrader says that in the Aesthetic time is described as given). We also know time conceptually (the Analytic is, as we have shown, a demonstration of the properties of time derived from the fact of consciousness). What we know about time conceptually are generalities; when we intuit time, it is not less general. Time can be considered an intuition of a generality. Is there any reason to believe that metaphysics deals exclusively with intuitable generalities? There are three possible types of question metaphysics might ask: (1) If metaphysics asked questions about concreta, about particular things, it would be indistinguishable

* *Identity and Reality* (London, 1908).

from empirical science. (2) If metaphysics asked questions about generalities known only conceptually, it would yield tautologic statements, the answers would be provided in the questions, and no addition to knowledge would result. (3) If, however, metaphysics asks questions about *generalities known intuitively*, or immediately, or by acquaintance, then its answers, though fully and necessarily determined by the subject of the inquiry, constitute an addition to knowledge. Tautology is escaped since one need not be conceptually aware of the generality being intuited; contingency is escaped because a generality fully determines its description. Necessity and non-triviality had long been the hallmarks of metaphysics before achieving their apotheosis as the "synthetic a priori."

Elkins Park, Pa.

KANT'S DIALECTIC

NATHAN ROTENSTREICH

IN the structure of Kant's system dialectic occupies a very important and clearly delineated part. Kant says that it persists in the three Critiques, and has a place in the context of each one of them. He did not, however, deal with the nature of dialectic in a precise fashion. This is due, at least to some extent, to the inadequacy of the formal and methodological tools which Kant had at his disposal. At times a clear discrepancy between the tools and the complexity of the problem was apparent, as will be shown in what follows. To inaugurate our discussion, I will offer a preliminary description of dialectic, a kind of coordinate in terms of which our discussion will proceed. It will be broader in content than that assumed by Kant. This methodological device must be employed in order to enable me to proceed in the attempted analysis of the view or views Kant actually held.

The main feature of any type of dialectic seems to be a drive for totalities or wholes, that is to say, a drive towards a synoptic view.¹ This might be realized in various forms, either in systems of thought or in systems embracing both thought and being. The well known formal features of dialectic, that is to say, the contradiction of concepts, is but an indication that the inner movement—as Hegel put it—of concepts in their development toward the establishment or manifestation of the whole takes place through and because of concepts.

A. TOTALITY

When Plato introduced the concept of *synopsis* he did not argue that systematization was the main goal of philosophy, and that therefore philosophy was tied up from the outset with a view which attempts to discover the community between concepts

¹ Cf. Richard McKeon, *Freedom and History*, p. 43.

and things (*koinonia*). The assumption Plato proceeded from was that the task of philosophy is to discover essences. The drive towards synopsis was for him a drive towards knowledge, and not, in the first place, a drive towards systematization. Or let us put this in a different form: the drive toward synopsis is the drive to know even a *single thing* and not, primarily, a drive to know the whole.

The whole is the precondition for knowing the single thing.

Knowledge of the whole is not, as Plato assumed, a precondition of the knowledge of any single item. Kant clearly distinguishes between knowledge and systematization, a distinction which is parallel to the distinction between "Verstand" and "Vernunft." For him the whole is a systematic idea or goal, and not a condition of knowledge. Instead of the idea of the whole, on the level of *knowledge*, the idea of the possibility of experience is introduced. The unity of knowledge proper is the unity within and, because of the unity of the possibility of experience, wherein all the concepts meet, and where all the concepts lead. The whole is replaced by the concept of the unity of experience. In Kant's own terms we may say that the whole ceases to be a constitutive idea of knowledge and becomes at most a regulative concept.

We may distinguish in Kant's presentation of the whole between two approaches, which point to different subject-matters and different interests of Kant's own presentation.

(a) The first—not in terms of Kant's own presentation, where it appears as the last—is the whole in its capacity as the Ideal of Pure Reason. The Ideal is supposed to be the substratum of every real and possible determination, and at the same time the totality of all these determinations. Totality as it is presented in Kant's concept of the ideal is but a transplantation of the nature of Spinoza's substance to the realm of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Hence we may say that the rise of the concept of totality as tied up with the concept of the Ideal of Pure Reason makes the traditional idea of substance represent totality.

² Clearly stated in *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 811; Kemp Smith's translation, p. 621.

(b) The second presentation of the concept of totality is to be found in the cosmological ideas where Kant clearly deals with the problem of regression from the conditioned things or facts to the totality of their conditions, or where he points to the drive to find an embracing totality of conditioned facts and their conditions. This is a *partial* presentation of the idea of totality. We do not here encounter an all embracing whole as in the case of the Ideal of Pure Reason. We deal only within the limited field of the idea of "world," with a totality of that world, as a totality where not only the given or possible—in the sense of "possible experience"—facts are dealt with but where the non-given conditions are also included in the universe of the "world." The totality in the Ideal of Pure Reason, being an all *embracing* totality, has the meaning of substance in Spinoza's sense; the totality within the realm of the cosmological ideas, because of its very partiality, has the meaning of a Sum of series. It can be attained by the methodological device of regression.

This difference between the total and the partial whole hints at a difference in terms of the logical position of the two wholes respectively. The total whole *qua* Ideal is supposed to preceed the parts. The parts, as determinations of the whole, are derivative only as each feature or each predicate is a derivative from the totality of predicates (*omnitudo realitatis*). This is not the case in the first two cosmological ideas. Here we start with the given events, with occurrences in time and space, and from here, by way of regression, we try to attain the totality. Totality might in this case be an outcome of a procedure; it is not an antecedent of every procedure.

These are the two concepts of totality within the *Critique of Pure Reason*. They may be thought of as pointing to the immanent meaning of "totality" within the system of Theoretical Reason. But the concept of system in Kant is not confined to the theoretical field; it points to a whole embracing all the three Critiques. Hence there is a partial system in the realm of theory and there is the total system including all the manifestations of Pure Reason. This totality was not dealt with by Kant in the same way as was the totality within the Theoretical Reason.

Kant assumed the embracing systematic totality of the three

Critiques as unproblematic from the dialectical point of view, and this possibly because of two reasons. In the first place he thought that in the concept of Primacy of Practical Reason he had a tool to bridge the difference between the theoretical and the practical fields, thus creating a dynamic unity between the fields and thereby a unity of system. And in the second place, Kant assumed that there are three cognitive faculties, Understanding, Judgment and Reason, and that a system was to be built out of manifestations of these faculties. The fact that the faculties are related to a common source provides the systematic unity between them. Hence the idea of the system as a totality of faculties expressed in the various activities and dealt with in the various consecutive Critiques—this idea was not considered to be problematic. To be sure, Kant sometimes cautiously spoke of his achievement not as a system but as a preliminary step towards one.³

It is sometimes said that the meaning of totality in Kant is in terms of reason only and not in terms of reality itself. This is correct only if we make the necessary qualification. What is correct in this statement is that the very search for totalities is not a feature of reality but is a feature inherent, according to Kant, in reason, because of its capacity to think comprehensively. But with this due qualification we have to say that the Ideal of Pure Reason is incompatible with the distinction between thought and reality. Because the Ideal connotes the all-embracing totality, it must comprise both thought and reality, just as Spinoza's substance comprises both thought and extension. Hence the very distinction between the two realms is here out of place. Secondly, the concept of totality is supposed to be a concept accounting for *reality*; yet the critical examination of it shows that it is only as a concept of reason that it does not cope with reality. Hence we may say that there is a movement in the employment of the

³ B 841, Kemp Smith, p. 659. The notion of soul has not been mentioned here, though it belongs in Kant's presentation of "Dialectic." This is due to the fact that soul does not connote a "whole" in the embracing sense of the word. To be sure within its own limits it can be considered as connoting a "whole" of the manifestations of the mind.

concept of totality in Kant. The ground for the introduction of the concept is inherent in reason. But the concept tries to be more than a concept of reason, and as an outcome of the critical examination is pushed back to reason. The concept of totality thus shows clearly the nature of Kant's dialectic: dialectic deals with concepts which cannot be realized and hence remain concepts only. Unrealized concepts are "ideas."

Dialectic appears where and when the problem of totality appears within the philosophical horizon. But according to Kant dialectic is not, and this is the decisive point, the *search* for totality. Dialectic is the *failure* of this search. Dialectic indicates the fact that the drive towards totality is not to be realized; dialectic represents the inner push of reason, but a push which cannot be materialized in the world or in valid knowledge of it. Kant takes for granted the proposition that philosophy is systematic, but he does not identify the effort at systematization with dialectic. Dialectic is a partial expression of systematization, and it occurs when philosophy pretends to make the totality, which is only an idea, into a world or God, i.e., when philosophy ceases to be philosophy proper and tries to be either the partial reality of the world or the total reality as the Ideal of Pure Reason.

The list of the consecutive steps which have bearing on Kant's reasoning on the nature of dialectic may be arranged in the following way:

1. Philosophy is an activity of reason.
2. Reason is systematic.
3. The system is expressed in the idea of totality.
4. Totality by its very nature tries to be more than an idea and to become reality.
5. But this overstepping of the realm of ideas is impossible because we started with reason and not with reality.
6. Dialectic is the outcome of this illegitimate overstepping.

Hence the substance of dialectic in Kant's sense is a *hypostasis* of concepts, while the *contradiction* between concepts is only a partial aspect of it.

B. HYPOSTASIS

It has been pointed out before that the rise of the idea of totality within the scope of reason is an outcome of the drive for system. The system gets materialized in objects and this feature of the movement of reason to objects creates dialectic. Dialectic in Kant mainly means the reification of ideas, or briefly, the trend of reason toward hypostatic assumptions.

That this is the main feature of dialectic can be shown easily in the fact that hypostatic entities appear in all the parts of dialectic. The turn of the idea of subject into the substance and soul is a hypostatic turn. The turn of the idea of the indefinite regression from conditioned things to their conditions, a regression which actually is only an indication of the perpetual process of knowledge, is again a hypostatic step. And in the last instance the turn of the idea of the totality of predicates into God is a hypostasis too. Hence Kant himself talks about "hyperbolic objects"⁴ to indicate the nature and the position of the objects in dialectic, which are actually no objects at all but hypostases of ideas.

What is strange and interesting in Kant's theory of dialectic is that he did not explain the inner driving force of this hypostasis characteristic of reason. He says. "But reason cannot think this systematic unity otherwise than by giving the idea of this unity an object; and since experience can never give an example of complete systematic unity, the object which we have to assign to the idea is not such as experience can ever supply."⁵ In terms of what has been said before we may say that the object is hyperbolic. Yet Kant did not put forward any ground for the main underlying assumption of this statement, that is to say, that reason cannot think this systematic unity otherwise than by making this unity into an object by hypostasising the unity. What Kant says is that reason is essentially *systematic*, but he does not prove that it therefore necessarily takes reason out of its boundaries and tries to make it into an external object.

⁴ *Prolegomena*, § 45.

⁵ B 709, Kemp Smith's translation, p. 556.

In his theory of reason Kant exhibits an interesting oscillation between two different views: the general assumption as to the essence of reason (*Vernunft*) is that reason connotes the power to make judgments autonomously, that is to say freely.⁶ Reason is identical with the very spontaneity of Mind. From this point of view reason does not have any other object but what it creates itself. On the other hand Kant starts with the assumption that reason is a theoretical activity, or at least, a partially theoretical activity. As a theoretical activity reason has to have what in modern, and scholastic, terms, has been called intentionality. Reason has to be intentionally concerned with something, and this feature of it manifests itself in the theoretical field as knowledge of an object.

Now, if these two features of reason are brought together, the dialectic of reason occurs. Within the limits of the finite understanding there is no way of showing that any object can be created by reason, that is to say there is no way of showing that reason *qua* full spontaneity of Mind is realized. Hence reason which may connote the feature of creation is outside the human scope. On the other hand, what reason intends to, because of its intentionality, is outside experience and hence reason proper does not have an object towards which its intrinsic intentionality could be directed. Hence it creates a pseudo-object; but this is a pseudo-creation only and hence the method is not one of real creation but of *Hypostasis*. It has an object, though only one created *ad hoc* for the sake of reason and from the sources of it.

As a matter of fact the hypostatic nature of reason is a double imitation. Reason within the human realm imitates God through only by creating pseudo-objects. Reason imitates *understanding* (*Verstand*) as well, by directing itself to objects, though again pseudo-objects, that is to say, created in and by reason itself. In the hyperbolic nature of the objects of reason both freedom and limitation of reason are brought to the fore. Reason even within the human-finite realm is more than understanding of objects,

⁶ *Der Streit der Fakultäten, Zweiter Abschnitt* (editio Kehrbach), p. 42.

since it attempts to create objects. Yet their creation is hypostatic only and leaves reason within the medium of "illusion."

We may throw some more light on the nature of the hypostatic turn of reason by taking advantage of a different set of terms. Concepts as explored in the *Analytic*, that is to say concepts as belonging to "Verstand," are functions directed towards the given data. In the realm of reason (*Vernunft*) an attempt is made to remove from the concepts their nature as functions and make their content stand alone, as it were. But the moment functions cease to be functions and are considered to be independent contents, they cease to be concepts only and become objects. Because concepts have to be functions but become independent of the function, they are supposed to exhibit their independence. This independence is presented as a creation of "hyperbolic objects." Let us take an example: the concept of cause is a function towards the understanding of the relation between events. Once this concept is removed from the realm of its functionality and cause is considered as a content on its own merits, it ceases to be a function and becomes realized in an object or as an object, for instance in God. The reification of the ideas is according to Kant the other side of the shield of the act which removes concepts from their functionality.

Within the scope of "Verstand," concepts are not reified, since they have a *legitimate* intentionality towards the given-sensible data. Once there is real intentionality, there is no reification. But where there is no real intentionality, objects are created in a hypostatic fashion in order to prevent the intentionality of reason from becoming void. Where there are given data, there is real intentionality. Where there is intentionality only and no data, data are created, that is to say, they cease to be data and become pseudo-objects *qua* hyperbolic objects.

"Vernunft," which is an interior capacity, turns out to be exterior. This is precisely what is called a hypostasis. This hypostasis might be summed up in three interrelated points:

- (a) What is only form turns out to be matter.
- (b) What is only immanent turns out to be transcendent.
- (c) What is only a function turns out to be a totality.

Yet all this shows *how* a hypostasis is accomplished and what is *wrong* with the hypostasis. But it does not show *why* a hypostasis occurs. To explain the starting point in reason from which a hypostasis proceeds, is not to explain why a hypostasis occurs. Kant did not explain what he considered to be the *natural* tendency of reason towards a hypostasis.

There is certainly a historical reason why Kant assumed that hypostasis is natural to Reason. The historical explanation is that he wanted to be both fair and critical towards traditional metaphysics. On the one hand Kant realizes that metaphysics exhibits a trend of reason toward hyperbolic objects, e.g. soul and God. On the other hand the hyperbolic nature of these objects is strongly upheld by Kant. Hence we may say that Kant assumed that the historical facts of traditional metaphysics prove that metaphysics is natural. To prove this he had to assume that reason by its very essence performs hypostatic reifications. Solomon Maimon in his criticism of Kant's theory of dialectic pointed out that the idea of totality is not a function of reason but a function of imagination, in order to indicate that reason as such cannot have this drive towards an assumption of the illusory.⁷

The fact that Kant is unable to prove the inner ground for hypostasis in reason throws light on his theory that the hypostases are natural. They are natural because they have been actually performed. Hence the whole notion of the hypostatic nature of dialectic is but a construct to explain the facts of the history of philosophy; it is not a feature and cannot be a feature of the systematic theory of reason. Kant exhibits in the field of Dialectic a kind of a *regressive method* similar to that used in the *Prolegomena*: the given fact for him that there are metaphysical systems which use concepts like soul, world and God. Now the Critique has shown that objects of this kind are beyond experience. The question still remains how to explain the fact that people thought and wrote about objects which, as has been shown, are hyperbolic. This is to be explained by the turn of reason toward hypostases. It seems thus—if our analysis is correct—

⁷ S. Maimon, *Versuch einer neuen Logik* (editio Engel), p. 197.

that the main feature of dialectic, that is to say, the trend towards reification of ideas, is neither a feature of "natural dialectic," nor the essence of reason as such. Constructed in order to explain historical facts, it is a feature of what we may call "historical dialectic." The turn towards hyperbolic objects has not been proved to be due to reason in its systematic essence. It has proved to be at most a feature of reason as it exhibited itself in the historical systems of philosophy.

We may put this qualification in a slightly different form: in order to prove that hypostases are natural to reason, Kant has to prove that dogmatism too is natural to reason. But Kant tries to show only that dogmatism is a stage in philosophical development and is not an inherent feature of philosophy as such. Kant deciphers dogmatism as bound up with hypostases, and as dogmatism is only historical, hypostases as well are bound to be only historical.

In one of his observations on the nature of Platonic dialectic, Hegel says that Plato's movement of thought is shown in a reflective way only*. That is to say, that Plato does not show that one concept leads necessarily to another. What he shows is that on reflection the relations prevailing between the various existent concepts can be explained. Applying Hegel's point to Kant, we must say that the trend of reason towards hypostases is a trend to be discovered on reflection by a spectator looking at the existing systems of traditional philosophy. The very assumption of these systems can be found in the movement of reason from its legitimate immanence to its illegitimate transcendence. This movement is *explicable* though it is *not permissible*. This though is shown from the outside and not from within, since it explains the sources of metaphysics *post factum* as an illusion of reason. It is not shown that reason by its own driving force and nature must be metaphysical. Thus in dialectic Kant shows at most—and this in defiance of his own program—that metaphysics is *explicable* but not that it is *natural* and hence necessary.

If it is true that the trend towards hypostasis is the main

* *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* (editio Bolland), p. 406.

feature in the dialectical nature of reason, then, in the light of our analysis, we say now that dialectic in general is a *possible* path of reason but not a *necessary* one. Dialectic *qua* hypostasis is possible only—this is but the other side of the shield—when dialectic in its systematic essence is related to the historical facts of philosophy. History of philosophy is in a way contingent—and not necessary as Hegel thought—and dialectic in Kant's sense as accounting for history, is therefore not a necessity.

C. ILLUSION

Hyperbolic objects are not real objects; real objects are given and not created. Hence hyperbolic objects are illusory. Kant introduces the nature of dialectic as "Logic of Illusion" from the point of view of the common-sense meaning. Yet there are two more precise point of view, a historic and a systematic one, which lead him to treat dialectic as Logic of Illusion.

The historic reason for this understanding of dialectic is certainly connected with the fact that both Plato and Aristotle considered sophistic to be a "dealing with what is not."⁹ The very fact that we deal with what is not, and this is what Aristotle tries to show, makes that what is not a quasi-existent, to which we attach properties. This is what we encounter in a hypostasis as well; ideas which do not point to realities are reified and hence "what is not" gets the value of "what is."

The systematic reason for the consideration of dialectic as the Logic of Illusion is to be found in the description given by Kant himself in his *Logic*. Kant's *Logic* is based on the fundamental distinction between forms of thought and thought which is related to data. This distinction underlies the content of Transcendental Logic as different from Formal Logic, though related to it by the bridge of the Metaphysical Deduction. Dialectic is based essentially on ignoring this distinction between the two parts of Logic. It immediately turns forms of thought which

⁹ *Metaphysics*, 1026b.

are mere forms into forms of true knowledge.¹⁰ Essentially a projection of mere forms into contents, dialectic is based on a misuse of the Analytic. Again, by making this distinction in terms of the two disciplines of Logic, Kant is able to explain what happens *when* dialectic occurs; he does not explain *why* it happens. Introducing Kant's own distinction we may say that both the theory of hypostasis and the theory of illusion are at most answers to the question "*quid facti*" of dialectic; they are not answers to the question "*quid iuris*" of dialectic, a question which must be answered.

To the historical reason for dialectic as "Logic of Illusion," another reason, which has both an historical and a systematic connotation has to be added. At least in one of the parts of dialectic (in the Antinomies which will be dealt with in some detail later on) we encounter an intrinsic problem as to the nature of dialectic. There are theses brought into prominence and there are antitheses as countervailing arguments against the theses. This formal feature of dialectic, at least in one of the parts, leads Kant to describe dialectic as the skill to argue at once for a statement and against it.¹¹ This has a sophistic sound, for the skill to argue pro and con used to be one of the subject matters of the sophistic curriculum. Hence dialectic as Logic of Illusions is "*ars sophistica, disputatoria*."¹²

The third reason for the identification of dialectic with Logic of Illusion brings to the fore the threefold nature of dialectic in Kant's theory, and leads to a threefold evaluation: In the first place we have to say that dialectic is understood in a scholastic way as "*ars disputatoria*," as bringing into prominence arguments pro and con. From this point of view dialectic does not have any central position in a philosophical system, not even one of indicating the critical part, over against the constructive-positive part of it. In the second place Kant relates dialectic to the constructive part of his system, that is to say, he relates it to the forms of thought which do have their validity within their legitimate boun-

¹⁰ I. Kant, *Logik*, Dritte Auflage (editio Meiner), p. 18.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 31.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 18.

daries. Dialectic is not only a skill; it is an illegitimate enlargement of legitimate forms. Here we have the description of the sources of dialectic as lying in the forms and manifestations of reason. In the third place Kant identifies the main structure of dialectic with the actual course of the history of philosophy, showing where in terms of concrete and defined contents this illegitimate enlargement occurred. At this point he actually does something more; he systematizes the given metaphysical subject-matters by describing their realms and by finding out their sources in the nature of reason, viz. in the three figures of the syllogism. Here again Kant assumes that, since he can describe the given metaphysical systems according to their subject-matters and show the relations of the subject-matters to the nature of reason, he actually shows that the illusions are necessary illusions.

It is clear that if dialectic were "ars disputatoria" only, Kant would not think it necessary though not valid. The evaluation of the illusions as unavoidable is an outcome of the elevation of the nature of dialectic to the level of illegitimate philosophic approach on the one hand, and an outcome of Kant's evaluation of the traditional systems of philosophy as actual embodiments of this illegitimate projection or enlargement of the Analytic on the other. Philosophers used to argue against sophists that they invented problems to discuss them. Hence sophistical reasonings were considered to be arbitrary. Kant explicitly says that the problems dealt with in dialectic are not arbitrary; that because they are not arbitrary they are natural, and that because they are natural they are necessary. Because Kant made the first decisive *identification of non-arbitrary with natural*, everything else followed.

Yet it is clear that Kant himself wrestled with the problem. "We therefore take the subjective necessity of a connection of our concepts . . . for an objective necessity in the determination of things in themselves."¹³ The fact that Kant stresses here the subjective necessity shows that he understands the nature of "subjective" necessity in a different sense from that related to Hume's

¹³ B 353, Kemp Smith, p. 299.

theory of subjective necessity in terms of causality. He wants to indicate another conception of subjectivity, related to the nature of reason as systematic thought. Kant shows the subjective necessity of systematic thought as connected with the nature of reason; he does not show the necessity that this systematic thought be realized as a world of illusion. We may sum up this point by saying: if there were hyperbolic objects, they can be understood, in terms of their sources in reason, as reified ideas. But before they are reified, there is no way of showing that they are necessary. Hence there is a Logic of Illusion once there are illusions, but there is no logic to show that illusions must be.

That there is no necessity for turning a subjective necessity into an objective one is clearly shown by Kant himself in his attempt to replace the traditional systems of metaphysics by regulative concepts. The fact that the theory of the regulative concepts is brought to the fore clearly shows that Kant cannot think hypostases and illusions to be natural and necessary, not even "subjectively" necessary. If they are natural and necessary, they cannot be confined to the legitimate boundaries of regulative concepts. The theory of the regulative concepts is based on the assumption that subjective necessity must be "subjective" only, and hence avoidable and certainly dispensable.

Yet here a decisive question as to the nature of Kant's dialectic in terms of its being a Logic of Illusions must be posed. What did Kant really consider to be necessary: the *contents* of soul, world, and God or the *reification* of these contents in paralogisms, cosmological ideas and the Ideal? If we cling to the doctrine of subjective necessity, then the only thing which can be shown to be necessary is the content of consciousness and not the reification of the content in the transcendent world populated by hyperbolic objects. But as a matter of fact Kant did not make this distinction between contents and their materialization in the form of hyperbolic objects. His premature identification of the contents with the objects had important repercussions in the very structure of Kant's system. Kant does not show why just these contents are the contents of reason in its drive towards systematization. He does not perform—to use his own terms—"a metaphysical deduction" of the contents of reason. This can

be shown in his ethical system, where he does not show for instance why the idea of happiness is a necessary ethical idea, which must henceforth be accounted for in the ethical system.

Kant oscillates between a radical conclusion of his own theory and a moderate one. But the oscillation is due not to inconclusiveness, but to the way he posed the question, that is to say, to the fact that he did not distinguish between the necessity of contents and the necessity of illusions. Contents are illusory only if they are reified, while as contents they are beyond a distinction between reality and illusion.

D. DIALECTICAL OPPOSITION

If we examine more closely the concept of illusion and its usage in Kant, we find a certain ambiguity. Generally speaking, the concept of illusion indicates the existence of hypostases, since hypostatic entities are but illusory entities. Hence the concept of illusion indicates the nature of an entity in terms of its status as a reality. Yet, on the other hand, Kant wants to indicate through the concept of illusion a different feature as well—the contradiction reason gets involved in.

The fact of a contradiction appears generally as an index of an illusion. Or to put it differently: the way reason is brought to realise that it is involved in a hypostasis is the contradiction it encounters. What Kant wants to point out is that hypostases are accompanied by contradictions, that is to say, that illusion in terms of reality creates an illusion in terms of the defiance of the logical principle of contradiction. This parallelism between the two points of view or the two meanings of illusion is from the architectonic angle the most interesting feature in Kant's theory of dialectic. But the very fact that reason is called to order, as it were, by contradictions indicates that Kant considered that reason has a mechanism of its own which prevents it from being deceived.¹⁴

¹⁴ *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (editio Meiner, 1929), p. 192.

Before proceeding to analyse the details of this theory, we have to ask first for the ground for assuming this parallelism, and for the nature of the self-controlling mechanism of reason. The starting point is certainly in the theory of hypostasis; for a hypostasis is an illegitimate overstepping of reason. In a hypostasis there is a contradiction already: we deal with reason as pure reason on the one hand, and yet with reason as reified in objects on the other. This double aspect of reason characteristic of a hypostasis is in itself—this we may infer—a contradiction. This fundamental contradiction creates all the other contradictions, listed in the antinomies of cosmological ideas and in the various parts of the three Critiques.

The underlying assumption which leads Kant to look at a hypostasis as a contradiction in the logical sense of the word is that reason and the reification of it are contradictories, since reason means *pure* reason and not the all-embracing reality which comprises reason and being as well. This is the main point in terms of the underlying logic of Kant's theory of dialectic and this is the real difference between Kant and Hegel. Once Hegel assumed that there was no contradiction between the nature of reason and reality, the entire outlook changed, and the contradiction ceased to be as, with Kant, an index of falsehood, and became instead a driving motive for the progress of knowledge in the development of Spirit. Hence we may sum up this first point by saying that Kant insists on the purity of reason and hence eliminates the possibility of reason as all-comprehensive. From this theory of reason it follows that logical contradiction defies reason.

The fact that reason itself has a self-controlling mechanism through which it becomes aware of the performed hypostasis lies again in the nature of reason. Since reason connotes purity, it connotes autonomy, as Kant explicitly says. Reason, because of its intrinsic autonomy, must have in itself the power which controls it and keeps it in its legitimate boundaries as *pure* reason. Now, the formal principles of thought, e.g. the forms of judgement, are considered to be well-established. They are manifestations of reason. Reason is controlled by these forms of itself. Hence we may say: reason is reminded by contradictions of its nature as *pure* reason. It is thus reminded of its purity when it tries to

abandon it. But Kant does not show why it tries to do that. The only way to explain this attempt of reason to cease to be pure and to become comprehensive is that Kant already envisaged *pure* reason to be less than *comprehensive* reason, that he thought that the only way to safeguard its purity was to make it all-comprehensive. But this is a Hegelian view and not a Kantian one.

Once we assume this supposed inner relationship between illusions as exhibiting hypostases and illusions as expressed in contradictions, we may find a point of departure for Kant's doctrine. We have then place to consider Kant's notion of the nature of the dialectical opposition. "I beg permission to entitle this kind of opposition dialectical . . . Thus of two dialectically opposed judgements both may be false."¹⁵ Kant explicitly distinguishes between dialectical opposition and a contradiction in the usual sense of the word, where the rejection of the one judgement as false establishes the truth of its contradictory.¹⁶

This distinction between an opposition and a contradiction is the underlying distinction of the first two cosmological ideas and the underlying ground for the rejection of both the theses and the antitheses as false. How did Kant transplant the formal distinction between opposition and contradiction to the field of the cosmological idea?

We may put the main answer in the following fashion:

(a) A contradiction takes place where there is a real disjunction, that is to say where there are only two possibilities: either *p* or non-*p*.

(b) In order to establish a real disjunction the range of the possibilities must be complete. Comprehensiveness of the range of possibilities is thus the precondition of the exhaustive disjunction.

These two considerations apply to the cosmological antinomies.

Kant thought that the underlying assumption of idea that the world is either finite or infinite in magnitude is that the world

¹⁵ B 532, Kemp Smith, p. 447.

¹⁶ B 531, Kemp Smith, p. 447.

exists in itself. This very question about the definite magnitude of the world closes the realm of the world. It makes us attain a station outside the progress of knowledge of experience. To decide about the definite magnitude of the world is to decide about something which can be decided only outside the world and not inside it. Hence—and this is what Kant wants eventually to convey—the very question is a pointless one. We perform here a hypostasis, since we make something which is open (experience progress and “nature”) into something which is closed, that is to say into “world.” Closing up experience is in itself illegitimate. It makes experience into a totality, and hence involves reason in an illusion, viz. in a dialectical opposition.

There is here a dialectical opposition because the range of the contradictory possibilities is not altogether meaningful. The trouble lies neither with the theses as such, nor with the antitheses as such, but with the underlying assumption that theses and antitheses are logically exhaustive. Kant holds that the idea of a range of possibilities is itself based on an illusion. Where there is no range of possibilities, there are no contradictions; where the range is hypostatic and hence illusory, the logical disjunction is illusory too, that is to say, a “dialectical opposition.”

Kant puts this idea in a different form when he says that dialectical opposition proper is based on a misunderstanding, on the common prejudice that appearances are things in themselves, and thus can be subjected to the idea of completeness. This misunderstanding which Kant terms an “amphiboly,” connotes a hypostasis in the sense that objects are made into hyperbolic objects, or “nature” is made into “world.” This misunderstanding reifies the totality in appearances or tries to make appearances into a totality. This again creates a dialectical opposition. That this misunderstanding underlies the first two cosmological antinomies can be shown in detail.

The first antinomy deals with the problems of a beginning in time. We deal here with existence in time, that is to say with existence within the scope of experience. And yet we ask a question about this existence which carries us at once into the field outside experience. The illusion is created because the object is immanent, while the question posed with regard to it is tran-

scendent. With regard to the second antinomy, we ask about the ultimate parts of the world, whether or not they are simple. Yet the question as to the ultimate parts cannot be legitimately asked with regard to appearances, since in nature we encounter *relations* and related terms and nowhere *ultimate parts*. Here again the substratum is experiential while the outlook pretends to be supra-experiential. This confusion creates the illusion manifested in the dialectical opposition which in itself is not a real contradiction but only illusory. The hypostasis present in the cosmological antinomies can be looked at in two ways: we may say that appearances are converted into things in themselves or else that things in themselves are made into appearances. Here again the logical source of the amphiboly is not explained. What is explained is the manifestation of this amphiboly, taken for granted to be a "natural" trend of reason.

When he refers to the *formal feature* of the first two antinomies, Kant speaks of a dialectical opposition. When he refers to the *nature of the object* of these antinomies, Kant introduces the term "mathematical antinomies." There is no justification for considering within the scope of the mathematical antinomies anything as first (beginning of the world) or as ultimate (the simple substance). The "mathematical antinomies" deal with a homogeneous series, "in such a series the regress was never thought as completed." "In the two mathematical-transcendental ideas the only object we have in mind is an object as appearance."¹⁷ We have to translate this emphasis on the homogeneous nature of the series encountered in the first two (mathematical) ideas into the language of Kant's theory of dialectic in general. It seems as if Kant asked himself the question, how it is possible that this illusion of the amphiboly, viz., of taking appearances as things in themselves and looking at the things in themselves as realized in appearances, occurs altogether. Why is it that we do not maintain the distinction between appearances and things in themselves, once we have made this distinction? The notion of the mathematical ideas related to a homogeneous

¹⁷ B 556, Kemp Smith, p. 462.

series is supposed to provide the answer to this question. Kant seems to think that since the series is homogeneous, there is a continuous transition from one member of the series to the next, from the last to the first (beginning of the world) and from the simple to the complex (in the theory of the composition of the substance). Since there is this continuity of transition it looks as if there would be no block in the process of transition. It looks as if it would be possible to reach within the process and through it to the thing in itself. The homogeneity of the series is the fertile soil for illusions. There is no sign showing that there is a leap performed from one realm to another. Hence the nature of the series is the basis for the illusion. The series as such is legitimate but the extension of the series beyond its proper boundaries is illegitimate. With this the distinction between the indefinite and the infinite is related, since we may continue with the series *ad indefinitum* but this does not mean that we reach the infinite by that process.¹⁸ The nature of appearances allows their realm to be extended, but does not abolish the distinction between appearances and things in themselves.

Since we are within the scope of appearances, we must not ask questions which refer to things in themselves. Because the very posing of these questions is amphibolic, the answers provided are opposed one to another in a dialectical way, that is to say, they are illusory.

This can be shown by introducing another pair of concepts. In the mathematical antinomies there is no clear-cut demarcation left for the delineation of "Verstand" as over against "Vernunft." Since the series is homogeneous, there is no indication within the series itself where one realm comes to an end and the other begins. The fact that not only the distinction between appearances and things in themselves, but *pari passu* the distinction between "Verstand" and "Vernunft" is abolished, is the full index of the entirely illusory nature of the opposition in the mathematical antinomies and of the nature of the dialectical opposition characteristic of them. The *Critique of Pure Reason* is in a way generated out of

¹⁸ B 551, Kemp Smith, p. 459.

the consideration of the first two cosmological ideas, because here we encounter the actual manifestation of the confusion within Pure Reason, that is to say of the confusion between "Verstand" and "Vernunft."

The only proper way, Kant thinks, of distinguishing between the realms in terms of the mathematical antinomies is by showing their dialectical opposition. Both the theses and the antitheses are false because there is no other way than that of showing that "Verstand" and "Vernunft" are distinguished in a clear cut way, viz. that the respective realms are different, not complementary. The very idea of complementarity is possible when the correlates are on different levels, coexistent, and not ordered in a series. Such a complementary, logical or architectonical pattern is lacking in the mathematical antinomies because the series is homogeneous. Hence the antinomies must be in dialectical opposition.

We may sum up the theory of the dialectical opposition in the following points:

(a) The totality reified in the scope of the first two cosmological ideas makes an open series into a closed totality.

(b) The open series is homogeneous. Hence in itself it does not allow a clear cut demarcation between appearances and things in themselves.

(c) The progression in the series from member to member is erroneously interpreted as a progress from appearances to things in themselves, from "Verstand" to "Vernunft."

(d) The entire field is one of amphiboly and as such in does not provide a sound logical ground for a real, that is to say a meaningful logical disjunction.

(e) Where the range is illusory, the quasi-disjunctive judgments are dialectical, that is to say both are false. A meaningless range of possibilities provides for meaningless disjunctive judgments. The falsehood of the two judgments is the manifestation of their intrinsic nature as meaningless. Or to put it positively: Kant assumes that real contradiction takes place where the range of the contradictory judgments is meaningful. Where the range is meaningful the law of contradiction is applicable, that is to say, when A is false, non-A is true and vice versa.

Now this theory raises some logical problems. When formal distinctions are to be applied, they must be related to distinctions in terms of content. This assumes that there is a real range of possibilities before us. The second assumption is that lack of meaning is logically presupposed by a dialectical opposition. Illusion in terms of content creates an illusion in terms of the logical relation between the two judgments, thus creating the illusion in factual statements. In short, the drive toward totality creates hypostases; the hypostases of the series present in the first two antinomies, create dialectical oppositions.

E. THE ANTINOMY BETWEEN VERSTAND AND VERNUNFT

Kant leaves no doubt as to extent of the dialectical opposition: "the psychological and theological ideas contain no antinomy, and involve no contradiction."¹⁹ But within the scope of the antinomies itself, Kant distinguishes between two classes, the class of mathematical antinomies and the class of dynamic antinomies. The second class, though technically listed among antinomies, actually belongs, in terms of structure and content, to the psychological and theological ideas where there is no room for antinomy at all. The third antinomy deals with causality versus freedom, while the fourth antinomy deals with an absolute necessary being versus the denial of an absolute being. Essentially the two antinomies belong together.

These dynamical antinomies are connected with the synthesis of the heterogeneous. "... in a dynamical series of sensible conditions, a heterogeneous condition, not itself a part of the series, but purely intelligible, and as such outside the series can be allowed."²⁰

Once we deny the existence of a free agent, independent of the chain of causes and effects, there is no logical ground for assuming the existence of a necessary being, the necessity of

¹⁹ B 701, Kemp Smith, p. 552.

²⁰ B 559, Kemp Smith, p. 463.

which is essentially independent of and prior to the causal chain.

The possibility of introducing the concept of heterogeneity into the scope of the analysis is due to the meaning of the concept of causality. Causality connotes an order, involving a difference in status between the cause and the effect. Once a difference in order and status has been admitted, there disappears that sheer homogeneity which was characteristic of the time series or of the continuity of composition, viz. of the first two antinomies. The introduction of a difference in order is the introduction of the aspect of heterogeneity into the series of events. The very fact that differences are introduced provides at least the possibility of asking whether or not there may be a first link in the series of the different links. The theses in the third and fourth antinomies do assume that to be first in terms of starting an action (freedom) and in terms of independence (necessity) is a special case of being different in status in terms of the causal chain. There is no possibility of interpreting the difference in status as a starting point for a separation of a link from the chain, in spite of the difference between it and the rest of the chain. Heterogeneity, though characteristic of the chain, cannot be interpreted as allowing a passing outside of the chain and the assumption of an agent which is free and necessary. In the first two antinomies there is a confusion between the immanent and the transcendent, while in the second two antinomies there is an inner guiding principle which leads us to retain the difference between the immanent and the transcendent. Homogeneity creates the logical possibility of an optical delusion that the immanent is transcendent; heterogeneity creates the logical possibility of avoiding this confusion.

Heterogeneity is the logical ground for the division of the entire field into two realms. What is stated in the theses may be true with reference to the things in themselves, while what is stated in the antitheses may be true with regard to the appearances. Heterogeneity provides the ground for the introduction of the concept of distinction and division not only in terms of status (cause versus effect), but in terms of two different realms as well. Here a new logical possibility arises. The third and the fourth antinomies do not present a case of dialectical opposition where

both theses and antitheses are false, because they are not based on an illusory rejection of the distinction between appearances and things in themselves. Hence the logical possibility that both the theses and the antitheses are true arises: because there are different objects, different statements can be made about them. Since the difference is not in content only, like a difference between chairs and tables, but a difference in the ontological status (phenomena-things in themselves) as well, there might even be a contradictory difference between statements referring to the respective ontological realms. Appearances have to be bound together in a causal chain; but in the realm of the thing in itself a free agent can be assumed.

Why do we divide the field into two fields altogether, or why are we driven to make this division? Here again we find in Kant an interesting confusion between an historical approach and the "essentialist" one. Kant starts with the acknowledgement of the given facts that two metaphysical views are opposed, one assuming determinism and one assuming a free agent. He turns this given fact into an essential antinomy of Reason. But once the essentiality of the antinomy is assumed Kant checks himself by the main principle he assumes, to the effect that there is no real antithetic of Pure Reason.²¹ Hence Kant is forced to suppose that the given antithetic in the metaphysical systems is merely apparent and not real. This is shown by relating the antithetic statements to different realms.

In the first two antinomies the two antithetic statements were considered to be apparent only (illusory) because the entire question was thought to be based on an illusion. In the second two antinomies antithetic is thought to be apparent because the question is taken to be real and has to be solved by the logical device of a distinction into two different realms. There the antithetic was removed by abolishing the question, here the antithetic is removed by a distinction. There the solution of the antithetic turned out to be an *elucidation* of the illusion, here the solution depends on a *recognition* of a fact.

²¹ B 771, Kemp Smith, p. 596.

These solutions were possible because Kant made two assumptions. The first was that the principle of contradiction is not only a principle to be applied in the realm of "Verstand," but also in the realm of "Vernunft." Why did Kant assume this? We may suggest that Kant held the view that logical principles are not principles of understanding (Verstand) only, though dealt with in the *Analytic*. He thought logical principles were forms of pure thought, and being pure that they were manifestations of the Pure Reason. Reason cannot be antithetic for him because the principle of contradiction itself is a principle of reason and as such does not master only what is outside or below Pure Reason, but Pure Reason itself as well. Kant supposed reason to be reflexive in its nature: the principles of reason apply to reason itself.

The second assumption of Kant is: No contradiction (real antithetic) exists between "Verstand" and "Vernunft," that is to say between propositions holding good of appearances and those applying to things in themselves, because "Verstand" in itself is a part of "Vernunft."

Kant has a double notion of "Vernunft": on the one hand "Vernunft" is the totality of capacities for freedom, including the capacity to think spontaneously. On the other hand Kant has a narrow notion of Vernunft, as the knowledge of principles, or the systematizing factor.²² There is certainly an inner relation between these two notions, since the capacity to think freely manifests itself in systematization though not exclusively so. What is called "Verstand" is the capacity of functions to order the sensible data; it is a manifestation of the spontaneity of Mind as well, and as such it is a partial manifestation of "Vernunft." This being the relation between Verstand and Vernunft, a relation between a part and a whole, Kant assumes that there cannot be a real contradiction between "Verstand" and its principles, and "Vernunft" and its ideas. When he encounters a contradiction he removes it by stating simply that "Verstand" is not "Vernunft" and appearances are not things in themselves. Hence what is correct with respect to "Verstand"

²² B 356, Kemp Smith, p. 301.

and appearances is not correct with respect to "Vernunft" and things in themselves.

Kant assumes provisional contradictions only. Contradictions are assumed as provisional in Hegel as well, until they are united in the syntheses. But the contradictory propositions are with Kant on two different levels, on the level of appearances on the one hand, and on the level of things in themselves on the other. With Hegel the contradictory propositions are on the same level. The index of their being on the same level is to be found in Hegel in the fact they are one-sided and as such need a complementary. And in the second place; Hegel goes on to solve the contradiction by a synthesis in which the two one-sided propositions are absorbed. Kant, in contrast, solves the contradiction by distinguishing between two realms. Hence there is a *movement* of propositions in Hegel and a *coexistence* of propositions in Kant. Kant keeps the two views, that of "Verstand" and causality and that of "Vernunft" and freedom, as both valid. He looks, as Hegel would say, in a reflective way, that is to say as an outside observer, at the two views and allows for each of them.

Once Kant assumed that the contradictory views dissolve in terms of realms and that a difference in realms is one of levels, a change occurred in the understanding of the different faculties of reasoning. Plato too recognized the difference between two manifestations of reasoning, that of "*dianoia*" and that of "*nous*,"²³ the first being exhibited in the mathematical knowledge the second in philosophical-dialectical knowledge. The decisive point in Plato's doctrine, though, is that there is an inner driving force which leads "*dianoia*" or mathematical knowledge to go beyond itself to "*nous*" or dialectical knowledge, viz. the inner transition from hypotheses to what is beyond hypotheses. Hence the essence, or to put it more exactly, the nature of the validity of the dianoietic kind of knowledge carries this very knowledge to a higher level, viz. to dialectical knowledge. There is a positive reason which carries the lower stage of knowledge to the higher one.

²³ See: *Politeia*, 511, 533-534.

The main point in Kant's theory is that there is no inner ground of this sort. There are two kinds of grounds for the distinction between two levels of reasoning: the historical, viz., the attempt to provide a systematic explanation for the fact that metaphysical systems are given cultural facts, and a negative one: viz., since reason is essentially free, its freedom is shown by removing the restraining conditions imposed on it by the nature of the realm of experience. "We remove from the object of the idea the conditions which limit the concept provided by our understanding"; "They should be regarded only as analoga of real things, not as in themselves real things."²⁴ Since essentially *Verstand* and *Vernunft* are identical, we have only to free *Vernunft* from its restrictive conditions in terms of experiences and its data to attain *Vernunft*. It is not the *logical* incompleteness of the stage of *Verstand* which carries it to the stage of *Vernunft*, as in Plato's theory of the transition from *dianoia* to *nous*. It is the assumption of the *metaphysical* incompleteness of *Verstand*, in terms of its restricted freedom which carries *Verstand* to *Vernunft*, or which establishes the realm of *Vernunft* in terms of the ideas which populate it. Yet here we find a real dialectic which Kant did not consider: once freedom is restricted to the field of experience there is real content in *Verstand*, since according to Kant's own theory restriction and realization are bound together.²⁵ Once freedom is unrestricted, the real content is replaced by hyperbolic objects.

Even when Kant allows for coexistent contradictory statements, in the third and the fourth antinomies, he does not say that the statements relating to the realm of *Vernunft* are statements valid for real things. From the point of view of *Verstand*, the objects of the free agent and the necessary being are still hyperbolic. The only way to give them a status is to show that they have a regulative value. Hence even when Kant admits the distinction between appearances and things in themselves, he looks at things in themselves from the point of view of appearances and not vice versa. This again marks a difference between Kant's approach and that of Plato: Plato dealt with the dianotic knowledge from

²⁴ B 707, Kemp Smith, p. 552.

²⁵ B 178, Kemp Smith, p. 181.

the point of view of *nous* and hence tried to see in *dianoia* itself the bridge towards *nous*. Kant deals with Vernunft from the perspective of Verstand and hence considers Vernunft to be only Verstand freed from conditions restricting Verstand. The way Kant goes from Verstand to Vernunft has its bearing on the fact that Kant defines Vernunft negatively and does not point in Verstand itself to the starting point for the transition to Vernunft. Verstand deals with Vernunft, though Verstand is only a part of Vernunft.

This might be the real reason for Kant's reservation as to the status of the Critique as a propeudeutic only and not a system. A system would be achieved when Vernunft dealt with itself, since it is both subject matter and perspective. But Vernunft is, as a matter of fact, the *subject matter* of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. It is also the medium of the critique, since it is Vernunft which criticises itself. But the perspective from which the critique is carried through is the perspective of Verstand. Hence Kant's hesitation as to the status of his own doctrine. To establish a system of Vernunft from the perspective of Vernunft would be tantamount to having a divine intelligence.

Both for Plato and Hegel dialectic comes about because the lower stage of knowledge moves towards the higher one. For Kant dialectic is present for the opposite reason—because one stage does not move toward the next. Plato's and Hegel's dialectic—in spite of the many differences between them—indicate a movement of thought; Kant's dialectic points up a stationary equilibrium between two ways of thought.

This to-be-removed antinomy between Verstand and Vernunft is the only persistent feature in Kant's theory of dialectic cutting across all the three Critiques. The persistency can be shown both in terms of content and in terms of form. In terms of content, Kant stresses that the antinomy between natural necessity and freedom in the causality of events in the world arises not only in Theoretical Reason but in the realm of Practical Reason as well.²⁸ The problem of breaking the necessity of the causal chain arises

²⁸ *Critique of Practical Reason*, tr. by Lewis Beck, p. 219.

as a problem in the *Critique of Judgment* as well, and is formulated as the problem of the relations with and possible compatibility between the causal and teleological outlooks. The fact that the antinomies reoccur in the various fields and are reformulated there is but an outcome of the main feature of the entire discussion, that is to say, that in the three Critiques we deal with heterogeneous data. Kant solves the problem implied in the antinomy between *Verstand* and *Vernunft* by taking advantage of the heterogeneous nature of the series, connecting the realm of appearances and noumena respectively with the distinct heterogeneous parts.

In connection with the antinomy of happiness and virtuous disposition, Kant again uses the distinction between what is absolutely false and what is conditionally false. Thus he allows for the acceptance of both sides of an antinomy, after the proper distinction has been made between the things in themselves and appearances. "The first of the two propositions, viz. the striving for happiness produces a ground for the virtuous disposition is absolutely false; the second, viz. that a virtuous disposition necessarily produces happiness, is not, however, necessarily false but false only in so far as this disposition is regarded as the form of causality in the world of senses. Consequently, it is false only if I assume existence in this world as the only mode of existence of a rational being, and therefore it is only conditionally false."²⁷ Kant sees the distinction between the absolute falsehood and the conditional one as connected with the possibility of dividing the universe into two realms. Where there is no such possibility, the antinomy leads to a dialectical opposition. Where such a possibility is granted because of the nature of the subject-matter we enter the path of a reconciliation between the two judgments which are contradictory *prima facie*. Kant sums up this permanent nature of his dialectic in the third Critique stating explicitly: "There are three kinds of Antinomies of pure Reason, which however, all agree in this that they compel us to give up the otherwise very natural hypothesis that objects of sense are things in themselves, and force us to regard them merely as

²⁷ Ibid., p. 218.

phenomena." ²⁸ In what follows Kant indicates again the didactic value of the entire theory of antinomies as a negative affirmation of the distinction underlying the whole idea of Critique; "without such antinomies Reason could never decide upon accepting a principle narrowing so much the field of its speculation." ²⁹ Yet it is clear that antinomies have this didactic value as a *memento* because the underlying assumption is that reason may not run in an inner conflict with itself. Reason must be rational, and rational means non-contradictory.

The fact that Kant used the concept of dialectic to indicate the nature and the status of the difference between phenomena and things in themselves did have a confusing effect. Neither in terms of Plato's description of dialectic nor in terms of Hegel's theory of dialectic is Kant's concept dialectic proper. Kant does not assume the "inner movement" of thought from one statement to another, from one level to another or from a one-sided proposition to its complementary one. When Kant talks about a double perspective, viz. about a double outlook on facts, as appearances and as things in themselves, the duality so significant for his theory of ethics as, e.g., the distinction between the empirical and the intelligible character, he talks rather in terms of Spinoza than in terms of what is traditionally and conventionally called dialectic. The consideration of things from a double point of view is clearly a part of Spinoza's theory: "Things are conceived by us in two ways: either as existing in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in God and following from the necessity of the divine nature." ³⁰ "For although each particular thing be conditioned by another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from eternal necessity of God's nature." ³¹ It goes without saying that there is a clear difference between Kant and Spinoza in terms of actual content: the second way of looking at phenomena in Kant is connected with freedom, while in Spinoza it is connected

²⁸ *Kant's Critique of Judgment*, tr. by J. H. Bernard, p. 239.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ethics*, 5, Prop. 29.

³¹ *Ethics*, 2, Prop. 45.

with necessity. But what we are considering here is not the body of the two systems, but their methods. Both Spinoza and Kant look at things from two points of view, or in terms of two series of causality, the narrow one limited to appearances and the other connected with things in themselves. Furthermore, for both Spinoza and Kant the transition from one outlook to the other one is connected with the idea of totality. To look at things *sub specie aeternitatis* is—with Spinoza—to look at them in a total context. To look at things in their connection with things in themselves—with Kant—is again to look at them in their totality.

Thus we may sum up the analysis of the notion of antinomy between *Verstand* and *Vernunft*. The contradiction between *Verstand* and *Vernunft* is a contradiction if and only if there is no distinction between the two. The distinction is one of levels. Statements which apply to *Verstand* differ from those which apply to *Vernunft*; what is called an antinomy is but a starting point for establishing their level.

Dialectic can be considered to be natural because the trend towards totality and the trend toward a reification of totality are both natural. The trend to reify creates the "natural" antinomy of the first two cosmological ideas. But this natural antinomy is a "dialectical opposition" only. The antinomy between *Verstand* and *Vernunft* is natural *prima facie* only, since on second thought it is removed by distinguishing the two realms. Hence what follows from this is that only the illusory statements are natural: statements which can be freed from their antinomy are not "natural." Natural antinomies are to be removed by throwing light on them as based on an illusion. *Prima facie* antinomies between *Verstand* and *Vernunft* are to be removed by showing that they are not antinomies at all. In both cases antinomies are not the last but the first word of the analysis.

The two last antinomies offer a transitional link between antinomies in general and the psychological and theological ideas. Both in the field of rational psychology and theology there are no antinomies. But we realize now that the antinomy in the two last cosmological ideas are only *prima facie*. Further, in them we find an indication of the antinomy between *Verstand* and *Vernunft*. Hence these two antinomies lead to the feature to be encountered

in all the three Critiques, viz. dialectic *qua* to-be-removed antinomy between *Verstand* and *Vernunft*.

The difference between the two classes of antinomies can be thus summed up in the following paradoxical way: the antinomies are real, that is to say there is no bridge between the two sets of antithetic statements, where the entire range is illusory. The antinomies are provisional where there is a possibility of maintaining two antithetic sets of statements, and connecting each with a distinct realm of objects and with a distinct medium: things in themselves and *Vernunft* on the one hand, appearances and *Verstand* on the other.

F. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE STRUCTURE OF DIALECTIC

Kant's dialectic requires a distinction between three layers:

- (a) Dialectic in terms of the validity of the concepts—called the Logic of Illusion.
- (b) Dialectic in terms of its main trend—the drive for totality.
- (c) Dialectic in terms of its formal structure, comprising the notion of the antinomies in general and the notion of the antinomy between *Verstand* and *Vernunft* in particular.

The link between these three layers of dialectic may be stated somehow as follows: the trend toward totality turns out to be a trend to reify totalities in the domain of appearances. This reification creates the antinomy of dialectical opposition. This antinomy is an illusion because the reification giving rise to it is an illusory realization only. On the other hand, as long as we stick to the notion of totality as expressing the systematic trend of reason but restrain from realizing this notion in the scope of appearances there is a provisional antinomy between *Verstand* and *Vernunft*. Yet this antinomy, because it is not related to an illusory realization, is at once an antinomy and a solution of it. The starting point is in the distinction between *Verstand* and *Vernunft*, and the outcome is a re-emphasis on this distinction.

Within the scope of the distinction between *Verstand* and

Vernunft there is no room for dialectic as a Logic of Illusion. The Logic of Illusion is replaced by what may be called the Logic of Regulative Principles of Knowledge, where pseudo-entities are guiding principles of knowledge in its continuing progress. Thus reified totality gives rise to the Logic of Illusion, while non-reified totality (that is to say totality as an idea only and not as an entity) creates the Logic of Regulative Principles.

Dialectic in Kant's sense comprises the Logic of Illusion and the Logic of Regulative Principles. The common ground for the two parts is the notion of totality. The search for totality in the Logic of Illusion involves reason in contradictions. The search for totality in the logic of Regulative Principles releases reason from contradictions.

Kant's theory of dialectic has no "inner movement of thought," and hence differs from both Plato's and Hegel's notion of dialectic. The inner movement of thought however appears in the Logic of the Regulative Principles of Knowledge. This Logic is but the theory of the continuous progress of knowledge toward a system. The very search for a system sets a goal for knowledge; the regulative principles guide knowledge in its pursuit of that goal. Hence the inner movement of thought appears when dialectic proper is abolished and replaced by the Logic of Regulative Principles. A movement of thought in Kant's sense is outside dialectic proper.

Hegel tried to attain a unity of dialectic, as at once marked by contradictions and as expressing Logic of Regulative Principles. He treated the contradictions as the driving force of the movement of thought and not, as Kant did, as an obstacle to that movement. The dialectic in Hegel's sense absorbs what Kant thought to be outside dialectic altogether. Hence the different evaluation of the status of dialectic and contradictions within both systems.

The Hebrew University.

CRITICAL STUDIES

A GREAT SCOTIST STUDY

GEORGE LINDBECK

THIS book is a land-mark in the study of John Duns Scotus.¹ It makes him, for the first time, accessible to the ordinary serious student of the history of philosophy. Yet it does not necessarily make him intelligible. Most of the time Gilson deliberately refrains from the sort of interpretative work which marks the difference between sheer scholarship and genuine history—not to mention philosophy. In these respects, he has done better in the past. His studies of St. Augustine, St. Bonaventure, and of Thomism are better unified, more incisive and definitive than the present work;² and his books on *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* and *Being and Some Philosophers* show a talent for philosophical interpretation which, quite consciously, he has not indulged in this study of Scotus.

Yet we must stick with our original judgment; this is a study of quite extraordinary merits. In order to appreciate them properly, it is necessary to know something of the difficulties which confront the researcher in this field. I shall mention some of these, in order to provide the background against which Gilson's contribution should be evaluated. A discussion of this contribution will follow, after which I shall raise some questions regarding Gilson's historical methodology, and conclude with some suggestions about the kind of book about Duns Scotus which needs to be written next.

¹ Etienne Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot : Introduction à ses positions fondamentales* (Paris, J. Vrin, 1952).

² *Introduction à l'Etude de Saint Augustin* (Paris, 3^e éd., 1949). *La Philosophie de Saint Bonaventure* (Paris, 2^e éd., 1943). *Le Thomisme. Introduction au Système de Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 5^e éd., 1948).

I

There is perhaps no figure in the history of Western thought, except possibly Ockham, whose views are so consistently misrepresented as those of Duns Scotus. Most of those who pass for well-informed believe that he is the prince of voluntarists who held, in the words of Brand Blanshard, that "even in God the will is primary and that it manufactures truth and right in accordance with inexplicable impulse."³ For nearly fifty years now, every competent writer on Scotus has felt called upon to refute this baseless canard. It becomes quite tiresome to those who read the literature; and yet the myth lives on. Apparently the truths of Mingès⁴ will never catch up with the falsehoods of Bauer.⁵

What are the reasons for this, as well as for other equally erroneous interpretations?⁶ It is not because Scotus is never read. To be sure, the circle in which he is known at first hand is small, but within it a tremendous amount of work has been done. The Franciscans, a notably learned and diligent order, consider him and Bonaventure their two greatest thinkers, and from the very first they have kept his memory green. At the time of the Renaissance, the *Scotisti* were the most numerous of the philosophical sects in European universities; thus it was that the humanist hatred of the schoolmen bestowed on Scotus the invidious honor of having his name immortalized in the English word "dunce." Interest in him lapsed during the Enlightenment, as it did even in St. Thomas, but since the middle of the 19th century an increasing flow of books and articles have been devoted to him. A complete bibliography would rival the enormous one prepared for Aquinas. Harris' partial bibliography runs to 47 pages,^{*}

³ Brand Blanshard, "Current Strictures on Reason," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, XVIII, p. 356.

⁴ P. Mingès, *Der angeblich excessiv indeterministische Gottesbegriff des Duns Scotus* (Wien, 1906).

⁵ F. C. Bauer, *Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes* (Tuebingen, 1842).

⁶ C. R. S. Harris, *Duns Scotus* (Oxford, 1927).

and Grawjewski's, which lists the publications of the 1930's only, totals 52 pages.⁷

Yet, until the appearance of the present volume, it was difficult to suggest, even to those who are not limited to English, any place where one could find out about Duns Scotus.

In the last thirty years, some of the writings traditionally attributed to Scotus have been proved spurious, and this has rendered suspect a great many of the secondary works, including the one sizable general study in English, Harris' two-volume *Duns Scotus*. Authenticity is no longer a major problem, for although some lesser works are still in dispute, the main corpus is now firmly established. However, the condition of the available text (that of Wadding, Lyon, 1639; reprinted by Vivès in Paris, 1891-1895) leaves much to be desired; and the work of the Scotus Commission in Rome, which has just started to publish a critical text,⁸ will take decades to complete.

In a sense, however, these problems are mechanical. They have hindered but not prevented sound research on Duns Scotus. A factor of perhaps greater importance, which we shall have occasion to discuss more fully in connection with Gilson's book, is the loyalty (or, in some cases, hostility) felt towards Scotus as one of the authoritative teachers of the Franciscan order. Even when this has in no sense compromised scholarly integrity, it has meant that the questions asked have not always been of central importance for the understanding of Scotus himself. Are his views on this or that problem in agreement or disagreement with the teachings of the church? Is his philosophy better or worse than that of St. Thomas? Too often the question, "Is he right?" has preceded the questions, "What does he mean?" and "Why does he think this way?"

However, perhaps the greatest hindrance to better knowledge

⁷ M. J. Grawjewski, "Scotist Bibliography of the Last Decade, 1930-1939," *Franciscan Studies*, XXII, XXIII.

⁸ *Joannis Duns Scoti O. F. M. Opera Omnia*, ed. C. Balić, 2 Vol. (Civitas Vaticana, 1950). These two large volumes include the introduction to the critical text and the beginning (i.e., through I, d. 2) of the *Opus Oxoniense* (which in this edition is called the *Ordinatio*).

of John Duns Scotus is the intrinsic difficulty of his writings. In part this stems from the fact that the originals were mostly lecture manuscripts, or, in some cases, student notes assembled from several sources. Yet even his most finished work, *De Primo Principio*, is not easy reading, and this despite the fact that it is the only one of his works which has been completely rendered into English.⁹ The style is terse and rugged and, especially in too-literal translation, sometimes lapses into an almost Kantian complexity. Nor does his thought make any concessions to the reader. He was original. Probably no previous medieval thinker invented so many novel technical terms and theories. Even more important is his famous subtlety; or, as Gilson expresses it in a passage not included in this volume, his "precision." "The difficulty," Gilson goes on to say, "is to avoid losing oneself in these qualifications, and to find out which is the last one. If one does not know which one this is, one may be gravely mistaken about his thought even while expounding it correctly, and with the best of good will, but according to a text which expresses only one step in his thought and not his final point of view."¹⁰ This exactly defines what is probably the most painful aspect of studying Duns Scotus.

Gilson doubts that he has always avoided this peril,¹¹ but he has succeeded often enough to make Scotus far more accessible than ever before.

II

It should now be possible to understand why Gilson's book, despite its limitations as an interpretative study, is such a great boon to the student of Duns Scotus—is, indeed, precisely what Scotus research needs at the moment. He has accurately summarized the views of the Subtle Doctor on the major philo-

⁹ Evan Roche, *The De Primo Principio of John Duns Scotus. A Revised Text and Translation* (The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, 1949).

¹⁰ Gilson, "L'Objet de la Métaphysique selon Duns Scot," *Mediaeval Studies*, X, p. 21.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

sophical views of his day, outlined the arguments by which he supported them and, especially in the case of St. Thomas, indicated the opposing views which Scotus describes and undertakes to refute.

As Gilson is the first to admit, however, this book is not complete even as a summary. By no means all of the philosophical questions which Scotus takes up are dealt with; but the choice is judicious. Further, there has been a disproportionate reliance upon the first two books of the *Opus Oxoniense* (i.e., the Oxford commentaries on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard), because these can be read in the easily transportable Quarrachi edition. As a result, Gilson perhaps does not always choose for condensation the best available exposition of a given problem. However, all the definitely authentic works, except some of the minor *Collationes*, are referred to.

As could be expected, Gilson's summaries are often models of their kind. Time and again the reader is impressed by illuminating cross-references, and by the enormous simplification in the order and exposition of arguments which has been achieved, in these particular passages, with a minimum of controversial interpretation.

Although the fact is nowhere indicated, not all of this book is here published for the first time. Approximately one third of the total, including all of the first and second chapters and part of the third, has already appeared in various periodicals.¹²

The first chapter, more than a hundred difficult pages long, deals with "L'objet de la métaphysique." However similar it may sound, this topic has only the remotest connection with the contemporary question, "What, if anything, is metaphysics about?" Scotus is not concerned with the nature of evidence, nor of meaning. Rather, his problem could be described as one of consistency. Metaphysics had to be defined in such a way as to make it clear that 1) the human mind is capable of it, that

¹² "L'Objet de la Métaphysique selon Duns Scot," *Mediaeval Studies*, X, pp. 22-92; "L'existence de Dieu selon Duns Scot," *Mediaeval Studies*, XI, pp. 23-61; "Simplicité divine et les attributs divins selon Duns Scot," *Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, XVII, pp. 9-43.

2) common and univocal being is its object, that, therefore, 3) through it we can know more of God than through physics, and that 4) it nevertheless does not abolish the need for revelation.

The second and third chapters, dealing with the divine existence and nature, continue to develop these same ideas regarding the relationship of being to intellect and to the knowledge of God. In the fourth chapter, these fundamental themes are worked out in connection with the relationship of God and creatures.

The fifth chapter, on angels, is something of a grab-bag, but that is because Gilson is in large part following Scotus' own order of exposition. Scotus, like other medieval doctors, seized upon the problems raised by angelology as an occasion for expounding his views on time, space, movement and certain aspects of intellection.

The next three chapters, dealing with the human soul, the knowing process, and the will, are more unified because Gilson is influenced here again by Scotus' arrangement. Interpretation finally enters the picture with full force in the final chapter, in which Gilson's central problem is to define Scotus' relation, as a theologian, to philosophy and philosophers.

The whole work is equipped with admirable indices, covering both subjects and persons, and with an appendix containing biographical information, notes on spurious and authentic works, and indications of the best bibliographical sources (oddly enough, however, omitting Grajewski's).

III

When considering Gilson's interpretations we should remember that we have here primarily the raw materials of a portrait. Gilson disclaims any intention of providing general conclusions, and it is only in reference to certain special problems that he has done so.

Although these interpretations are frequently brilliant, they are, taken as a whole, disappointing. They must be considered so, even after allowances have been made for the fact that careful

and objective research on Duns Scotus simply is not far enough advanced to produce works like Gilson's on Augustine and Aquinas. Partly this is because of the polemical context within which Scotus research is being done. A second factor is, however, Gilson's historical methodology. We shall consider these two points in order.

As we have already mentioned, there is within the field of medieval scholarship perhaps no figure who is more controversial than Duns Scotus. The Franciscans, quite naturally, desired to show that he was not only fully orthodox, but that he also made significant and permanently valuable contributions to philosophical as well as theological thought. As Gilson says, some are scandalized by this. He mentions no names, for his book is studiously irenic, but the reader immediately thinks of what might be called "narrow" Thomists who find it difficult to admit that anyone can be good Catholic while adhering to a non-Thomistic philosophical position. There has been a tendency, now disappearing, to believe anything about Duns Scotus as long as it was unfavorable. He has been accused, of course, of voluntarism, but also of Kantianism¹³ and, most preposterous of all, Spinozism.¹⁴ (In fairness, it should be said that these legends have generally been started by non-Catholics whose fault has not been dislike of Duns Scotus, but rather that bane of modern scholarship, a misplaced desire for originality.)

There are two reactions to this. First, the conciliatory, which tries to show that really Aquinas and Scotus are in basic agreement.¹⁵ This, obviously, is dangerous to the understanding of both thinkers. More often, in simple self-defense, the Scotists have tended to orient their studies towards showing that, on this or that point, Duns Scotus is superior to Thomas Aquinas. Much of the best work now being published on Duns Scotus, and

¹³ O. Willman, *Geschichte des Idealismus* (Braunschweig, 1894), pp. 516 ff.

¹⁴ B. Hauréau, *Histoire de la Philosophie scholastique* (Paris, 1880), t. II, p. 224.

¹⁵ An example of this is the treatment of the argument for the existence of God in E. Bettoni, *L'ascesa a Dio in Duns Scot* (Milano, 1943).

the only substantial work in English, comes from the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure, New York; yet even here this tendency is present, and in an able book by Fr. Day on *Intuitive Cognition in the Later Scholastics*, this is really the major theme. Most of the other major questions being asked about the thought of Scotus are influenced, in selection or treatment, by this same outlook: univocity *versus* analogy of being;¹⁶ the use of the formal distinction in attributing predicates to God *versus* analogical attribution;¹⁷ metaphysical *versus* physical arguments for the existence of God.¹⁸

Another major theme in Scotus research is of a somewhat different sort, for it fringes on the question of orthodoxy: does Scotus have leanings towards theologism?

Gilson tries in this volume to remain above controversy, but in this he is not altogether successful. For one thing, he is a convinced, and sometimes belligerent Thomist, and so his efforts to be impartial, although on one level quite successful, often seem unnatural. More important, his emphases are inevitably influenced by the polemical context. Thus, in the interpretative passages of this book, he treats most extensively the first and last of the problems we have mentioned: univocity *versus* analogy (or, more colorfully, Scotist "essentialism" *versus* Thomistic "existentialism"), and theologism.

Questions such as these, which result from asking about Scotus' relationship to St. Thomas and to Roman Catholic orthodoxy, are important and interesting; but the reader who is neither Roman Catholic nor Thomist, may have other questions which he would prefer to have answered, and which may seem to him more central. What is the real meaning of the emphasis on the metaphysics of individuality, liberty and novelty in Scotus? What is his relationship to the beginnings of modern thought? To be

¹⁶ C. L. Schircel, *The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Philosophy of Duns Scotus* (Washington, 1942).

¹⁷ M. J. Grawjewski, *The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus* (Washington, 1944).

¹⁸ A. B. Wolter, *The Transcendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus* (St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1946).

sure, as we have already indicated, much of the material for answering these questions is provided or suggested by Gilson. Further, previous investigations, by Gilson himself as well as by others,¹⁹ have touched on these questions, but one would like to see them completed and discussed in the total context of Scotus' thought.

Not only will students whose interests differ from Gilson's wish he had written a different book; there is also serious question whether the topics he has chosen, or had imposed upon him by the current state of Scotus scholarship, are not misleading.

This is particularly clear in the case of theologism; here Gilson makes central in the study of Scotus the finding of Scotus' answer to a question which Scotus never asked himself. The question was posed by the Vatican Council in 1870, 562 years after the death of Scotus, when it declared that "God . . . may be certainly known by the light of the natural human reason."²⁰ Gilson performs a valuable and necessary service in showing that Scotus did not think in categories which make possible a clear-cut "yes" or "no" to this proposition; but, nevertheless, the length and character of his discussion distorts the total picture.

Turning now to the other major interpretative effort of Gilson, we note that he is at least partially aware of the distortion. He explicitly warns his readers against the "illusion of perspective" which might result from the constant comparisons with Aquinas, when, actually, Scotus' intellectual dialogue was primarily with Henry of Ghent, and only to a minor extent with St. Thomas.

However, this does not meet an even more basic objection. Is there adequate justification for using the now familiar "essentialism *versus* existentialism" motif in any primarily historical study of the middle ages?²¹ After all, the distinction was

¹⁹ For example, E. Gilson, *La Liberté chez Descartes et la Théologie* (Paris, 1913), pp. 128-49. J. Auer, *Die menschliche Willensfreiheit im Lehrsystem des Thomas von Aquin und Johannes Duns Scotus* (München, 1937). P. Vignaux, *Luther, Commentateur des Sentences* (Paris, 1935).

²⁰ P. Schaff, *The Creeds of Christendom* (New York, 1877), II, p. 240.

²¹ Wolter, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-70, has already raised this question, but in terms which are not altogether fortunate.

not part of the self-consciousness of the period. What Gilson considers the great metaphysical conflict of that day was one of which medieval thinkers were themselves largely unaware. Scotus does not consider his differences with St. Thomas as centering around the problem of existence, nor do 14th century thinkers describe him as the exponent of some subtle kind of "realism" ²² (which, while not the same as "essentialism," is the closest thing to it in medieval vocabulary, and, in the case of Duns Scotus according to Gilson, inextricably involved with it).

From what immediately precedes, it would appear that Gilson's choice of interpretative categories requires a justification which he does not give in the present volume. What is more, he does not seem to see the need. He denies that he has "a point of view," and repeatedly insists on the tentative and incomplete character of his conclusions. In short, he seems to think that an adequate historical method is guaranteed by a lack of conscious bias and an honest desire to be purely objective.

It is only charitable, and probably also accurate, to regard such surprising statements as his disclaimer of a point of view, as simply Gilson's way of saying that, as a conscientious historian, it is no part of his purpose to compose a Thomistic polemic against Scotus.

However, the fact is that this is precisely what he has done. In saying this, we neither impugn his scholarly integrity nor his brilliance as an historian. Indeed, it is precisely because he is a Thomistic controversialist, as well as an erudite and careful scholar, that his historical work is so interesting and, we may add, so illuminating.

It is from his Thomism that Gilson derives the basic hypothesis which, increasingly, he attempts to demonstrate in all his work. He finds evidence for it everywhere, as his two similar books, *L'Etre et l'Existence*, and *Being and Some Philosophers*, bear witness. This thesis, in the words of James Collins, is "that each philosopher takes his start from an originary [sic] intuition of being which dominates his entire outlook . . . There seem to be

²² P. Boehner, "Scotus' Teaching According to Ockham: II. On the *Natura Communis*," *Franciscan Studies*, VI, pp. 395-497.

a few persistent and characteristic ways of looking at that which is . . . Gilson is inclined to narrow the conflicts down to a fundamental one between Thomistic existential philosophy of being and the various degrees of de-existentialized metaphysics."²³ We might add that when other philosophies are measured by this Thomistic yard-stick, they are naturally found wanting. This is true even when Gilson studiously avoids any explicit evaluations, as in this volume.

We must conclude, then, that the justification for applying this interpretative category of "essentialism *versus* existentialism" to Duns Scotus is inseparable from the justification of the version of Thomism to which Gilson adheres. Yet even those who question Gilson's interpretations will find the descriptive—that is, the major—part of his book indispensable in formulating their own views as to the basic meaning of Scotism and of its significance in the history of philosophy.

IV

It is perhaps even more important in the case of Duns Scotus than for most thinkers to distinguish the levels of explicit and implicit meaning. Consciously, he is conservative; but in reality, revolutionary. His intention, in part, was to reassert the ancient traditions of Augustinianism against both Platonistic and Aristotelian innovators such as Henry of Ghent and Thomas Aquinas. Yet he ushered in a new era of thought. The conclusions for which he strove are often the same as those of the great thirteenth century systematizers, but he rejects their arguments. He could not think as did his predecessors, for the atmosphere he breathed was different and his thought was governed by new presuppositions. Yet, as is true of most original thinkers, he seemed not to have grasped the crucial features of the intellectual revolution to which he contributed.

Of great, perhaps decisive, importance in the creation of this

²³ J. Collins, "History in the Service of Metaphysics," this journal, II, p. 107.

new intellectual atmosphere were the logical developments of the period. Logical theory in the fourteenth century, we are now discovering, was superior to anything again achieved until the last hundred years.²⁴ On the side of practice, the ceaseless scholastic exercises in the *Organum* of Aristotle bore fruit in an increase in rigor and complexity, and in a greater inclination to settle metaphysical disputes by direct appeal to logical rules. Thus, to Scotus, it seems self-evident that the Thomistic analogy of being can be conclusively refuted by a simple reference to the law of identity.

Correlated with this, we find an emphasis on conceptual clarity and distinctness which, while not precisely Cartesian, nevertheless led to a rejection of the Aristotelian theory of matter and of potentiality on the grounds that a something which hovers uncertainly between being and non-being is self-contradictory. A further consequence of denying reality to what can be only vaguely conceived was to establish a one-to-one correspondance between reality and thought. Many distinctions which had heretofore been considered mere *ens rationis* were given a more solid ontological foundation through Scotus' theory of the formal distinction.

As a result, discourse about God became more literal—less symbolic and metaphorical—than it had been in traditional Augustinianism, or even in Thomism. This is a modern and imprecise way of saying that the Scotistic formal attribution of predicates to God allows for less use of the *via negativa* than did most of the earlier medieval ways of thinking about God.

It would seem, then, that such highly technical theories as the univocity of being and the formal distinction are associated with a profound change in the way of viewing divine being, and ultimately, therefore, reality itself. Scotus describes God as, first of all, *ens infinitum*; yet God, in his teaching, seems in some sense a being set over against other beings, rather than, as St. Thomas expresses it, that which "is in all things, and inner-

²⁴ P. Boehner, *Medieval Logic* (Chicago, 1952); J. T. Clark, "Conventional Logic and Modern Logic," *Proceedings of the Jesuit Philosophical Association*, 1951, pp. 11-96.

mostly." ²⁵ It is significant that Scotus does not call God *ipsum esse*, being itself, even though this name is used by both the Augustinian and Thomistic traditions, and is cited by St. Thomas as "the most proper name of God." ²⁶

This new outlook makes it easier to conceive God in personalistic terms. Doctrinally speaking, God is neither more nor less a person than for other orthodox medieval thinkers; but Scotus' thought adds emphasis to the personal elements by making them metaphysically more applicable.

Another result is a higher appreciation of individuality in general. This is one aspect of Scotus' thought which is widely known. Every student of philosophy learns to lisp *haecceitas* (a barbarism for which Scotus is only indirectly responsible). However, the question of its meaning is a complex one. The awareness and high evaluation of the separateness of things, which is reflected in Scotus' doctrine of individuation, is connected with the concern for conceptual clarity and distinctness to which we have already referred. Consequently, Scotus' stress on the uniqueness of things does not involve him in anti-intellectualist nominalism. On the contrary, he considered individuality a qualification of essence, and therefore, in principle, intelligible.

The change in thought and sensibility which we are trying to characterize expresses itself also in Duns Scotus' ethical theories. He focused attention on those elements in moral activity which are fully open to conscious inspection and are amenable to exact formulation. Thus, in order to preserve the freedom of the will, we find Scotus differentiating the activities of will and intellect more sharply than had ever been done before. He held, for instance, that the kind of relation between these two faculties which St. Thomas proposes concedes too much to determinism. Also, Scotus makes much less use than earlier thinkers of the equation "the good is that which perfects nature." He seems to find this too vague. Precision requires that the rationally demonstrable obligations be limited to the love of God; and that, furthermore, this love, in so

²⁵ *Summa Theologica* Ia, q. 8, a. 1, *resp.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 13, a. 11, *resp.*

far as it is purely rational and natural, be not defined in such a way as to exclude hate of neighbor. To be sure, Scotus insists that it is wrong to hate one's fellow men, but this commandment is a positive and contingent ordinance of God, not a rule of reason.

In this sketch, I have chosen to describe Scotus as a thinker who recast traditional materials in the interests of a new, and presumably partly unconscious, ideal of conceptual clarity. It would have been equally possible to stress his responsiveness to the obtrusive individuality of things, or his awareness of radical contingency and freedom. All three factors played essential roles in the formation of his thought. They functioned, not as principles of a deductive system, but as pervasive, often hidden, influences causing him to modify the arguments and ideas of his predecessors even while largely retaining them.

It seems to me, now that Gilson's book is available, that the next step in the understanding of John Duns Scotus is to define more fully and exactly the nature and the sources, both intellectual and cultural, of these subterranean factors. Only when this is done can we begin to speculate meaningfully on the significance of Scotus in the history of Western thought.

Yale University.

FEIBLEMAN'S ONTOLOGY

ISABEL STEARNS

ACCORDING to William Morton Wheeler, there were two extreme types of biologists, the naturalists who were the more extroverted and romantic, and the classicists or introverts, who were biologists in the strict sense. The former, who were intuitive and receptive, published copiously, though often without much sense of form or proportion; the latter, who were the more analytically minded, and tended toward form and control in their output which was of a much more intensive, compressed and ordered type of thought.¹

If one were to make, not altogether seriously, such a distinction between types of philosophers, there is no doubt that Professor Feibleman would in many ways fall into the first category. The present volume is impressive in its scope:² at one time or another it touches on practically every known field of philosophy, the sciences, the arts, theology, etc. Unfortunately, the development of this vast material is not adequate to the greatness of the themes. Mr. Feibleman has at times interesting, original and provocative ideas; but the reader must, as it were, mine through a mountain of lesser material in order to come upon these occasional nuggets of precious metal. Philosophical doctrines which are palpably inconsistent are eclectically thrown together; arbitrary statements are made; and at times there is an almost incredible over-simplification of problems and lack of subtlety in analysis. To point out the numerous inconsistencies would be a task almost too easy, and one can only regret that Mr. Feibleman did not for his own sake more carefully revise the book before publishing it, so as at least (if possible) to remove the most glaring of these.

The book's intention is to present a "finite ontology," a

¹ From his Presidential Address to the Boston Society of Natural History, April, 1931. Quoted in *The Practical Cogitator*, ed. Curtis and Greenslet.

² James Feibleman, *Ontology* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1953).

hypothetical system of axiological realism which shall at the same time be, in the author's words, an "ontological positivism."³ It is safe to say that this attempt to mediate between the demands of metaphysicians and those of positivistically-minded philosophers is not likely to satisfy the members of either group. By denying one of the assumed postulates of the positivists: that metaphysics is nonsense, and by adding another: that ontology is to be defined as consistency-rules between divergent sets of empirical data, Mr. Feibleman arrives (in the manner of the creation of non-Euclidean geometries) at a revised postulate-set, in accordance with which he intends to construct his "ontological positivism" or "finite ontology." But this operation remains a *tour de force*, since he never grapples with the basic difficulties inherent in any such transition of thought. Furthermore, his ontological system, when adumbrated, becomes a Platonic and even at times quasi-Hegelian structure⁴, which of all systems, one would think, would be the least compatible with his original starting-point. On the one hand, he acknowledges debts to Plato, Aristotle, Peirce (as has been said) and Whitehead; on the other, to Wittgenstein and Carnap; and the monistic bent of his ontology⁵ can be synthesized with a certain atomistic trend in his epistemology⁶ only by means

³ Here Mr. Feibleman refers to C. S. Peirce's conception of "propositivism" (p. 165). The influence of Peirce on the book is very marked. However, the author's conception of positivistic methodology is frequently much narrower than any to which Peirce would have subscribed.

⁴ Note, for example, his statement (p. 392) that it is "better for existence to participate in essence to as large an extent as possible . . . than to be poor and barren." Or consider his conception of the "dialectic" of the individual.

⁵ It is true that he says (p. 128) that ontology is "incurably pluralistic." His "primal postulate," however, is that of Unity (cf. pp. 134 and 190).

⁶ This is by no means its only trend. As I wish in this review to consider the writer's ontology rather than his epistemology, it is sufficient to say here that the latter combines certain behavioristic influences (cf. pp. 535-36), a sense-datum account of sense-experience (cf. p. 531), and a perspectival theory of knowledge which tends at times toward objective relativism. The main stress of his epistemology is, however, realistic, and often naively so.

The author begins his discussion of epistemology by talking of the "elements" of existence, namely, qualitative elements of value as the data

of a metaphysical view that the ideal oneness of being has somehow become fractured and fragmented, and that the isolated fragments of existence are now through "destiny" seeking once more to unite.⁷

At the outset, Mr. Feibleman accepts a division of all propositions into tautologies, and those which are empirical (at least conceivably so) and hence in some sense verifiable.⁸ Yet his own system stands or falls on the use of highly imaginative constructs, which often have a mythical, even poetic ring, such as destiny, *dike*, *moira*, *soteria*. He makes use of terms from the special sciences, for example, "fracture" or "cleavage," and "reverberation," in a very interesting way which intentionally transcends the special science from which the terms are originally obtained. How statements employing such constructs can be regarded as either tautologous or empirically verifiable in any usual sense of verifiability, Mr. Feibleman never adequately explains.⁹

of sense-perception, and relational elements of logic as the data of reasoning (p. 530); however at some points later (cf. p. 556), he becomes much less atomistic. The position given to epistemology itself varies at different points in the work.

⁷ Cf. his reference (p. 493) to the *epistrophe* of Plotinus.

⁸ See p. 169. However, tautological propositions must be erected upon verified empirical propositions, if they are to be allowed within the system provided by ontological positivism (*ibid.*). On p. 266 he takes the position that "the aim of empirical laws, even though never completely reached, is toward the condition of tautology." This assertion, of course, tends to modify his original distinction.

On p. 169 it is true that he refers also to "poetic propositions," to be later explained, but these, however, do not constitute a part of knowledge. On pp. 601 and 614 he introduces the conceptions of "axial propositions" and "axial languages." This should surely have been done much earlier. It offers a clue to a possible reconstruction of the book in which some of its difficulties might have been solved. Axial propositions, however, on p. 603, constitute a subdivision of tautologies. The question still remains whether statements of a metaphysical or even quasi-mythical order can be treated simply as tautologies. It seems clear to the reviewer that many of these as used by Mr. Feibleman are synthetic in nature. His position that "tautological propositions . . . are arrived at by setting up postulate-sets," etc., (pp. 169-70) will scarcely solve this difficulty.

⁹ So far as the author's definition of ontology in terms of "consistency-rules between divergent sets of empirical data" (p. 166) is concerned, how

One can suppose only that as the author came to develop his ontological system, it burst the original Procrustean bed of positivistic methodology, but there is no indication that he himself has ever realized this fact. In view of the daring nature of much of his own metaphysics, some of his strictures upon earlier metaphysicians appear surprisingly harsh.

Reality or Nature for Mr. Feibleman is subdivided into a universe of essence, a universe of existence, and a universe of destiny which in the manner of the Platonic Eros mediates between the other two.¹⁰ There is a certain analogy (incomplete, of course) between Mr. Feibleman's universes of essence and existence (the former of which is derived from an original unity of being) and Spinoza's *Natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, especially as regards the problem of passage from the one to the other.¹¹ Although the author somewhat deprecates Santayana's

is it possible to treat such metaphysical statements as those used by him simply in terms of consistency-rules?

With regard to the problem of the meaning of verifiability, he states (p. 170) that "verifiable propositions have an ontological status," and that "propositions are ontological if and only if they can have an empirical reference." On p. 435 verification is equated with correspondence testing by means of controlled, repeatable experiment. On p. 431 it is stated that science uses "the method of hypothesis, experiment and verification," and on p. 451 ontology is asserted to be "the highest science." One can only ask how the author's ontological structure as given could ever be rendered amenable to controlled experimental testing.

In the last part of the book, verification is interpreted in a wider pragmatic manner, as the interpretation and application of deductions from original postulates, a procedure which is not direct but mediated (cf. Kant's Schematism). In some way, "goodness of fit" between the theoretical and our concrete experience may be partially demonstrated through the action our postulates lead us to take (cf., e.g., p. 725).

In all the foregoing, the author's basic mistake lies in the attempt to make metaphysical meaningfulness dependent on verifiability.

¹⁰ Strictly speaking, the author's ontology may be taken as a system only with regard to its construction within the realm of essence. On p. 398 he states that only the universe of essence is to be understood as a complete system; the universe of existence is only partly systematic, and the universe of destiny is to be understood as an incomplete approach to the complete system from the largely incomplete. There is, however, a "logic of events" (p. 410), and it is probable "that nature is primarily deductive" (p. 435).

¹¹ Value and energy are equated with each other (p. 264) and on p. 229, value is spoken of as "the stuff of being." [Cf. Whitehead's *Science*

treatment of the realm of essence, his own treatment of the universes of Existence and Destiny is in many ways reminiscent of Santayana's "Realm of Matter,"¹² as he himself points out. The difficulties in Platonic, or even more, neo-Platonic, metaphysics are by now well known, and one cannot but ask for the source of the "ontological fault" in Being, according to which the "unity of Being as Value" is rendered multiply fracturable into a diversity of possibilities or lesser values.¹³ But this concept of the "ontological fault" (derived from geology) remains the surd in Mr. Feibleman's system, and the problem of the "original fall" is, perhaps understandably, never solved.¹⁴

On the plane of existence, the parallel problem is that of the nature of the individual. When speaking of the universe of existence, Mr. Feibleman refers to his ontology as one of "a field of interaction."¹⁵ The individual is defined as an intersection of certain essences at a given spatio-temporal locus.¹⁶ It would appear at times that it is the spatio-temporal locus which is the

and the Modern World, p. 238.] Value is subdivided into "election," which is dynamic, and "quality," which is static. But these two definitions of value in the last analysis are irreconcilable, and value cannot at one and the same time be equated with the whole, which is a possibility, and with energy-relations, which are dynamic. One is reminded of Spinoza's identification of logical implication with dynamic causation.

¹² P. 399.

¹³ Pp. 196 and 252.

¹⁴ See, e.g., his reference on p. 357 (when speaking of existence) to "the desperate efforts of the spatio-temporal manifold to untwist and straighten itself out." On p. 359, "the nature of existence is dependent on the fragments of the universe of essence, twisted about . . ." What is the cause of the twisting? Is this to be attributed to the rule of change (cf. pp. 408 and 424) or the "native disorder" of existence (p. 381).

On p. 233, universals are "the knives with which the ontological fault is cleaved." They are "possibilities of discrete value," and abstractions from value, but, whereas values are ineffable, universals are rational and relational. The author does not tell us how the cleavage takes place. It may be pointed out, however, that his difficulty results from the fact that on the one hand he wants to distinguish sharply between quality and relation; on the other, to treat these somehow as one.

¹⁵ P. 285.

¹⁶ Cf. pp. 291-92. On p. 295, the intersection of values and universals at a certain date and place causes their limitation and distortion.

source of individuation,¹⁷ since essence *qua* essence should be reduplicateable; but this, however, is not at all clear. The spatio-temporal itself must be retranslated into terms of energy, and it is rather the individual's "destiny-factor" or its function of movement toward an impossible perfection, its *privation* in an Aristotelian sense, which is in one sense, at least, the source of its individuality.¹⁸ In its historical career the individual carries out a dialectical course¹⁹ which is a motion along a path of conflicts from disorder toward order. In the last analysis, however, the individual remains no more than the aspiration of existence toward the ideal, which in one sense partially constitutes it, in another remains forever beyond it.

It is possible in a review of this nature to touch only very briefly on Mr. Feibleman's treatment of such wide topics as Aesthetics, Ethics, and Theology. In Aesthetics, as one would expect, the universe of essence is for him the source of value, and art is essentially symbolic²⁰ and an intermediary. The unique contribution of the individual in the creation of art, and the autonomous and novel value of the work of art as *something in its own right*, not merely as an actualization of the ideal, are accordingly neglected. The religious value of holiness is treated in a completely secular manner, with the result that the unique character of the experience of the holy is, in Mr. Feibleman's treatment, utterly lost.²¹ Thus ethics and religion to all intents and purposes become one.

¹⁷ Cf. p. 293, where "the uniqueness of a thing is its locus," and p. 294 where "the uniqueness of individuals depends on the incompatibility of space-time in their case."

¹⁸ It is the destiny-factor which names the thing (pp. 292-95). However, its singularity comes from its deviations from the norm (*ibid.*), and these may have as their source the spatio-temporal locus (cf. footnote 16). On p. 360, "essences are universal, but the context of their existence is individual." On the other hand, "the participation of singulars in essence . . . allows them to exist as singulars."

¹⁹ Cf. p. 299. On p. 362, the principle of individuation is equated with the principle of the individuals' change or exchange of essences.

²⁰ ". . . the object of art is an axial symbol of the universe of essence" (p. 454). But, (p. 456) "the actually beautiful object is a fragment rather than a shadow of the archetype of beauty."

²¹ Whatever may be the personal attitude of a thinker toward religious

In his treatment of the different sciences, Mr. Feibleman is much more adequate, and gives evidence of a wide acquaintance with scientific thought.²² He assumes a non-reducible hierarchy of the sciences, with physics as the lowest, and sociology as the highest of these. Sociology is the "Science of Cultures"²³ and each culture possesses an "implicit dominant ontology" which is inescapable²⁴ and may be made explicit by the philosopher. This position could easily lead, of course, to an ontological relativism, and one naturally inquires as to the source of the preferred position of Mr. Feibleman's own ontology. It is vital to his position that, as has been said earlier, the latter is held only hypothetically and non-dogmatically. He claims that once an "implicit, dominant ontology" has been extracted and made explicit, it can be subjected to criticism; and thus, advance in the formulation and choice of ontologies can take place, a process which will converge upon the "ideal ontology" asymptotically. Yet on the other hand he argues that the finite ontology of axiological realism is the ontology upon which scientific experimentation and advance is grounded.²⁵ Thus, in a manner strangely similar to

experience, such experiences as those of the numinous or the charismatic should surely be taken account of in any account of the holy which claims to be empirically grounded. Mr. Feibleman envisages (p. 514) "a church of the unlimited community with Socrates as its Savior and its gospel according to Plato." One may grant the ethical nobility of the Socratic ideal, and still feel that characteristic elements of the religious experience, which Socrates and Plato themselves would have recognized, have been ignored here.

²² He assumes, however, in accordance with his generally Platonic position that "Science seeks the knowledge of the graded series of being . . . within . . . Essence [by] inquiry into the graded series of actual fields . . . (p. 440). On such a view, in the last analysis, no clear distinction between mathematics and the experimental sciences such as physics or biology can be maintained.

²³ The reviewer doubts that "cultures" are such self-contained units as this type of anthropological view so often assumes.

²⁴ Cf. p. 424, "Every human culture differs from every other in the ontology it adopts." Also (p. 345), the true content of the psyche is to be found at the subconscious level where social beliefs are held, and these beliefs comprise the "ideal dominant ontology," which governs the culture.

²⁵ Cf. p. 426, where "scientism" is connected with the realistic ontology. On p. 211, the author says that his ontology involves a "condition

that of Hegel, the true ontology is both an ideal which is being approached, and also the means of approaching this ideal. There are a number of paradoxes here with which the author does not sufficiently come to terms.

The present reviewer is aware of the tremendous extent of Mr. Feibleman's undertaking and the arduousness of the task he has set for himself. The courageous attempt to devise a fundamental ontology which will relate to all the areas of our experience and constitute a bridge between science and myth, technique and worship, must always be respected. But there are deep ontological and epistemological problems inherent in any such undertaking, which Mr. Feibleman has not yet faced. The ontological enterprise itself remains no less imperative, notwithstanding the lack of success of the present work.

Bryn Mawr College.

of relative absoluteness, not absolute relativism." As a realist, he carefully distinguishes (a) the historical and psychological order, and (b) the logical order of knowledge (cf. p. 604). Knowledge is independent of its discovery, and the truth of a system does not depend on the way in which knowledge of the system is acquired (p. 605). There is no space here to go into the details of Mr. Feibleman's account of the different types of truth. For the reviewer, there still remains the question how, if each culture inherently has its own "implicit, dominant ontology," there can be this critical progress toward the ideal ontology. Furthermore, the ideal ontology can be present as a goal only as essence: yet the realistic ontology as a method becomes a matter of "destiny."

PHYSICAL COSMOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHICAL PHYSICS¹

T. A. GOUDGE

DURING the last few decades, physical cosmology has become a highly flourishing enterprise within the field of the sciences. Its precise affiliations, however, have tended to be somewhat obscure. Certain experimentalists have regarded it as a curious branch of pure mathematics. Others have considered it to be a sort of quasi-metaphysical speculation, hardly to be taken seriously. Mr. Bondi's *Cosmology* brings forward the subject as a proper branch of physics. The book accordingly discusses both the theoretical superstructure and the observational foundations of the subject, and does so in an attractively crisp, economical way.

Several features of cosmology are of striking philosophical interest. (a) Unlike other branches of physics which deal with *kinds* of occurrences and relations, cosmology investigates only one unique entity, the physical universe. Hence the science cannot avail itself of standard inductive procedures which depend on the assembling of samples. (b) Cosmologists are therefore obliged to choose between two other procedures. Mr. Bondi calls them the "extrapolative" and the "axiomatic-deductive" lines of thought. The former starts from physical laws known to hold of terrestrial or near-terrestrial phenomena. It then tries to frame an answer to the question: "What is the largest set of phenomena to which these laws can be applied consistently and successfully?" The result of this approach has been the construction of a number of "models" of the universe at large, each patterned on verified laws of physics. The axiomatic-deductive approach starts from certain *a priori* assumptions which are held to underlie any physical science whatever and which are equivalent to certain

¹ H. Bondi, *Cosmology* (Cambridge, England, University Press, 1952).
Herbert L. Samuel, *Essay in Physics* (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1952).

suppositions about the structure of the universe. From these assumptions, together with special axioms adopted for the purpose, the laws of cosmology are deduced. Then the deductions are checked with the observational data. Here again, various models of the cosmos have resulted.

"In spite of the differences in outlook of the various theories of cosmology, they all agree in postulating the validity of the so-called 'cosmological principle' which, broadly speaking, states that the universe presents the same aspect from every point except for local irregularities."² Those who take the extrapolative approach adopt the principle as a simplifying hypothesis only; while those who take the axiomatic-deductive approach adopt the principle as ascribing certain general properties to the universe. There are actually two important forms of the principle in circulation. According to the "narrower" form, all positions in space are equivalent, but variation in time is allowed. According to the "perfect" cosmological principle (introduced by Bondi and Gold in 1948) the universe presents the same aspect, save for local inhomogeneities, from any place at any time. This leads to the steady-state theory of the cosmos, wherein the general character of the observable universe is regarded as stationary. "All other theories believe that there is a universal 'cosmic' time of physical significance marking off stages in the evolution of the universe and possibly also influencing local physical development."³ One of Bondi's purposes in the book is to show that the steady-state model has advantages which none of its competitors possess, just because it gets rid of "the time-scale difficulty."

Although the validity of the cosmological principle is said to be postulated, the author does in fact give three arguments in support of it. The first argument goes back to a basic assumption of all physical science—"the indefinite repeatability of experiments." In a laboratory experiment there is normally a complete control of every condition except the time and place of performing it. Since the experiment can be repeated, and each repetition will occur at a different spatio-temporal locus, we pre-

² *Cosmology*, p. 11.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

suppose a homogeneity of space and time at least as far as the laws of nature are concerned. "Hence the underlying axiom of our physics makes certain demands on the structure of the universe; it requires a cosmological uniformity."⁴ The second argument stems from the Copernican doctrine that the earth is not in a central, specially favored position. This doctrine is readily construed as meaning that the earth is in a *typical* position. A wide interpretation of "typical" then renders the doctrine equivalent to the "narrower" form of the cosmological principle. The third argument derives this principle from a general postulate of simplicity. The latter amounts to affirming as a working hypothesis that the large-scale structure of the universe is as simple as possible, and hence that it is uniform throughout.

One of the more daring developments in recent cosmology involves an attempt to solve the problem of "the creation of the universe." Bondi thinks that the bringing of this problem within the scope of physics is a special achievement of the steady-state theory. All the other cosmological theories hand the problem over to metaphysics which has been unable to make any headway with it. Philosophers will, of course, watch with interest to see whether a "scientific" theory of creation, capable of winning widespread assent, can be formulated. Will physics succeed where metaphysics has failed? I venture to suggest that if even a mildly promising start is to be made, cosmologists will have to devote more attention to explicating the terms in which the problem is stated, especially the term "creation" itself. For instance, when Bondi says: "It should be clearly understood that the creation here discussed is the formation of matter . . . out of nothing,"⁵ at least one reader finds it difficult to know what exactly is to be "clearly understood." Nor is it easy to be sure what is meant by "the rules governing the creation process," as long as this phrase receives no further elucidation. Moreover, even at the present, highly preliminary stage of the discussion it is clear that a price has to be paid by cosmology in order to bring the problem of creation within

⁴ Ibid., pp. 11-12.

⁵ Ibid., p. 144.

its scope. This price is a drastic modification of the law of the conservation of mass established by terrestrial physics. But then in what sense is cosmology to be regarded "as a branch of physics in its own right"?

From Mr. Bondi's presentation of the details of the various cosmological theories now on the market, one can get a clear understanding of how the disciplined activity of imagination contributes to scientific progress. Conversely, one can see that what is going on here cannot be understood in terms of a narrowly empiricist philosophy of science. No cosmologist is worried about the empirical verifiability, the inductive probability, or the predictive efficacy, of his theories. Even their "truth" is not a matter of central interest. Indeed, the words "true" and "truth" do not occur, so far as I have noted, at any point in Bondi's book. What a cosmologist does concentrate his attention on are models, world maps, world pictures, etc., and their relative adequacy or inadequacy. The adequacy of a given model depends on many things, of which agreement with observations (or rather lack of conflict with observations) is only one. Cosmology is thus a domain where mathematics and the imagination combine in a fascinating attempt to "triangulate the universe."

Viscount Samuel's *Essay in Physics* is quite different in temper from the preceding book, since it is the work of a philosopher writing in a semi-popular way about science. The aim of the essay is to offer "some speculations" about matters which lie between physics and philosophy. These speculations are designed to supply certain basic ideas which will provide for contemporary physics a more satisfactory philosophical foundation than the one it has at present.

Three prominent features of contemporary physics seem to Viscount Samuel philosophically objectionable and in need of replacement.

(1) Physical theory has increasingly substituted various "fictional abstractions" such as space, time, statistical laws, probability waves, the space-time continuum, etc., for dynamic causes in nature. These abstractions are treated like actual existents, e.g., they are credited with having physical properties. In other words, mathematical conceptions have ousted the older, more

concrete ideas of classical physics, so that, as Whitehead has urged, "science relapses into the study of differential equations. The concrete world has slipped through the meshes of the scientific net." To remedy this situation, Samuel follows Whitehead in contending that physics should take as fundamental the concept of "event." Events are the ultimately real units which constitute nature. The latter is in fact a complicated system of physical events, not a set of mathematical equations. On such an approach, space and time are derived by abstraction from relations among events. Hence the "space-time continuum" is not a physical fact but a man-made figment, which "cannot, by any 'curvatures' or the like, affect in any way the behaviour of things which are physically real." ⁶ To think that it can do so is to commit "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness," a fallacy to which physicists are at present particularly prone.

(2) On its empirical side, physics has adopted the policy of limiting itself to whatever is observable, i.e., to phenomena and their relations. Inference to unobservables has been banned. Indeed, it has often been said that talk about unobservables is devoid of meaning. "Reality" for the physicist is identical with the totality of the observable. It is easy to pass from this statement to the conclusion that physical reality is identical with the totality of the observable, and so to espouse a form of Berkeleyan idealism. Viscount Samuel dissents from this whole policy. He thinks that "inference from what has been observed may, in very many cases, give us valid indications of the existence, character, and behavior of unobservables." ⁷ Moreover, physical events *per se* are quite independent of the processes of observation. Long before man appeared in the cosmos with his ability to observe and measure, the atoms, molecules, gases, liquids, stars, planets, etc., existed in their own right. "No theory of physics—or metaphysics either—can hold good which would not be valid for the universe before man; or for the universe now, beyond the narrow limits

⁶ *Essay in Physics*, p. 12.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

of his vision." ^a The ban on inference to unobservables in physics should therefore be lifted.

(3) If this were done, an important consequence would follow. Instead of artificially limiting itself to the description of phenomena, physics could pursue once again its classical objective of seeking their explanation. Now to explain a phenomenon is for Viscount Samuel to discover its cause or causes; and this seems usually to entail an inference to unobservables. But if physics is to be concerned with a search for causes, it must discard once for all the notion of chance. The author is quite emphatic on this point. "We must not invent some little metaphysical demon, called Chance, to be responsible for whatever cannot be explained otherwise." ^b Physics should return to its belief in universal causality, and adopt the view that even in the domain of quantum theory, "chance" is simply a name for our ignorance of causes. The author thus finds himself here agreeing with such "elder statesmen" of physics as Planck and Einstein.

When making these philosophical criticisms, Viscount Samuel stays on familiar ground and says little that is novel. But he then essays to play the more dangerous game of becoming an amateur physicist, hoping thereby to "open up a new way of approach" which will lead to the "explanation" of four phenomena whose nature has remained unintelligible to contemporary physics. These are: (i) the nature of electromagnetic radiation and the medium for its transmission; (ii) the nature and mode of propagation of gravitational "attraction"; (iii) the nature of motion in general and the meaning of "momentum"; (iv) the nature of waves and particles and of the relations between them. The author proposes to put forward a "clue" that might help to solve all these interconnected problems simultaneously.

The clue in question turns out to be an assumption that whatever is physically real is to be explained in terms of an all-pervasive "ether of energy" which exists in two states, one quiescent, the other active. "Quiescent energy is conceived as a continuum, and as the sole physical constituent of the universe.

^a Ibid., p. 15.

^b Ibid., p. 35.

All material events are to be accounted for as cases of the activation of quiescent energy."¹⁰ Working with this assumption, the author attacks each of the above-mentioned problems, and tries to show in a purely discursive, non-mathematical way, how new light is thrown on it. Thus particles and waves are construed as different types of activation of the energy-continuum. Instead of postulating *à la* Bondi an absolute creation of matter *ex nihilo*, a less mysterious process is supposed, viz., the formation of particles in the quiescent ether "wherever and whenever the requisite conditions obtain." Gravitation is another kind of activation of the energy-continuum, as is electromagnetic radiation. In neither case must we posit any unintelligible "action at a distance," with no intervening physical medium; though in the case of gravitation an *ad hoc* hypothesis of reciprocal activation of the ether is required to render intelligible the inverse-square law.

Whether the above assumption and the deductions drawn from it have any scientific value is a matter for physicists to decide. Some indication of how they will react is contained in a brief letter from Einstein, which appears as an appendix to the book. Although he does not comment on the details of Viscount Samuel's proposals, Einstein makes it clear that he cannot accept a doctrine which makes "reality" other than an intellectual construction based on our sense data. The latter alone are directly given to us; and the positing of the "real" which exists independently of our sense data is always the result of an interpretation due to thought. Hence when physics utilizes elaborate mathematical constructions, such as the space-time continuum, there is no warrant for contending that reality has been replaced by fancies.

The same point may be put in a slightly different way by asking: "Is Viscount Samuel's continuum of quiescent energy any less 'a man-made figment' or 'fictional abstraction' than the physicist's space-time continuum?" The former is on the author's own admission "imperceptible and indescribable . . . unknown and probably destined to remain unknown."¹¹ If so, what ground can there be for asserting that the continuum of quiescent

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 50-51.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 55, 67.

energy exists, whereas the space-time continuum doesn't? Furthermore, is anything really gained by attributing phenomena to the activation of an unknown "ether," and then saying that they have been "explained"? Despite the engaging modesty with which Viscount Samuel offers his "speculations," they hardly begin to meet these obvious objections, let alone others which the technicalities of contemporary physics will undoubtedly suggest.

University of Toronto.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN NATURE

OLIVER MARTIN

THE problem of the philosophy of human nature is: What is man? The importance of the problem cannot be overemphasized. All of the practical sciences presuppose some answer. Fr. Klubertanz presents us with a well-reasoned answer within the Thomistic tradition.¹ It is a reasoned answer because there is an argument. It isn't composed of happy guesses produced by generalizing in a conjectural fashion the limited categories of experimental psychology. At the beginning, evidence is presented showing that man is a substantial unity. At the end, evidence is presented demonstrating that man has a soul and, to a limited extent, what its nature is. In between, the "activities" and "powers" of man are considered—internal and external sensations, habits, the sensory appetites, the nature of the will and the intellect.

The author devotes a good number of pages to clarifying the relations between PHN (philosophy of human nature), experimental psychology, and metaphysics. It is this thesis, a problem of the order of knowledge, that we wish to question. We shall first present some of the difficulties that give rise to the problem. Second, we shall indicate the kind of knowledge which PHN is. Third, we shall attempt to demonstrate that in the body of his work the kind of knowledge represented is that of the "metaphysics of man" and not the "philosophy of human nature." Finally, we shall point out the importance, and non-verbal character, of a correct answer to the problem.

SOME DIFFICULTIES

PHN (philosophy of human nature) and EP (experimental psychology) are contrasted in terms of "starting point," "methods," and "type of conclusion." EP begins with

¹ George P. Klubertanz, S. J., *The Philosophy of Human Nature* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953).

specific facts that are precise and detailed. They are demonstrated to be universal in fact by techniques that more or less closely involve laboratory testing of many individuals. For example, this science investigates the various conditions that can have an influence on memory; it considers how much different persons forget after a week, a month, a year; it tests the advantages and disadvantages of various techniques of remembering (p. 4).

On the other hand, PHN begins with

facts that need not be specific, but must be very accurately determined. They are ideally demonstrated to be universal by a proof that gives the reason for their being universal. For example, the philosopher tries to see as clearly as possible what to remember means; he investigates this action to see what he can learn about the nature of man from it; he relates this action to other actions of man in terms of the nature thus revealed (p. 4).

The experimental scientist is interested in measurement and verifying techniques. For the philosopher "measurement in itself is usually irrelevant" (p. 5). "The technique of the philosopher is usually a rigorous use of reflection and/or analysis. From an experience, he passes by means of reflection-analysis to consideration of what it is that he has observed and of its mode of being" (p. 5).

What kind of conclusion does EP obtain? "As far as possible the scientist states his conclusions quantitatively. In general, what he is looking for is the connections between various facts, the conditions that modify the fact, and the consequences this fact may have in relation to other facts" (p. 5).

On the other hand, "The philosopher states his conclusions in terms of nature and mode of being. What he is looking for is the answer to these questions: What kind of activities are these? What kind of being is man?" (p. 5).

It is not at all clear to us what the contrast is. Are the "facts" different for EP and PHN? What are the "specific facts" of EP in contrast to non-specific facts of PNH? In a note we are told that "by 'specific facts' are meant the very specialized results characteristic of the sciences" (p. 4). But this is question-begging, for the term "specific facts" has already been used to define *that* which is now used to define *it*.

EP investigates the "conditions" of memory, PHN tries to see

what it "means." The distinction is real, but it cannot significantly be used to separate two disciplines. It would make the work of the experimental psychologist impossible. If he cannot investigate what memory means, how can he know its conditions? This difficulty might be surmounted if we could say that EP presupposes PHN. This possibility is eliminated, however, for we are told that "There can be no real direct dependence of either form of knowledge upon the other" (p. 396). Perhaps EP measures what PHN is talking about? Measurement, it is said, is "usually" irrelevant for the philosopher. However, the word "usually" breaks down the distinction. Furthermore, what can it possibly mean to say that the technique of the philosopher is "usually" a rigorous use of reflection and analysis as opposed to the scientist's technique of measurement? Doesn't the scientist reflect and analyze as well as measure?

There is reason to believe that the author is not completely satisfied with the distinction between EP and PHN, for in one of the Appendices he returns to the problem. However, the term now used is "scientific psychology." The "starting point" of scientific psychology is "experience and experimental or scientifically observed data," while that of PHN is "experiential" (p. 394). To understand this a "note" refers us back to the material we have already quoted, and which we have not found clear. But another distinction is introduced. The "material object" of scientific psychology is "behavior, human and animal," while that of PHN is "man as revealed through his activities" (p. 394). Now, either the material object is the same or it is not. If it is not, then the psychologist and the philosopher are not talking about the same "thing" at all. One is talking about "man" and the other isn't. If the material object is the same, then not it, but rather the notion of "formal object," would be relevant in contrasting the two disciplines.

Again we return to the question as to the "facts" which presumably make the starting point of EP and PHN different. Are there two different kinds of "behavior," two different kinds of "activities," the one the property of EP, the other of PHN. Perhaps what is meant is that the facts for EP are those of "external observation," while those of PHN are the facts obtained

from "internal observation" or introspection. If so, this would make impossible the aim of PHN, which is to understand the nature of man as a whole being, not just his subjectivity. Presumably this is not what is meant, for the experimental psychologist can deal with introspection. "'Behavior' means all 'non-automatic' or modifiable activity which can be observed, admitting both external and self-observation" (p. 394). Sometimes Fr. Klubertanz speaks as if instruments are used in getting facts in EP but not in PHN (pp. 5, 395). If this is to be the distinction between "special" and "non-special" facts, then a most unsatisfactory conclusion follows—PHN becomes the crude, pre-scientific stage of EP.

Well, are the starting points of EP and PHN the same, or are they not? Finally, the author says that they are the same "to some extent," though "not entirely" (p. 395). Some of the evidence for scientific psychology is, and some is not, "meaningful" for PHN (p. 396). This does not help very much, for this would imply that EP and PHN could conflict with each other. Yet we are told that such conflict is impossible (p. 396). It is not difficult to distinguish between the various experimental sciences of man. But what our author conceives of is a science (PHN) which parallels or supplements EP, which "seems to be most closely related to experimental psychology," and yet is in some manner different from it (p. 4). And both "have true forms of organized knowledge about man" (p. 5). What we have tried to show is that this conception is not at all clear. In fact, in this sense, we doubt whether there is any such thing as PHN.

Now, it may be objected that the whole matter can be cleared up if we take account of everything our author says. The philosophy of human nature is the *metaphysics* of man. The formal object of EP (or scientific psychology) is "the observable and/or measurable behavior of human and animal organisms, insofar as this behavior manifests the integrated dynamic interrelationships within the organism or between the organism and its environment," while that of PHN is "the nature of man in relation to his being and activities" (p. 395). The organizing principles of EP are physical, mechanical, and mathematical concepts, while those

of PHN are "metaphysical" (p. 394). Finally, the method of EP is "rational induction," while that of PHN is "intelligible induction" (p. 394). The former is that which is mediated by experiment, reflection, and analysis; the latter kind of induction is immediate, e.g., seeing that a part is necessarily less than the whole (p. 388-389). It appears, then, that PHN is part of metaphysics. For both the formal object is being. PHN is a kind of *special* metaphysics, having to do with the *human* being; *general* metaphysics is concerned with being *qua* being. Since PHN is the metaphysics of man, we would expect that the method of PHN and metaphysics is the same; and so Fr. Klubertanz says that both use "the method of intelligible induction, reflection, and analysis" (pp. 6, 398). Now we can understand why the author says that in EP we find that "man acts thus and so," while in PHN we discover that "having such a nature, man must act thus" (p. 9). The "must" is obtained metaphysically. Explained also is such a statement as this: "This course does not presuppose a course in experimental psychology" (p. 8).

However, the author eliminates any doubt that we may have had by bluntly saying that: "It would be totally incorrect to think of the philosophy of human nature as applied metaphysics, and it would be almost as great an error to think of it as a branch of metaphysics" (p. 7). He finally says we must "meet this problem squarely," and suggests that while PHN is not actually a part of metaphysics, it does depend upon metaphysics. In fact, "The best name for expressing such a relationship is that the philosophy of nature is a 'potential part' of metaphysics" (p. 399). In a "note" it is suggested that if we are to understand what "potential part" means here it will have to be understood in terms of "analogy" (p. 400-401). But it is not the analogy of proportionality; rather it is "an analogy of dependence or participation," a "community" of one kind of knowledge with another. It is just this "community" of one kind of knowledge with another that we wish to consider.

A PROPOSED SOLUTION

Let us be clear as to what kind of problem it is that we are considering. It is a problem of the order of knowledge. A prob-

lem of what the philosophy of human nature is, is philosophical, but it is not itself a problem of the philosophy of human nature. The order of knowledge is part of the metaphysics of knowledge. Specifically the problem before us is that of the relation of kinds of knowledge to each other in terms of *evidence*. The kinds of knowledge we shall be considering will be distinguished by their formal objects.

Man can be studied from two standpoints. In the one we are concerned with human nature in relation to being; in the other, in relation to the mode "mobile." The first is (MM) the metaphysics of man, the second is the experimental science of man. Neither can be deduced from the other. The details of the mode cannot be derived from metaphysics. Nor can the details of the mode "prove" something metaphysically. Both are necessary. In short, to obtain PHN the evidence must come from EP and M—the symbol "M" designating "metaphysics"—whether general or special. In terms of formal objects the matter may be put in this way: to obtain knowledge about *(hm)b* (mobile being that has the specific nature which man has) we must have knowledge about *hm* (the humanly mobile) and *b* (being).

In terms of the broader subject, (PN) the philosophy of nature, the equations are as follows. To obtain PN the evidence must come from ES (experimental science) and M. In terms of formal objects, to obtain knowledge about *mb* we must have knowledge about *m* and *b*. Is the philosophy of nature actually or potentially a part of metaphysics? No. Does it depend upon, or presuppose, it? Yes. But it also depends upon and presupposes experimental science. Now, since PHN is part of PN we can say that PHN depends upon and presupposes both EP and M. PHN and PN are integrative disciplines. What is abstracted and separated for a purpose, as a means only, is put together. It may be said that one begins and ends with PN, M and ES being but phases in the pursuit of such knowledge.

The consideration of being *qua* being is general metaphysics, of the mobile *qua* mobile is experimental science. But what is the difference between cosmology and the philosophy of nature? Is not mobile being the object of both? The answer, we suggest,

is this, that cosmology is the consideration of the mobile as being, while the philosophy of nature treats of mobile being *qua* mobile being. Since the two disciplines have so long been confused, what we actually find in books is a mixture of the two under either one of two names. But that the two are not the same may be seen when we take note of the different kind of evidence each requires. The difference hinges on the two different ways propositions of experimental science can function as "data" for philosophical problems. The term "presuppose" is notoriously vague when we speak of one kind of knowledge presupposing another. There are at least three meanings of the term.

(1) "Type B knowledge presupposes type A knowledge" means that "A is partially *constitutive* as evidence of B" if the truth of some specific proposition of B requires the assertion of some specific proposition of A. (If the converse is also true, then "wholly constitutive" is defined.) Example: Some propositions of metaphysics are constitutive of the philosophy of human nature.

(2) "Type B knowledge presupposes type A knowledge" means that "A is *regulative* of B" if the truth of some (indifferently chosen) propositions of B requires the truth of some specific proposition of A. Example: Some propositions of metaphysics are regulative of the experimental sciences.

(3) "Type B knowledge presupposes type A knowledge" means that "A is *instrumental* to B" if the truth of some specific proposition of B requires the truth of some (indifferently) propositions of A. Example: Some propositions of the experimental sciences are instrumental to metaphysics.

There are three propositions that are relevant to our immediate discussion and may now be asserted. (1) Singular propositions and generalizations (which constitute the experimental sciences) are instrumental to metaphysics. Metaphysics "presupposes" them. This means that the intelligible is revealed through sense experience. This process is what Fr. Klubertanz calls "intelligible induction." But it is most important to note that while the propositions of sense experience are necessary in order for the intelligible to be grasped, it is not necessary for this or that singular proposition or generalization to be true. The denial of this prop-

osition forces one into some kind of a *priorism* in which sense experience is either irrelevant to ontological truth or is actually a handicap to its attainment. Without a doctrine of innate ideas or its equivalent the possibility of metaphysics remains a mystery, for there can be no doctrine of degrees of "abstraction."

A corollary to the first proposition is this, that the propositions of experimental psychology are instrumental to the "metaphysics of man." MM "presupposes" EP. It is this kind of an argument that Fr. Klubertanz uses when he shows that man is a substantial unity (a composite of act and potency) through an appeal to the conclusions of the experimental sciences. He does not and cannot mean that EP is either constitutive of or regulative of the metaphysics of man. But through "intelligible induction" by means of generalizations about man the *being* of man is revealed. Our author's work is essentially of this nature, a treatise on the metaphysics of man. It is for this reason that he can say that in order to understand his work a course in EP is not necessary, i.e., EP is not constitutive of, but only instrumental to, MM. The point is that the evidence for the truth of such a proposition as that of the substantial unity of man is independent of this or that generalization in the experimental sciences. Any one (indifferently chosen) generalization might conceivably be found later to be false and yet the metaphysical proposition remain true.

This same analysis can be carried through for other key propositions in the author's work, e.g., that the human soul is the substantial form of man (p. 319). Man, being neither God nor angel, could not know this about himself without sense experience. But singular propositions and generalizations do not prove this metaphysical proposition. It is for this reason that true metaphysical propositions could be known in an age that was backward in what is now called experimental science.

(2) Metaphysics is regulative of experimental science. For our immediate purpose (only) this is the least important of the three propositions. What this means is that the *possibility* of true propositions in experimental science presupposes the *actual* truth of *some* specific metaphysical propositions. What they are is the problem. It is to be observed, however, that the truth of

this proposition is independent of the question of the truth or falsity of the metaphysics which is regulative, or the manner of expression of the regulative principles—e.g., the uniformity of nature, the principle of limited independent variety, the principle of sufficient reason, etc.

(3) Metaphysics is constitutive of the philosophy of nature. For our immediate purpose this is the most important of the three propositions. A corollary is that metaphysics is constitutive of the philosophy of human nature. But it is also true that EP is constitutive of PHN. PHN is a mixed, a hybrid discipline, formed by bringing together M (and of course MM) and EP to arrive at conclusions, which are the propositions of PHN. While all actual arguments are somewhat complex, we may describe the structure of the reasoning of PHN by referring to a syllogism representing a condensed argument. The major premise is metaphysical, the minor premise is a proposition of EP (a generalization), and the conclusion is a proposition of PHN. And this is as it should be, for man is neither "noumenal man" nor "phenomenal man." Man is that whole being of which these are "parts."

How else can the philosophy of human nature be obtained but by bringing the two kinds of knowledge together? Unfortunately PHN is rarely found in a systematic form. What we usually have are two substitutes for it, when it is not denied completely. When the metaphysical is denied as constitutive, then PHN is the name for a group of propositions consisting of commentaries and conjectures on EP. Often this takes the form of arbitrarily generalizing some concepts of EP into metaphysical categories and reducing others to these. This is positivism. Positive science becomes an "ism". It also tends to reduce man to non-being. For when a mode is identified with being we have neither; we have "nothing," "non-being." Opposed to all of this, Thomists have correctly insisted on the metaphysical, and they have developed quite systematically the "metaphysics of man." But when MM is confused with PHN there is a tendency to deduce propositions of the latter from the former. In so doing one plays into the hands of the positivist who quite correctly insists that this cannot be done. The upshot of it all is that in the order of knowing man is split in two. And as long as some Thomists

try to make PHN out of MM there are others who are quite willing to make PHN out of EP.

Fr. Klubertanz' treatise is essentially MM rather than PHN. Consider the following propositions.

(a) "The will is not subject to any efficient causality except from God, and so is not subject to external necessity" (p. 256).

(b) "The proper object of conscious appetite is the known good" (p. 225).

(c) "The soul is really distinct from the body" (p. 320).

(d) "The human soul is immortal" (p. 320).

In the proof of such propositions singular propositions and generalizations are not constitutive as evidence. They are, however, constitutive of propositions of EP. PHN is a synthesis of MM and EP. The author's problem, which is the metaphysics of man, is a prior one, and so important that it must be solved in order to have PHN. But it is *not* PHN. The latter problem remains to be considered. Otherwise we merely have two systems, MM and EP, "supplementing" each other. But if the problems of PHN are not solved correctly in the theoretical order, they will be improperly handled *in practice*. In short, judgments presuming to be PHN will be made in any case. This means that deductions about PHN will be made from metaphysics without the benefit of EP, or "speculative" statements about PHN will be made simply by "generalizing" the notions of EP, and without benefit of metaphysical knowledge. In the first case we have an unfortunate kind of metaphysical *a priorism*; in the second case, positivism.

It is difficult wholly to escape PN or PHN. Fr. Klubertanz doesn't. In fact he gives a very penetrating analysis and solution to a most important problem: what is the relation between the metaphysical knowledge of man and the evolutionary conception of man obtained through the experimental sciences? Also, the "intellect" of metaphysics is related to the concept "intelligence" as used in experimental science. But where do we find such problems of PHN considered? Not in the body of his work, but in the Appendices under the general topic of "Related Issues." We intend to demonstrate that such "related issues"

constitute PHN, in contrast to the body of his work, which is MM. The first example is chosen for analysis.

In the language of moderate realism, evolution in biology seems to require the notion of "effects as higher than their causes." How is this notion to be related to fundamental ontological (metaphysical) principles? The author gives a brief review of the evidence for biological evolution, and makes the following distinction. "When inherited non-essential traits are changed in the series of generations, we shall call this change 'inter-racial evolution.' If essential perfections are gained or lost in the series of generations, we shall call this 'essential evolution'" (p. 420).

There can be both kinds of evolution. When essential evolution occurs there is a "chance" interference of "lines of causality." From the standpoint of empiriological (experimental) science this interference is uncaused and contingent. "But . . . what is chance with regard to creatures is planned by God." "Thus chance + Providence can explain the origin of effects that are higher than their created causes" (p. 423).

Our interest is not now in the truth or falsity of the propositions, but rather in the structure of the argument and the kinds of knowledge involved. The argument may be laid bare and condensed in the form of a syllogism. Let a, b, c . . . be the phenomena referred to in evolution theory.

(A) All effects higher than their causes are effects of God's intervention through secondary causes.

(B) a, b, c . . . are effects higher than their causes.

(C) a, b, c . . . are effects of God's intervention.

The conclusion (C) is a proposition of the philosophy of nature. (A) is metaphysical. (B) is a proposition of experimental science. Both M and EP are *constitutive of* PN. PN is an integrative discipline, and as such is essentially deductive. "Rational induction" is used to obtain (B); "intelligible induction" is used to obtain (A).

We have now concluded our demonstration. It is here in an Appendix that Fr. Klubertanz comes to grips with the problems of the philosophy of human nature, in contrast to the body of his work which is really the metaphysics of man. Even the example we have used is strictly speaking one of the philosophy

of nature and only indirectly that of PHN. Actually the number of PHN propositions to be found are very few. An example would be—again under “Related Issues”—“It is quite probable that the human soul is created at the moment when the new individual is formed by the union of ovum and sperm” (p. 410). It is to be observed that the evidence for this proposition must come from both metaphysics *and* biology. A specific proposition of biology must be true if that proposition of PHN is true. On the other hand, for the proposition “The human soul is spiritual” to be true all that is required is that some (indifferently) phenomenological or empiriological propositions (or propositions actually or potentially of experimental science) be true. This means, to put it in other terms, that sense knowledge is necessary in order that through abstraction and induction the intelligible may be revealed.

Thirteen propositions may be stated as a combination of summary principles and hints of further problems beyond the scope of this critical study.

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES

- (1) EP is necessary as evidence for PHN.
- (2) M is necessary as evidence for PHN.
- (3) Instead of PHN being potentially a part of M, M is actually a part of PHN.
- (4) What are “supplementary” and relatively autonomous with respect to each other are M and EP.
- (5) In PHN there is applied metaphysics, but the application is to EP to obtain propositions of PHN.
- (6) It is in cosmology that there is no applied metaphysics, for it is a part of metaphysics.
- (7) It is in an integrative science that there is established a “community of knowledge.”
- (8) The problem of analogy in connection with the community of knowledge arises in understanding the middle term which links major and minor and also relates two kinds of knowledge.
- (9) Without a doctrine of analogy one is forever locked

up univocally within a given kind of knowledge. This means each kind becomes imperialistic in relation to some other.

(10) Hence, there is the attempt to deduce PHN from M. (Is this the Wolffian error?)

(11) Or there is the attempt to generate PHN from EP.

(12) There can be no incompatibility (from the standpoint of evidence) between propositions of MM and EP because MM is only regulative of EP and EP can only be instrumental to MM. Neither one is constitutive of the other.

(13) Since MM and EP are both constitutive of PHN the truth of a proposition of the latter can be challenged by appeal to a proposition of either MM or EP.

SOME PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

The understanding of what the philosophy of human nature is in relation to the metaphysics of man and experimental psychology is a matter of *what* is evidence for *what*. The barrier of the uncommunicable is not to be looked for, say, in the relation of mathematics to physics. Where it is to be found is in the sciences of man; specifically, in understanding the evidence necessary for propositions of PHN, and the relation of that subject to the ethical. There are those who, while rejecting modern tendencies toward non-being (nihilism) to be found in certain forms of pragmatic relativism, believe that certain kinds of realism have also erred in attempting to base ethics on a metaphysics of man rather than on a philosophy of human nature. Too often the consequence has been that the inadequacy of an ethical absolutism based upon the metaphysics of man without the experimental (empiriological) sciences has had to be supplemented by a casuistry based upon the hard facts of the latter but in abstraction from the metaphysical, without which there cannot be the ethical. It is to be noted that the question of the truth of our thesis is independent of the truth or falsity of any Thomistic proposition about human nature, for the problem we are considering has logical priority.

A man is a unity. Whatever may be his destiny he lives in

this world and accordingly is subject to all the relationships the spatio-temporal order makes possible. The practical sciences, such as economics, political science, sociology, insofar as they are concerned with means to ends, presuppose not merely a metaphysics of man but also the experimental sciences about man (e.g., biology and psychology). In short, they presuppose PHN.

The author says that "The philosophy of human nature is an absolute prerequisite for a philosophically grounded ethics" (p. v). On this we agree. But this raises a most interesting question. Granting that the half of the problem Fr. Klubertanz deals with is more important than the half left out, what would be the effect of the inadequacy on "natural law" theory for ethics? Is it not possible that we may have here the key to some of the ethical disagreements that stem from this kind of Thomism²—which are also difficulties at least for many who are quite realistic metaphysically, and yet who believe, correctly or incorrectly, that certain particular ethical evaluations cannot be deduced from the metaphysics of natural law alone. It is to be hoped that Fr. Klubertanz, having dealt so excellently and systematically with the metaphysics of man, will expand what he calls "Related Issues" into a complete philosophy of human nature.

University of Rhode Island.

² We put it in this way because although we have not claimed that the thesis we have presented is implied by the philosophy of St. Thomas it is not, so far as we can see, incompatible with it.

SYMBOLISM AND ART

MORRIS WEITZ

THE main concern of contemporary aesthetics has been the nature of a work of art and the role of the spectator of it. Literary criticism and analytic philosophy have joined to sponsor this inquiry. Together, they have succeeded in replacing certain traditional rhapsodical doctrines in aesthetics with clear statements and solutions of some of the problems in the philosophy of art.

In her new book,¹ Mrs. Langer has boldly chosen to orient aesthetics toward a reconsideration of artistic creation and the "making of the artistic symbol." Philosophy of art is impossible, she contends, until we return to the source of art, the artist at work in his studio; and deal patiently and realistically with *his* problems and achievements. Only then will we be able to understand, through clarifications of the concepts involved in art creation—"expression," "creation," "import," "vitality," "organic form," "symbol"—the nature of a work of art and its relation to the beholder.

Mrs. Langer's fundamental claim is that art is the creation of forms which are symbolic of human feelings. "Symbolic" is the key term here, and the views of her earlier *Philosophy in a New Key* (hereinafter, *PNK*) are developed to cover all the arts in this new book.

The relevant parts of her theory of symbolism to aesthetics are these. Human beings, unlike the lower animals who recognize only signs or what she now calls signals of things, are uniquely symbol-making and symbol-using creatures. Our thought or conceptual life is distinctively symbolic. Language is the most obvious and universally recognized kind of symbolism; and words, with their relatively fixed and conventional references, are its ultimate constituents. Without words, functioning as vocabulary,

¹ S. K. Langer, *Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art Developed from Philosophy in a New Key* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953). Hereinafter, *FF*.

and our syntactical rules for combining them, there could be no language. With them, however, we have been able to establish ordinary and scientific modes of communication by means of which we can say (true and false) things about our world.

But this, which Mrs. Langer calls "discursive symbolism," is not the only kind. Both on the "pre-rational" and, especially for our purposes, on the artistic level, there are symbols or their clusters which, because they lack vocabulary and the consequent capacity for discourse, cannot be said to say anything about the world. And yet they do symbolize something of the world, at least to us humans. There are, in life and in nature, basic characteristics of rhythms and movements which manifest themselves in their various ways. Although they are not, perhaps cannot be, discoursed upon, they can be symbolized non-discursively by certain presentational symbols that exhibit the logical forms of the nature or life they symbolize.

Mrs. Langer offers some preliminary examples of non-discursive or presentational symbolism. Consider an actual wave breaking against the rocks. The wave, of course, is inanimate and yet it is a (presentational) symbol of powerful living forms rooted in our biological beings. Looked at intuitively (which, we shall see, is the only way we can apprehend these symbols, according to Mrs. Langer), we see in the wave a symbol of our life rhythms. The wave is a symbol which expresses one semblance of life. It is, allegedly, if I may put it so, a logical picture of one aspect of our experiences.

Then there are certain purely decorative designs. These, too, Mrs. Langer takes to be presentational symbols of biological feelings. They are also logically congruent with what they symbolize. They are the expressions of basic vital rhythms, projections of vital feelings into visible shapes and colors. Both the design and the feeling may have motion and rest, rhythmic unity and wholeness.

This conception of presentational symbol, Mrs. Langer says, yields a clarification of a paradigm statement about designs: "Borders must move forward and grow as they move." Now, actually, there is no real movement, i.e., change of place. Rather, they seem to move. Thus, the statement is construable as one

about a design which functions as a symbolic form that abstracts from the continuity, directedness, and energy of real motion and conveys the idea of these characteristics through the design. The advancing line of the design, because it is a logical picture of movement, begets the illusion of growth. It is in this sense, but only in this sense, Mrs. Langer insists, that the statement is correct. Consequently, motion in art is not change of place but change made perceivable. Real motion is logically related to linear form, and the perception of line is charged with the idea of motion.

The running mouse seems to cover a path, and the still line we look at which it has covered seems to run. Both embody direction; they are sufficiently logically congruent to be symbols of each other.

But her best preliminary example, the one that ties her two books (*PNK* and *FF*) together, is music. Music is the deliberate making of a symbol or expressive form. It is no language because it lacks a vocabulary and it has no meaning because it lacks specific references. It says nothing, but it shows a great deal. Music is essentially tonal structures which are logically similar to the forms of feeling: of growth, attenuation, conflict, resolution. It is "a tonal analogue of the emotive life." Our feelings exhibit certain logical patterns and music presents similar patterns in its pure measured sounds and silence.

The congruence of logical structures or formal analogy is basic to non-discursive symbolism. Which of the two terms of the fact of symbolization shall be designated as the symbol as against the symbolized is determined by our interests and the nature of the terms. In the case of music, Mrs. Langer chooses to refer to the sounds as the symbol rather than the feelings, since, she says, the sounds are easier to perceive; handle, produce, combine and identify than the feelings.

Music—because it is a presentational symbol—illustrates another point, fundamental to all the arts. It has no meaning but it has an "import," i.e., the patterns of sentience. This gives it (and all the arts) its significance or, better, significant form; and as significant form, it expresses forms of vital experience which language or discursive symbolism cannot talk about.

Closely associated with "import" and "presentational symbol" is her notion of "expression." Music (and art) is a symbol of feelings. It is in this sense that art expresses feelings. To say of a work of art, then, that it is expressive, is not to say that it is either a symptom of the artist's feelings or a signal which stimulates ours. It is simply to say that a work of art is a presentational symbol of the forms of sentience; and this is the same thing, Mrs. Langer points out, in an answer to a traditional problem, as to say that art *can* contain unfelt feelings, i.e., by logically expressing them.

Basic to Mrs. Langer's *whole* theory is a conception of language which is as old as Plato and as up-to-date as Russell, Frege, Carnap, and the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus*. Indeed in her *PNK* (p. 79), Mrs. Langer wrote that the latter's views were the main source of her theory. The outstanding feature in Mrs. Langer's version of the conception, which conception I venture to call the classical, is the notion that language is some sort of mirror of the world in which vocabularies consist essentially of names of things. Every linguistic unit (in Wittgenstein, with the exception of the logical constants which mirror nothing) is correlated with what it pictures. There are, almost throughout, logical or structural similarities between language and reality. With Russell (of the Logical Atomism period), I gather, Mrs. Langer accepts the view that these logical forms range from the isomorphism between names and particulars to atomic propositions and atomic facts all the way to completely general propositions and facts.

In this picture theory of language, the problem of meaning is specified as the problem of the relation between language and reality. Given the interpreter, the meaning of any unit of the language is defined as the object for which it stands. The meaning of an expression, "x," is what it names or refers to; and if a certain expression, "y," names or refers to nothing, as Russell's notorious "The present King of France," it has no meaning but is assigned one in the context of its use.

In her *PNK* (p. 55), Mrs. Langer sums up this classical conception of language and meaning: "Even in the simplest kinds of meaning there must be at least two other things related to the

term that 'means'—an object that is 'meant', and a subject who uses the term." There is nothing in her *FF* which would lead one to believe that she has given up this view.

Mrs. Langer's whole theory of non-discursive symbolism seems to be rooted in her picture or mirror theory of language. The basic difference between the two types of symbolism, as she interprets them, lies in the fact that the discursive is (ideally) completely isomorphic with reality whereas the non-discursive is only formally or logically isomorphic with reality (in Russell's sense of, e.g., "xRy" being the form of dyadic relational propositions and facts). It is only in terms of the degrees of isomorphism that I can understand what she means by the "logical congruence" of the presentational symbol and what it symbolizes. And this is why I said earlier that she means by a non-discursive symbol some sort of logical picture, i.e., certain items which in their form (e.g., Russell's "xRy") mirror other items in their form.

This whole conception has been refuted, and by no other more certainly than by the later Wittgenstein himself, as his new work shows. And also by a host of others—Wisdom, Ryle, Strawson, Waismann, etc.,—who, in their writings of the last decade or so, have demonstrated the tangle of errors that is the classical conception of language. Since I have surveyed their arguments elsewhere (see my "Oxford Philosophy," *Philosophical Review*, April, 1953), I present here only the relevant results: That language is a mirror is a misleading metaphor; if a metaphor is needed, language is much more like an enormous toolbox, full of the most diversified sorts of tools, practically all of which resemble not at all those things in the world they may be applied to. Must we say that the shovel has to resemble the hole it digs in order to dig it? Must we not say that words and sentences, by themselves, i.e., independently of our employment of them, do not refer to, or name anything, but that it is in the context of our use of them that we can say that some words are being employed to name something, others to refer to something, still others to describe or classify something; and that some sentences are being employed to refer to something in order, say, to go on to describe it, others to prescribe (i.e., to give advice or to guide), still others

to make concessions, etc.; that the *meaning* of an expression is the rules, regulations, and conventions governing its employment and not, in any relational way, an *object* for which the expression stands; that, consequently, philosophy must distinguish between meaning, naming, and referring; and must we not say, finally, that even the notion of what constitutes a language is not as simple as Mrs. Langer and the others of the tradition have assumed? Is it so certain that every language must have a vocabulary? Is there one defining essence in language? In games? In language-games?

There can be no doubt *these* days that a theory of language cannot rest on the classical, correspondence view; even in aesthetics, we must realize that we cannot get on fruitfully without attending to the revolutionary aftermath of the breakdown of the classical theory.

But now, let us ask: Are there presentational symbols? Is a wave, a design, music, logically congruent with feelings?

Try a map. We all know in what sense we can plausibly say that, as we use maps, we establish certain relational resemblances between the items of the map and the items of the territory it maps. Suppose we say with Peirce that the map, in the context of its use, is iconic with what it maps: they are logically alike because of the relational resemblances between their different terms.

Now, try music. Sounds rising and falling. Terms in certain relations. Then feelings. Other terms in their ups and downs? My problem is this: wherein is the logical similarity, the relational resemblance? Is music a map or *like* a map of our feelings? Can we perhaps treat it as a map, neglecting what is not relevant, the way we might some secret map in code? I wish Mrs. Langer were clearer on this important point of logical congruence. I cannot myself see in any precise sense how the relations among musical items resemble with the same logical form (in the way, e.g., that "John loves Mary" resembles in the same logical form not only the fact that he does, as Russell conceives it, but also the fact that Harry hates Harvey, since all of these are of the "xRy" form) the relations among our feelings.

Perhaps part of the difficulty is that there is no full statement as to what Mrs. Langer takes feelings to be.

I do not wish to say that there are no presentational symbols, only that it is not clear (at least to me) what she means by "logical congruence," the conception which is essential to her theory.

Mrs. Langer's next step in her theory of artistic creation is to interpret the created art symbol as an illusion. On the one hand, there is the realm of actuality, that which can be symbolized either discursively or non-discursively; then, on the other hand, there is the artist who, in his creation, brings into existence a symbol which is divorced from this realm of actuality. His creation is a "sheer image."

But the essence of this image is not its imitation of anything. "The true power of an image lies in the fact that it is an abstraction, a symbol, the bearer of an ideal" (p. 47). Anything can be made into an image when it is presented as a form instead of an actual object. As such, it is a purely "virtual" object or "semblance." Any real object, Mrs. Langer says, appears in different ways to different observers; these appearances are semblances of the object. But sometimes there is no real object, only a collection of appearances or semblances as, e.g., a rainbow or a shadow. This is an illusion. And it is in this sense that a work of art is an illusion. We look at a picture, we see a face, and yet we know that if we touched it we would feel paint and not flesh. Artistic creation is always the attempt to produce and sustain the illusion and to articulate its own forms to where it coincides with the forms of feelings. It is this coincidence, in which the symbol-illusion objectifies our subjective experiences, that relates art to actuality.

Mrs. Langer's lengthy treatments of the various arts are dominated by one theme, to reduce each of the arts to a controlling element, "its primary illusion," which "swallows up" all the other elements. Mrs. Langer likes her categories neat, and everything in all the arts falls, with an invigorating dexterity, into its assigned place. But throughout one keeps wondering whether she is talking about the arts or her own interlocking set of categories. To me, her overall reductionism is untenable, a throwback to earlier versions of formalism (e.g., "A painting is a combination of

line and color"); I find her specific analyses of the arts unconvincing and unhelpful. First, she divides the arts into the plastic, music, dance and poetry. Each of these is construed as a presentational symbol with its own primary illusion and its own transformable secondary elements. Among the plastic arts are painting, sculpture and architecture. They share as their primary illusion the creation of "a virtual space." Painting is for her essentially a shaping of space. The *whole* purpose of painting is to articulate pictorial space, visual forms. Actually, the canvas or wall is really flat; and yet for the eye there seems to be a deep space full of shapes. This makes purely visual pictorial space an illusion, a virtual space, like the space behind the surface of the mirror. Everything else in a painting helps to produce, support and develop this picture space. Unless I seriously misunderstand, I take this to mean that every line, color, texture, and subject is aesthetically relevant only in so far as it is perceived as shapes in space.

Now, even apart from the fact that much of recent painting has in fact rejected "virtual depth" (would Mrs. Langer say these aren't really paintings?), her treatment strikes me as aesthetic high-handedness. In an age in which color has been singled out by some artists and critics alike to be the controlling factor in at least some paintings, and texture by others, or volume-tension by still others, it is certainly "unstudio-like" to impose virtual space as the dominant element on all paintings.

Furthermore, in the sense that a painting has color, line, and texture just as surely as it may have virtual depth, can we truthfully say that painting is illusory? Of course, the element of depth is illusory: it looks deep but it really isn't. But we can't talk this way about colors, lines and texture. In paintings there are *real* colors, lines and textures, real reds, blues, horizontals, verticals, thicknesses, etc. How can one say that they are illusory reds, etc., in the way that one can say that the depth is illusory? In the sense in which there are actual colors, lines, etc., in painting, we cannot say accurately at all that painting or the whole of art is illusory. Some elements in art are, some are not, illusory.

My criticism of reductionism and inattention to the diversity of controlling elements within the same art applies equally to Mrs. Langer's discussion of sculpture and architecture. Her

claim is that sculpture is the creation of a virtual space in which the emphasis is upon the exhibition of virtual kinetic volume, where the latter is a semblance of our actual kinetic volume which characterizes us as human organisms. The actual volume, e.g., the stone, is only the material out of which the illusion is made.

Architecture may mislead us aesthetically, Mrs. Langer says, because of the factor of utility. But if we see it for what she says it is—a presentational symbol, a semblance, a virtual space, an illusion, a significant form—we shall come to recognize it as a plastic art which is also purely conceptual. In architecture, in its virtual space, there is created an “ethnic domain.” These domains correspond to actual ethnic domains, “cultural non-geographical places.” In architecture an ethnic domain is made visible, tangible, sensible. By means of an actual place it creates a virtual place which is then logically congruent with a non-geographical place. And because all this embodies the semblances of the rhythms of a culture, architecture also expresses feelings. Does this kind of talk (“semblance-talk”) really help? I find an *aperçu* here, a hint there perhaps, but not an illuminating, concrete analysis of the art.

Mrs. Langer’s discussion of music is especially interesting because of its promotion of a modified Bergsonian theory of real time, without the truth of which there could be no music. Music, Mrs. Langer says, is made out of tones but it is not the same as tones and their relations. It too is an illusion begotten by sounds. It is forms and motions seemingly there, an auditory illusion.

Actually, she says, nothing moves in music, hence musical motion is a semblance. But there is virtual movement of the tones in the realm of pure duration, which is the image of lived, real time, the time of the passage of life which is measurable only by sensibilities, tensions and emotions. The primary illusion of music is this semblance of real time.

Real time explains the real nature of music. But we can understand both only by intuition, by directly experiencing time. One abstraction from it is “clock-time” which treats it as a one-dimensional, infinite succession of moments, as measured change. But this clock-time is not to be confused with real time, which is real passage, transience, volume filled with physical, emotional, and

intellectual tensions. This is the time we all experience unless we are lost to science, mathematics, and everyday, practical life. All of us can know this time intuitively.

The essence of music is the illusion it creates through its sonorous image of the passage of real time; that is, virtual time. Like Bergson, Mrs. Langer believes that no discursive symbol can grasp real time. She insists though that the presentational symbol can. Music can do what philosophy and science cannot, set forth the dynamic forms of real time.

Suppose that some of us are either incapable of intuiting this real time or cannot accept its existence, would Mrs. Langer say to us that we are incapable of understanding music since we do not grasp its primary image?

This theory of real time, I want to suggest, following Wittgenstein and Waismann, is no theory at all but an exercise in bad grammar.

The question, "What is the nature of time?" is a paradigm of traditional philosophical concern. Any satisfactory answer, it is thought, would have to be some sort of real and true definition of the essence of time; and the definition would be such as to serve as the ideal for any proposed locution anyone might offer in regard to the use of the concept of time. Once the definition was determined, any deviation from it could be dismissed as an erroneous use of the concept. Now, Wittgenstein and Waismann have suggested that this whole procedure is a misguided attempt to invent some honorific formula which produces nothing except a residue of extremely useful idioms that are left inoperative by the formula.

Can the word be defined? But why should I try to find a definition? A definition would enable me to eliminate the word 'time' from any given context and replace it by its definiens. But it is just the point that there exists in English no other word, nor any combination of words, which does the job the noun 'time' does . . .

So to answer the question we look into diverse phrases in which the word occurs, spread out before us, as it were, the whole tortuous usage. We connect the word with others, we put it into various contexts, we trace over the lines of its use, and by doing this, we convey its meaning. Indeed, if anyone is able to use the word correctly, in all sorts of contexts and on the right sort of occasions, he

knows 'what time is,' and no formula in the world can make him wiser.²

The dance, thinks Mrs. Langer, creates semblances of real gestures; it employs as elements certain real gestures to build up these semblances. Real gesturing emanates from centers of vital forces or powers. In the dance these vital forces become virtual powers. Hence, when we see the dance *as dance*, we do not see people running around; we see the dance driving this way and that, fleeing and resting, where all the motions seem to come from powers beyond the performers. The real forces create illusory, virtual ones and these are the dance.

The fact that the dance uses actual, physical movements must not mislead us, Mrs. Langer admonishes, into any theory of self-expression or stimulus-response. Such a theory spells the destruction of the dance as an art since the presentational symbol has been denied. It is only when we recognize that these physical movements are dance-materials which serve to create the work of art that we come to see the dance not as self-expression but as logical expression.

This theory of the dance does not do justice to what seems to me to be central in the modern dance. Mrs. Langer's insistence on the illusory character of dance-gesture compels her to say: "Free dance movement produces, above all (for the performer as well as the spectator), the illusion of a conquest of gravity, i.e., freedom from the actual forces that are normally known and felt to control the dancer's body" (p. 194). But this simply won't square with the contemporary dance, and especially, since Mrs. Langer returns to it, with what actual dancers *say* they do. Perhaps the main source of the revolt against the classical ballet by the moderns was the conviction that the dance, which is so intimately tied to the body, should *accept* and *exploit* the gravitational forces between the body and the earth. Free dance is a return to gravity, to the actual forces that are normally known and felt to control the dancer's body. The whole shift from ballet to Martha Graham has been the shift from illusion to reality.

² F. Waismann, "Analytic-Synthetic," *Analysis* (1950), pp. 26-27.

The aesthetics of poetry, Mrs. Langer claims, has been ruined by what she calls pragmatism, i.e., the conception of poetry as discourse about life and stimulation of our feelings. This conception has invariably led to the wrong questions, "What is the poet trying to say?" and "What is he trying to make us feel?" The recognition of poetry as presentational symbol, she says, yields a new interpretation. Poetry, understood correctly, is the use of discursive symbols (words) to create an illusion, a pure appearance, a significant form. The feelings of poetry are neither ours, the artist's, nor his characters', but the meaning of the symbol. The objective and independent existence of a poem as a work of art consists in its being such a symbol.

The basic aesthetic question, then, she says, is, "What has the poet made and how did he make it?" The answer is: an illusion of life in which semblances of actual events are organized into a purely and completely virtual reality. The very opening lines of a poem establish the semblance of experienced events which, because it is non-discursive symbolism, dissociates the poem from our actual lives.

In a highly original section, Mrs. Langer tries to distinguish various kinds of poetic writing in terms of their verb tenses. The normal use of the narrative, she says, is the past tense; the normal use of the lyric is the first person singular present tense. But its use does not refer to any particular present moment, for the lyric is contemplative and since the latter deals with timeless ideas, the natural tense is the eternal present. The "I" of the lyric, thus, refers to no actual person but is a device for creating a timeless interpersonal subjectivity.

The novel, for Mrs. Langer, like the lyric, comments on and inquires into nothing. It contains no statements, being a presentational symbol. What it does is to *show*: It is an illusory, virtual creation of life-semblances. The drama offers not finished realities, rather immediately visible human responses. It abstracts from those life-situations which are directed toward the future. It creates a visible, virtual future in the mode of destiny. Dramatic action is a semblance of real action so constructed that it has implicit within it a piece of virtual history.

In a world of unplanned coincidence, Mrs. Langer says, we

all share a basic vitality. Comedy is its image. And that is why the comic poet creates as his illusion of life an oncoming future full of dangers and opportunities, of events occurring by chance. The fabric of comedy is always destiny in the guise of fortune, and its structure naturally contingent, episodic, and ethnic. Yet, even as pure illusion, destiny resembles one aspect of real life, namely, the sense of the past and future as parts of one continuum, of life as a single reality.

Tragedy is virtual destiny: the future shaped in advance in the mode of fate. But there is no fate any more than there is a destiny. But the fate of tragedy corresponds to an actual "tragic rhythm." Tragic drama is a semblance of our actual growth, maturity, and decline; our potentiality, defeat, relinquishment of power and sense of self-fulfillment.

In this theory of literature, there is the same sort of reductionism as we found in her treatment of painting, the attempt to swallow many fundamental elements, equally important, by the one, the "primary illusion." But there are other, more specific objections, and I shall concentrate on these.

If poetry, as non-discursive, can say nothing, then factual truth and falsity are inapplicable to it; and, consequently, the problem of belief does not arise. The trouble is, however, that the view won't square with the facts. We must start with the actual presence of statement or truth-claims as one among the ingredients of some literary works of art. No denial of their presence, from Croce to Richards, has been convincing, since the premisses of their denials have been less credible than their conclusions. The interesting problem here is not whether there are statements in some art, made either through the printed word or by suggestion, but to determine, if possible, how they function in the total work and their relevance to a proper response to the works that happen to have them. We solve nothing by denying them, for they will continue to function regardless. Mrs. Langer is so anxious to keep art presentational that she relegates a central problem of practical criticism, namely, the discovery of depth-meanings, i.e., symbols in the everyday, traditional sense, which discovery enriches our reading of literature, to a kind of useless "sleuthing." But since modern poets have taken this problem of

enriching the poetic medium through these depth-meanings seriously, Mrs. Langer abandoned the studio long ago.

Does it really illuminate to say that the essence of the literary arts is virtual history? Here again we see that what is being sought is a formula, a real, true definition of something, which definition can be used as the contrasting model of all other purported definitions. But can we really define "tragedy," "comedy," "poetry," yes, "art" itself? Have not our definitions been either honorific slogans or disguised persuasive ones? Even in Mrs. Langer's treatment of tragedy, we find, e.g., the assertion that the plays of Racine and Corneille are not really tragedies but heroic comedies since they have no growth, tragic rhythm, no full realization of personality, only a fate which is misfortune. But is this not to say that they are not tragedies simply because they don't conform to *her* formula?

Mrs. Langer herself quotes from A. Thorndike: "Any precise and exact definition is sure to lack in comprehension and veracity" (*FF*, p. 359). I think this is correct. For what is the problem, to find a cluster of characteristics, a *sine qua non*, a common universal, that all tragedies share; or what? And how could one proceed? Could we treat "tragedy" as a name for a finite class of cases (say this and that play of the Greeks and the Elizabethans), and then go on to say, "Anything is a tragedy that resembles the members of this class in some one or number of respects." What would this give us?

I, having been as guilty as Mrs. Langer in raising these essence questions in aesthetics, now think that we shall get nowhere until we drop them. To paraphrase Waismann, "Let's forget the definition and look for the uses." By tracing the various employments of "tragedy," by distinguishing its standard critical uses from certain honorific ones, we may yet discover what "tragedy" means.

Mrs. Langer is not terribly far from all this, at least in avowal. She, too, says she seeks clarification of meanings of concepts in philosophy. But instead of pursuing actual specific elucidations, she invests an elaborate family of concepts—some old, some new—with unusual and difficult meanings which add up to a "theory" that she then imposes in an Hegelian fashion on

the arts themselves. Her goal of clarification is obscured and defeated by her conception of philosophy as conceptual construction rather than conceptual elucidation. This is why she seeks, as "theorists" invariably do, her many related formulae which all derive from her one, true, real definition that "art is the creation of forms which are symbolic of feelings."

Some final remarks on her views on the role of the beholder and the problem of criticism. For Mrs. Langer, intuition is basic in the appreciation of art. Only intuition can apprehend symbolic form, hence art can be apprehended intuitively or not at all. Intuition is not a method but an act of direct mental insight into form. One understands art, then, only by intuiting a whole presented (symbolically) feeling. The role of the beholder is determined by the nature of the work of art. Since the work is an objectively created image, the beholder, if he is to apprehend it as art, must respond to it with the proper attitude of contemplation. Any alternative response, e.g., make-believe, evocation, scientific curiosity, etc., marks a destruction of the work, a perversion of a presentational symbol into a discursive one or emotional signals or symptoms.

I concur that the role of the beholder is determined by or is to be determined by the work of art itself, i.e., that the problem of appreciation is a normative and not a descriptive one. But it seems to me that Mrs. Langer's discussion is marred by her assumption that a proper response to a particular work is the *natural*, i.e., usual one. She writes as if it were a mere matter of course that people respond as they should to art, i.e., in such a manner as to behold *what is in the work*. It is obvious why she writes in this way, because she assumes—as she must since hers is presumably a "studio," i.e., an empirically sound, theory—that most people who seek aesthetic experiences accept art as presentational symbolism. But it is not a matter of course at all. It is a most difficult thing to try to convince people that certain works of art require certain appropriate responses which may be, as they often are, completely unlike our usual responses to non-artistic things. So far as I can see, if someone disagrees with Mrs. Langer (or myself) and holds that when anyone beholds art, he ought to wallow in its emotions the way he does, our main recourse is to

try to show him how very much he is missing *of the work* by responding the way he does and how very much more he will get if he acts the way we do. But if he refuses to listen and persists in his behavior, what else can all of us do but bemoan our respective tastes?

Mrs. Langer dismisses all aspects of criticism except those devoted to the question, "How was the illusion made?" The traditional problem of standards she construes as a mistake in that it is an attempt to find rules for art, which cannot be done. Here, too, I disagree. There are lots of philosophical questions to be raised in regard to criticism, and the main one, in my opinion, is to examine the logic or logical grammar of some of the different, crucial terms of criticism. Instead of talking about how the illusion was made, we would do better in philosophy to ask precisely how critics themselves use their expressions. Just what is the logic of the critic's use of terms like "good," "bad," "better than," "great," "masterpiece"—all of which seem to be members of one family; of terms like "poignant," "garish," "gay," which seem to be members of another family; and of terms like "sonorous," "red," "voluminous" which seem to be members of still another family? I am myself convinced that we shall answer a great number of related questions in aesthetics if we attempt logical descriptions of the various contexts of the use of these and other terms which are the stock in trade of practicing criticism.

One final word. I have said nothing at all about the many excellent discussions of both doctrines and issues in Mrs. Langer's book. These pervade the work. But because Mrs. Langer has written an important, original and provocative book, it seemed to me that it deserved a concentration on the great difficulties which are typical of the aesthetic tradition she exemplifies.

Vassar College.

THE REALM OF PARADOX

JACOB TAUBES

1. The "paradox of faith" has been one of the major discoveries of Christian theology during the last century. Kierkegaard's paradox of faith served as a key to the dialectical theology of the twenties (Karl Barth, Emil Brunner and Friedrich Gogarten) which tried to understand Luther's *sola fide*, the major theme of his theology concerning man's justification by faith, and Paul's "foolishness of the cross," the central theme of his messianology.

Kierkegaard's "absolute paradox" was born in his critique of Hegel's absolute reconciliation between faith (πίστις) and knowledge (γνῶσις) and bears the scars of his desperate struggle between atheism and the belief in the God of Abraham. In Kierkegaard's critique of Hegel's reconciliation it became evident that there are two basic possibilities in interpreting religious experience: gnosticism and pisticism. Paul, Augustine, Luther, Kant, Kierkegaard and Karl Barth represent the pistic interpretation of religion. They are "pistics" who protest against man's gnostic hubris and try to expose his illusion about a cognitive way of archetypal knowledge. The paradox of faith implies a *sola fide* which can never be turned into a general and universal method. But theology is stronger than faith! It turns even the paradox of faith into a method relating the way of paradox to the classical ways of theology, the method of negation and analogy. The paradox of faith is thereby taken out of its context, its energy diffused and its motif turned into a general argument for apologetic theology.

Professor Slater goes even further.¹ He aims at nothing less than a demonstration of the universal range of the paradox. The paradox of Nirvana with special reference to Burmese Buddhism is but an example. His "ultimate interest, however, is much

¹ Robert Lawson Slater, *Paradox and Nirvana: A Study of Religious Ultimates with Special References to Burmese Buddhism* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951).

wider; the final issue is universal, the challenge of bewilderment which is everywhere twin brother to Faith, the No which accompanies our Yes. This final issue concerns the nature of that Reality which shapes our lives, both quickening and confounding our philosophy" (p. 1). Kierkegaard's paradox of faith is thereby turned into a general and universal method, and in a strange way—through a theology and philosophy of religion, which claims to be indebted to Kierkegaard—Hegel's ghost takes revenge on Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard's way of paradox is no "way" at all, but a leap over the abyss. It fascinates twentieth century theology which tries to use Kierkegaard's marginal situation for its own purposes without, however, entering into the mill of his dialectic. For Kierkegaard's way of paradox on the margin of Christian faith, with one foot always in the atheistic interpretation, cannot, if taken seriously, guide those who want to pursue the classic theological methods of negation and analogy.

Professor Slater's contribution toward a wide survey of the context of religious paradox, a survey not limited to the Christian religion, obliterates the perennial antagonism between the gnostic and pistic interpretation of religion. Therefore he can assert that the religious paradox is nowhere more strikingly exemplified than it is by the Buddhist symbol of Nirvana (p. 2). Since the author is interested in the formal structure of the religious paradox he tends to overlook that gnosticism and pisticism are well defined stages in the historical development of the religious consciousness which come to the fore only under specific conditions.

2. Gnosticism is connected with a certain stage of religious consciousness which is not compatible with the paradox of faith. For the paradox of faith presupposes exactly the vast abyss between the divine and the human which all religions of enlightenment, mysticism or gnosticism, try to close. Whereas the pistic religious consciousness does not bridge the abyss between the divine and the human and lives in view of the abyss in a paradox of faith, the ultimate quest of the gnostic religious consciousness is to be "illuminated" about the path that will span the abyss. The "language of paradox" in gnosticism (mysticism and religions of enlightenment) serves the opposite purpose from the paradox of faith and the pistic religions.

Professor Slater's inquiry has "two aspects" which he considers interrelated but which, it seems to me, contradict each other, and this inner contradiction tends even to endanger the excellent results of his field study in Burma. In the first place Professor Slater is concerned with showing that Burmese tradition is a living tradition of Hinayāna Buddhism in which Nirvana is the ultimate religious term. This historical interpretation is joined, however, with an excursion into the field of comparative religion which tries to reveal the significance of the language of paradox for the study of religion in general. But he fails to take into consideration the basic division between gnostic and pistic religious consciousness and treats in the same line the paradox of religious expression as it is manifest in the pistic religions of revelation with the language of paradox that comes to the fore in the religions of enlightenment. In his effort to prove the universal range of the paradox of faith, Professor Slater discusses on one page (p. 100) the Book of Job and the Psalms and on the next the paradox of religion in Plato's theology (p. 101), thus generalizing the notion of paradox to such a degree that it becomes almost equivalent with religion.

Most obvious is Professor Slater's syncretism in the discussion of the paradox in the Christian tradition (p. 102-). It seems to him "not such a far step from the language of Plato's analogy" to Paul's messianological paradox. And from Paul's messianological paradox Professor Slater goes to Clement of Alexandria who "provides one of the most striking early examples of negative phraseology" (p. 103). He does not stop to notice that between Paul's messianological pistic paradox and Clement's negative theology lies the break-through of gnosticism in the realm of Christian thought. Since the difference between gnostic and pistic consciousness is not relevant for Professor Slater, he can easily put together the gnostic rationalistic John Scotus Erigena with Thomas a Kempis who expresses a "similar insight" if only in a devotional language" (p. 105). Professor Slater even connects Eckhart's mystical division between *deitas* and *deus* with Luther's pistic distinction between *deus revelatus* and *deus absconditus*. The survey ends with a reference to Kierkegaard,

whose way of paradox should help to explain the method of analogy and negation in the classical Christian tradition.

3. The only point which could have served, however, as a link between Christian and Indian theology, the gnostic *via negativa*, remains insufficiently developed and without the emphasis it deserves. This is not accidental. By obliterating the difference between gnosticism and pisticism Professor Slater can only use external analogies and cannot develop morphological parallelisms inherent in the same structure of thought. Otherwise he would have had more to say about Dionysius the Areopagite and his *via negativa* than, "here indeed the influence of neo-Platonism is marked but here also there is frequent appeal to the Bible. Here too we are forcibly reminded of Hindu and Buddhist terminology" (p. 103). It remains obscure and accidental why the influence of neo-Platonism is marked, why we are forcibly reminded of Hindu and Buddhist terminology in the realm of Christian negative theology. It is strange that the author refers only so cryptically to the Alexandrian link between Christian and Indian gnostic speculation since more than a hundred years ago the morphological parallelism between the gnostic theosophical speculations and the Buddhist theology was observed² and since then frequently studied. I believe that to understand the gnostic structure of Buddhist theology it is important to develop the parallelism in further detail. Alexandria served as the historical meeting place for East and West. There was, as records show, a frequent exchange between India and the West through Alexandria which stood midway between Orient and Occident.³ Christian theologians traveled freely to India⁴ and Buddhist apostles came to Alexandria. Clement Alexandrinus⁵ and Origen⁶ show familiarity with Indian doctrines. India was a "fashion" in Alexandrian

² Isaak Jacob Schmidt, *Ueber die Verwandschaft der Gnostisch-Theosophischen Lehren mit den Religionssystemen des Orients, vorzueglich des Buddhismus* (1825).

³ Cf. B. Breloer et F. Boemer, "Fontes historiae religionum Indicarum," in *Fontes historiae religionum*, VII, ed. C. Clemen.

⁴ Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.*, V, 9.

⁵ *Strom.*, VI, 5, 38.

⁶ *De principiis*, III, 3, 2.

intellectual circles as it is among some Western intellectuals today. Erich Seeberg has suggested a most ingenious explanation for the concrete historical relation between Indian and Alexandrian philosophy. At the beginnings of neo-Platonic philosophy stands the somewhat mysterious Ammonios Sakkas, the teacher both of Plotinus and the Christian theologian Origen.⁷ Seeberg⁸ makes it highly probable that Ammonios was a Buddhist monk. The name "Sakkas", which through the joke of a Bishop⁹ was for centuries taken as *σακκοφόρος*, pack-carrier, points to the fact that Ammonios belonged to the Sakyan clan. This suggestion fits in with Porphyrius' report that Plotinus, under the influence of Ammonios, was interested in Indian philosophy, and even tried, though without success, to go to India. Ammonios Sakkas presents the Alexandrian link between Indian (Buddhist) theology and Christian and pagan neo-Platonism and this connection explains why we are "forcibly reminded" of Hindu and Buddhist terminology in neo-Platonic theology. The mystical tradition of neo-Platonic Christian theology, beginning with Clemens Alexandrinus and Origen, blots out, however, the last trace of a "paradox of faith" in Paul's sense of the term. The Alexandrian school of theology is an orthodox variation of general gnosticism. In the issue between *πίστις* and *γνῶσις* the Alexandrians stand, as Clement once openly said, on the side of *γνῶσις*. Christian mystical neo-Platonism shares some features with the Buddhist *via negativa*, because both belong morphologically in the "class" of *γνῶσις*, of gnostic speculation.

What is at question is not the methodological device of paradox. For we find this device in various fields of intellectual activity: mathematics, logic, epistemology, metaphysics and theology. Either the term "paradox of faith" has a concrete and morphologically determined meaning, or the term means everything and therefore nothing. "Nirvana" may be a *numen*, but it

⁷ Porphyrius, *Vita Plotini*, c. 3, c. 14; Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.*, VI, 19.

⁸ Erich Seeberg, "Ammonios Sakkas," in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, LX. Cf. Ernst Benz, *Indische Einflüsse auf die frühchristliche Theologie*.

⁹ Theodoret, "Graecorum affectionum curatio," sermo VI, Migne P. G., LXXXIII, 868.

certainly does not denote anything that one has "faith" in, and is consequently not a "paradox of faith." The contraries in the term Nirvana: life—cessation of life, annihilation—bliss, are not resolved by faith. The contraries are opposites "out" of which the truth shines through by itself. No positive "credo" is necessary; only silence is legitimate. The Christian paradox of faith has nothing to do with logical contradiction or metaphysical opposition. It is the belief in Jesus as the crucified Messiah that contradicts Paul's religious *doxa*, as long as he is yet Saul. In short, the division between the realm of πίστις and the realm of γνῶσις is primordial, and though the motif of paradox occurs in both realms it signifies different matters. If such considerations are taken seriously it is impossible to confuse Eckhart's gnostic division between *deitas* and *deus* with Luther's pistic division between *deus absconditus* (the God of wrath and justice) and *deus revelatus* (God in Christo) (p. 110).

4. Professor Slater's general thesis on the nature of the paradox of faith determines his discussion of Buddhism. A survey of the long history of Buddhism shows that it has been at different times and in different settings a religious movement. Through the many veils of the legend Gautama Buddha shines through as a young noble of the Sakyan clan in Northern India some six centuries before the Christian era, who combined a sage-moral insight with a religious charisma. He brought to his disciples a gospel and preached "the Middle Way" in his first sermon at Benares. The new discipline he enjoined "making vision, making knowledge, would lead on to peace, to wisdom, to enlightenment, to Nirvana." Gautama could announce this gospel because he himself had attained enlightenment; he had become a "Buddha," an Enlightened One (p. 7).

Buddhism is indeed a crux in the history of religion, a sceptic "philosophy," that turns into the gospel of a "world-religion." The case of Buddhism is usually cited as an "exception" among the historical religions, since originally it had no doctrine of god. Professor Slater contests this commonly held opinion and describes most vividly the religious life of the Buddhist communities in Burma, revealing the intimate relationship between the monastic life and the Burmese cultural pattern. The Burmese religion is

a religion that permeates the life of the community. Professor Slater's sections on Animism and Buddhism, Monastery and Community, and his divisions of the Characteristics of Burmese Buddhism should help to dispel prejudices in current Western religious discourse. His account of the popular ideas of Nirvana and of the more learned interpretations of the monasteries is also illuminating. But the author's theoretical interpretation of the material is questionable, and his interpretation of the paradox of faith tends to confuse the idea of Nirvana.

5. In their attempt to illuminate the meaning of the term "Nirvana," Western scholars have searched through the available manuscripts and commentaries for any word that might bear upon the vexed question. It never occurred to anyone that the "simplest and best way" to find out what the term "Nirvana" means was "to ask one or two of the more intelligent among the living representatives of the religion" in which the term is used to express a leading symbol (p. 6). This method may indeed be the simplest way, and it inspired the author's research on the spot. But is it necessarily the "best way"?

Would anyone advise Buddhist scholars to go to Italy and ask laymen in villages and learned monks in monasteries about the original meaning of some basic Christian concepts like "kingdom of Heaven" or "justification by faith"? A critical study of basic Christian concepts reveals that already one generation after Paul the original eschatological meaning of the basic concepts of Paul's theology had fallen into oblivion. The meaning of the basic Christian concepts has undergone considerable change throughout history. It would be hopeless to ask the "living representatives" of the religion about the "original" meaning of some basic Christian concepts. I do not mean to invalidate the method of "field study" where ritual and custom are involved, but some more caution is advisable when it is a question of basic terms which can change their original meaning without notice.

6. Etymologically the term "Nirvana" signifies "dying out, cessation, extinction" (p. 77). The prevailing metaphor in Buddhist literature is "extinction of fire." Earlier interpreters too easily concluded that Nirvana means the extinction of life itself. Negation could only refer to the dying out of the soul. Therefore

the issue arose whether Nirvana means an "eternal trance" or the "absolute annihilation" of the soul. Professor Slater shares with some other scholars the opinion that the "dying out" refers not to life itself but to the three-fold fire, which corrupts life: the fire of lust, the fire of ill-will, and the fire of stupidity and ignorance. Thus he arrives at the conclusion that the term "Nirvana" signifies an affirmation rather than an ultimate negation, an affirmation clothed in negative terms (p. 77). It is reasonable to doubt whether the term "Nirvana," conceived only as annihilation, could have been the goal of a missionary gospel, as Buddhist teaching was from the start.

From this just consideration Professor Slater goes further and draws conclusions which are incongruent with the Buddhist grammar of motives. He accepts the judgement of Father Taymans d'Eypernon that the term "Nirvana" means "*l'épanouissement de la personne*," the flowering of the personality, and endorses his conclusion concerning the Buddhist conception of the soul as "significant" because it is derived from studies pursued in Ceylon (p. 4). Father d'Eypernon "suggests that it is partly the failure to note the scholastic definition of the soul which has prevented the full recognition of the implications of the Buddhist approach. Buddhism, he concludes, is not inconsistent; it is incomplete—incomplete because it provides no principle of unity" (p. 81). This principle of unity will obviously be provided by scholastic philosophy. But how can the scholastic doctrine of the soul (based on the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle) suddenly turn into a matrix for the interpretation of Buddhist concepts? It smacks too much of apologetics and reveals a tendency toward syncretism in method.

7. The Achilles' heel of Professor Slater's thesis seems to me his interpretation of the ambivalences in the term "Nirvana" in terms of the "paradox of faith" (p. 87). That the term is at once positive and negative, that the term is "essentially a religious symbol" does in no way require that Nirvana be a "paradox of faith." The basic religious concept of the sacred is ambivalent and includes polar meanings; yet it would be quite misleading to term "sacred" a paradox of faith. An ultimate term in religion

signifies a *numen*, charged with opposite energies, qualities and motives, but not necessarily "paradox of faith."

The author's confusion begins with the concept of "faith" which he uses uncritically. Instead of capitalizing the term "faith" he should have determined, by analyzing the concept, its meaning and context. Such an analysis would have brought out into the open that it is meaningful for Paul in his *Epistle to the Romans* to mark the "faith" in the crucified Messiah as a paradox and that it is meaningless to speak of a "paradox of faith" in Mahayāna or Hīnayāna Buddhism. Paul develops the specifically Christian concept of faith out of his messianological paradox. Paul's concept of faith does not imply a paradox as regards his belief in God. God is never a question for Paul; only Jesus as the Messiah is a "paradox" for him. For the accepted *doxa* (accepted also by Paul) is that the Messiah is coming to redeem and to liberate the people of Israel and the world. The death of Jesus proves that he merely pretended to be the Messiah. That the *crucified* Jesus is the Messiah runs against the accepted *doxa*: it is a *paradox*. Therefore, according to Paul, faith in the dead Messiah is more important for man's salvation than all his "works and deeds." Therefore man is justified by faith in Jesus as the Messiah. Take Paul's paradox of faith out of its context and you are left with an empty cliché.

The emphasis on faith implies always an opposition to the gnostic religious consciousness. The paradox of faith is characteristic of religions of revelation where the abyss between the divine and the human cannot be bridged from the human side. Man has not the power to ascend to divine union. Grace can descend on man, but man cannot ascend to the divine. The religions of revelation stand opposed to the religions of enlightenment. Enlightenment is rooted in the human realm; therefore religions of enlightenment may also be atheistic.

8. In his last chapter: "In Conclusion and Without Conclusion" (pp. 112-21), Professor Slater develops the outline of a general theory of religious paradox. "Logical surgery of any kind is ruled inadmissible. The full *Yes* and the full *No* of the paradox must be sustained and the resultant tension is part of the truth which must be intimated. Only thus, in spite of the apparent contradiction can the truth which is discerned be

intimated." The challenge of logic is not debated. What is debated is the conclusion to be drawn from this challenge. The claim that the logician can be judge as well as challenger is rejected. If we seek the ground of this rejection we seem to be referred to some element of compulsion derived from the religious imagination. The language of religious paradox is the language of poetry rather than the language of prose. And it is a poetry which refuses to submit to the tribunal of prose, insisting that an imaginative contrast is not a fictitious contrast but one which reflects the impact of Reality. At the same time it insists that this revelation is not to be "confused with comprehension" (p. 116). Using a schema of Gershom Scholem that tries to demarcate the exact historical place of mysticism in the development of religious consciousness after the stage of "myth" and "religion," Professor Slater places the religious paradox in its "historical development" between the domains of "imaginative truth" and "religious logic" (p. 117). It remains ambiguous, however, whether the religious paradox is only a stage in the historical development of man's consciousness or whether a perennial human possibility is implied. The reference to Cassirer (p. 118) suggests the first possibility, the remark on the relation between "religion and critical philosophy" (p. 118), the second. Religion rebukes "the philosophic tendency to shut the door by premature definition or to disregard the full complexity of the data presented. Critical philosophy ignores this rebuke at its peril" (p. 118). It remains, however, open whether the author takes sides in the *γιναντομαχία*, in the basic issue between faith and wisdom. The program of the book tends toward an integration of the "paradox of faith" into the wisdom of the world, especially of India, and thus tends toward *γνώσις*.

Our critical discussion of the author's theoretical interpretation and philosophical tendency should not eclipse the excellent and instructive presentation of hitherto unknown material about Buddhist religious life in Burma. It is the "excursion" (p. 2) into the field of comparative religion we had to criticize; praise is due to the excellent study of Burmese religion as a living tradition of Hinayāna Buddhism.

Cambridge, Mass.

DISCUSSIONS

OPTO ERGO SUM:
A REPLY TO MR. EDDINS
NEWTON P. STALLKNECHT

I WELCOME Mr. Eddins' comment¹ on my article, "Decision and Existence,"² since it gives me an opportunity briefly to restate and perhaps to clarify my purpose in examining Leibniz' notion of human existence as presented in his theology. Let me say to begin with that I was not interested in establishing a *criterion* in terms of which we might say of any apparent object "this exists," or "this does not exist." However, I was and am still deeply concerned to give the notion of existence as it refers to conscious self-hood a genuine meaning. It seems to me that the theory of possibility and existence latent in Leibniz' theology renders the notion of personal existence meaningless. Leibniz' predicament becomes clear when I ask the question: Does this life of mine *exist* or am I a rejected possibility? On strictly Leibnizian grounds we have seen that this question cannot be answered. But we may avoid this predicament by reconsidering the relation of actual and possible. Certainly we must not fall into the essentialist error of considering my whole life as either actual or possible, i.e., as a passage in either an actual or a possible world. On the contrary, as a theater of decision, my life must involve an interplay of concrete actuality and open or disjunctive possibility. No one would argue that such possibility by itself constitutes the full meaning of existence. Nor, after consideration of Leibniz' possible worlds, can we argue with assurance that existence is adequately to be described as a system of concrete detail, for each possible world is a system of fully concrete compossibilities, internally complete, I should remind my critic, with spatio-temporal and

¹ This journal, VII, pp. 112-14.

² This journal, VI, pp. 31-44.

dynamic relations in Santayana's sense. Nonetheless, it may be that existence can be described by combining concretion and open possibility. It then appears as a decisive movement from open possibility to fully determinate actuality.

It would seem that "possibility," "concrete actuality," and "decision" are terms indispensable in describing my existence. It may also be that the meaning of no one of these three terms may be adequately conceived without reference to the other two. By preferring to follow Santayana, Mr. Eddins emphasizes concrete actuality. Now, as I read Santayana, existence like essence is a category, not strictly a "realm" of being, a category that we come to respect as we act and make decisions. It should not, even in Santayana's materialism, be considered in abstraction from critical situations. Santayana's animal faith accepts the presence of a concrete actuality, the "realm" of matter conceived as a field of action.³ I might add that a *human* faith will accept our act of decision that makes its terms with the changing conditions constituting this realm. Thus I have asserted that "to exist is to have an unfinished history and a problematic future, the two being united in decision." When I think of my own existence or that of my friends, I bear this meaning more or less clearly in mind. My own existence is apparent to me every time I consider my past and my open future as the margins of a decision that is being formulated in my mind. Suppose now that someone convinces me that my decisions do not face an open future but stand to their future in a strictly chronological relation comparable, let us say,

³ This becomes very clear in *The Realm of Matter* where Santayana insists upon the "forward tension" of each "natural moment," thus emphasizing the irreversibility of the flux of existence. Consider: "the nature of natural moments may be found written large in the conventional or dramatic moments of human experience. That the natural moment has a forward tension becomes the more plausible, or even certain, when we consider that we are describing elements of *existence* (not mathematical or dialectical patterns, which analysis might discover there) and that the field of existence is simply the field of action: for there is no doubt that in action a forward tension is inherent. Nor is it the agent only that has this movement; we have found that his partner in action, the brother-world on which he acts, must have it too, if they are to play the same game, and contribute to the same sequel" (p. 91).

to the relation of earlier and later events as portrayed in an elementary text-book of history. Then I must face the difficulties latent in Leibniz' theology.

With Mr. Eddins' comments in mind let us briefly consider two or three further questions: How do I come to believe that in making decisions I face an open future? Is this belief based on intuitive feeling? Is facing an open future not compatible with our inclusion in a Leibnizian possible world? Answers to these questions can only be indicated in what follows.

My belief in an open future has its origin in intuitive feeling, not, to be sure, in an intuition comparable to Santayana's contemplation of an essence, but comparable to a primitive experience like animal faith. The intuitive insight that we mention is not easily reported in verbal form except by giving it a colorless name such as "sense of alternatives." If one feels the need of expressing the content of this insight more explicitly, it may help to indicate certain situations in which such intuition is wholly absent. Consider the "flatness" apparent upon seeing a mediocre motion picture for the second or third time. Or compare the memory of a crisis in one's past with the sense of urgency or adventure attendant upon a decision that is in the making. (Here lies something of the difference between Hume's *impression* and *idea*, and also something which is involved in Santayana's notion of animal faith.)

Now, it would seem that for Leibniz' God all possible worlds are "past" in the sense that genuine alternatives do not interrupt their temporal texture. Further, if a creature comes to self-consciousness through recognizing his presence in a crisis that calls for decision, he is not in a "past" world, but in a world whose texture is broken by an unresolved problem or conflict. In this case, he is an agent, not a passage in a historical syllabus, even though we think of this syllabus as exhaustive in detail. No such record can then do him justice.

To be sure, we have been working all along from the assumption that our sense of being an agent and our sense of the open future, which our agency helps to close, are not illusions. Thus we are assuming that what Santayana calls *sentimental* or *dramatic* time, belief in which he recognizes as "natural and proper

to an animal spirit," is, philosophically speaking, as trustworthy as animal faith. For my part, I can see no grounds for trusting one and challenging the other. Santayana's animal faith presents us with a *field of action*. From this experience our sense of natural substance is said to spring. I might suggest that when we consider the notion of a field of action, the term *action* must be emphasized as heavily as *field*. If we are to make this emphasis we must unite our awareness of an open or ambiguous future with animal faith. So reinterpreted, animal faith may be seen to lead as directly toward our self-consciousness as it does to an awareness of natural substance. To be sure, Santayana has offered us the notion of "shock," or awareness of sudden interruption or frustration, as a supplement to animal faith in order to explain the origin of belief in an enduring or "interruptible" self. But surely this shock must be combined with a sense of alternatives if the discovery of an *active* self is to follow. Again, one must admit that even at this point to reinterpret decisive consciousness ingeniously within a framework of determinism is possible but as unreasonable or wayward, it seems to me, as to reduce natural substances to bundles of sense data, a move that Santayana himself would never approve.

Indiana University.

HARTSHORNE AND THE INTERPRETATION OF WHITEHEAD

A. H. JOHNSON

IN his discussion of "a prevalent misinterpretation" of Whitehead's theory of God¹, Hartshorne suddenly shifts his "fire" from Paul Weiss and remarks: "Johnson rather arbitrarily denies this

¹ Charles Hartshorne, "The Immortality of the Past: Critique of a Prevalent Misinterpretation," this journal, VII, pp. 98-112.

[Hartshorne's interpretation of a statement by Whitehead], softening his misdeed by the word 'apparently' (p. 109).

It is true that Hartshorne apparently softens the impact of his criticism by the word "rather." However, the accused begs leave to defend himself against the charge of being arbitrary and of perpetrating a misdeed.

Hartshorne is willing to admit that Whitehead is open to several interpretations. Concerning the question of the status of the past, he contends that according to Whitehead the "entire past" (p. 98) is retained in God's consequent nature. He grants that some of Whitehead's statements seem to support another view. Nevertheless, he argues that the weight of evidence sanctions his interpretation. He offers, as a decisive quotation, the following: "the many are one everlastingly, without the qualification of any loss either of individual identity or completeness of unity" (*Process and Reality*, p. 532). Hartshorne is convinced that the only proper way to deal with this statement is to accept it literally and hence conclude that, in Whitehead's opinion, God's consequent nature includes other actual entities without loss. He then states that "Johnson rather arbitrarily denies this," i.e., the interpretation that this statement should be taken literally to mean that there is no loss of the past as far as God's experience is concerned.

It seems to me that Hartshorne is arbitrary in making this judgment. The page of my book (*Whitehead's Theory of Reality*) to which he refers (p. 65) includes a discussion of the quotation in question. My interpretation of it, which indeed differs from his, is based on a number of quotations, from the writings of Whitehead, which are provided in my book or referred to in footnotes. Thus it seems appropriate to suggest that my interpretation is not arbitrary. It is not arbitrary because it is based on an examination of relevant sections of Whitehead's writings including the quotations offered by Hartshorne and, in addition, other statements which he apparently does not regard with sufficient seriousness. In short I *have shown* why I understand Whitehead to contend that all available data are *not* prehended positively by God and hence *why* the statement quoted by Hartshorne "apparently" should not be interpreted as he suggests.

The arguments in support of my interpretation, drawn from the writings of Whitehead, receive decisive support from comments appended by Whitehead to a manuscript which I prepared under his supervision, and fully discussed with him, during the academic year 1936-37. Some pages of this manuscript (in photostatic reproduction) have been included in *Whitehead's Theory of Reality*. On page 216 it is suggested that when Whitehead states that "the consequent nature of God is composed of a multiplicity of elements with individual self-realization" (*Process and Reality*, p. 531), this is not an *accurate* expression of his actual point of view. Whitehead accepted this criticism as his marginal note indicates. Further, on page 217 it is claimed that *some* available data are *eliminated* from God's nature. Whitehead did not object to this statement. Indeed in his note at the foot of the page he suggested that negative prehension has a place in God's experience. This certainly implies loss.

More specifically, Hartshorne argues that all past actual entities are retained in God without any loss of "immediacy or vividness." He states that "to become past or perish is not to alter" (p. 109). Yet Whitehead himself is convinced that "actual entities 'perpetually perish' subjectively. . . . Actuality in perishing acquires objectivity, while it loses subjective immediacy" (*Process and Reality*, p. 44). Further, there is the statement which claims that each ordinary actual entity (other than God) reaches the final stage of its career when "its own internal existence has evaporated, worn out and satisfied" (*Process and Reality*, p. 336). This is the condition which must be fulfilled before any actual entity is available for prehension by any other actual entity, even if that other entity be God.²

I find myself in agreement with Hartshorne when he interprets Whitehead to mean that evil is present in the experience of God.³ (I would say *some* evil.) My disagreement begins when Hartshorne claims that for Whitehead there is no loss of the past as far as God is concerned. In making this claim it seems that he is finding more of Royce's theory of truth in Whitehead than

² See *Whitehead's Theory of Reality*, pp. 28-29.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

is actually there. In any case, I am of the opinion that Hartshorne has arbitrarily accused me of being "rather arbitrary." In this instance at least my *reputed* "misdeed," I trust, is missing from the experience of God in whose vision truth is found.

University of Western Ontario.

EXPLORATIONS

THE SCEPTICAL CRISIS AND THE RISE OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY, III

RICHARD H. POPKIN

IN the second half of the 17th century the Pyrrhonian controversy continued with the sceptics trying to destroy the new philosophy and to show that it really did not solve any of the difficulties. A new set of Pyrrhonists arose to replace the earlier ones, and a new group of rationalists arose to defend the knowledge of the new world. The early leader of the 17th century Pyrrhonists, Gassendi, gradually deserted the cause, and became an exponent of Epicurean materialism as a way of justifying the new science. He did not give up his doubts about our abilities to know the world as it really is, but insisted that the deceptions in experience gave us a clue as to its probable nature. The differences in experience at least prove that the way we experience the world depends upon our organs and an unknown object. We can know the way objects appear to us, the way they are in relation to me, and from this infer their probable natures in terms of what might cause my experiences to be as they are. The variety of experiences require some real objects with real properties to explain them. These objects are most probably the atoms that Epicurus had talked of. This non-sceptical Gassendi still realized that he could not answer his earlier objections, but was convinced that some causes must exist of our experience.¹⁸⁹

The main battles of the Pyrrhonists were not fought with Gassendi, but with the later followers of Cartesian rationalism.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. Petrus Gassendi, *Syntagma Philosophicum in Opera*, I, pp. 67-84. In these epistemological discussions cited above, Gassendi always tries to adopt a middle position between a dogmatic claim to knowledge of reality and complete scepticism. These later views of Gassendi are discussed in Pintard, *Le Libertinage*, pp. 492 ff.; George S. Brett, *The Philosophy of Gassendi*, pp. 1-13; Sortais, *La Philosophie moderne depuis Bacon jusqu'à Leibniz*, Chap. iv.

Pascal saw the Pyrrhonian view as invincible; all science was in doubt, if we appealed only to rational evidence. No axioms or principles could be found which were indubitable, and all one could conclude was that "Pyrrhonism is true."¹⁶⁰ As long as there are dogmatists, the Pyrrhonists will conquer.¹⁶¹ Reason forces one to Pyrrhonism. Nature however refuses to let us doubt everything.¹⁶² Only through God's grace can we get out of this predicament of being sceptics by reason and dogmatists by nature, and only through the mysteries of faith can we be saved from the *crise pyrrhonienne*.¹⁶³

Pascal's fellow worshipper at Port-Royal, Antoine Arnauld was more hopeful of defeating Pyrrhonism. He rested his case on Descartes' doctrine of clear and distinct ideas as the bulwark that could stem the tide of scepticism and save the new science. In the *Port Royal Logic*, Arnauld had said of the rule that whatever is clearly conceived must be true,

We cannot dispute this principle without destroying the whole evidence of human knowledge and establishing an absurd Pyrrhonism. For we can judge of things only by the ideas which we have of them, since the only means we have of conceiving them is through our ideas. Now if the judgments which we form by considering these ideas do not regard things in themselves . . . it is plain that we could have no knowledge of *things*, but simply, of our *thoughts*, and consequently we should know nothing of the things we are persuaded that we know most certainly; but we should only know that we think them to be so and so, which would manifestly destroy all science.¹⁶⁴

Thus, Arnauld saw that if one abandoned the principle of clear and distinct ideas, the *crise pyrrhonienne* would again recur. The absurdity of denying that we possessed knowledge of an external world would have to be accepted. Fortunately, Arnauld believed, it was impossible to be a Pyrrhonist. One just could not sincerely assert that all was in doubt. "The Pyrrhonists are not a sect of people persuaded of what they say, but a sect of

¹⁶⁰ Pascal, *Pensées*, No. 432, p. 527.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, No. 374, pp. 499-500.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, No. 387, p. 506, No. 395, p. 508, and No. 434, pp. 528-35.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, Nos. 432-37, pp. 527-36, and Pascal, *Entretien avec M. de Saci*, pp. 150-55.

¹⁶⁴ Arnauld, *L'Art de Penser*, pp. 378-79.

liars."¹⁶⁵ Men did believe in clear and distinct ideas as true and had to save the new science from destruction.

The last phase of this history of thought, the Pyrrhonian destruction of Cartesian rationalism, stems from the great French rationalist of the last part of the 17th century, Father Nicholas Malebranche, who tried to eliminate certain dubious aspects of Descartes' thesis. These were the insistence that God could not deceive us, and therewith the Cartesian proof of the existence of a real external world describable in mathematical terms. Malebranche insisted that we could offer no demonstration of the existence of an external world. Our knowledge was only of ideas in the mind of God. We could clearly and distinctly know what he called "intelligible extension," the pure mathematical conceptions, but could never know "visible extension," the configurations in the sense world, since they were not clear and distinct. The only evidence that the world of intelligible extension bore any relation to a real world outside of our minds and God's, was not that God was no deceiver, but solely that the first chapter of *Genesis* reported that an external world existed. Such evidence was not demonstrative, but only convincing.¹⁶⁶ We saw all things in God, and through our faith in Him believed that what we saw also in some way applied to the external world. It was not necessary that God create such a world, since if it were God would be limited in what he could do. Hence it was a contingent and irrational fact that such a world existed.¹⁶⁷

The only things that we could know existed, were those that we could clearly and distinctly conceive, viz. the ideas in God's Mind, especially those of intelligible extension.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. xx-xxi. This type of rejection of scepticism as incapable of acceptance by rational and psychologically balanced men also appears in Henry More, *The Immortality of the Soul*, in *Philosophical Writings of Henry More*, ed. by Flora Isabel McKinnon, p. 59. (This work of More's first appeared in 1662.)

¹⁶⁶ Nicholas Malebranche, *Réponse du Père Malebranche au Livre des vraies et des fausses Idées*, in *Œuvres philosophiques d'Antoine Arnauld*, ed. by Jules Simon, pp. 443-50; Nicholas Malebranche, *De la Recherche de la Vérité*, ed. by Geneviève Lewis, Vol. III, *Eclaircissement VI*, pp. 24-33, and *Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion*, pp. 75-77.

¹⁶⁷ Malebranche, *Dialogues on Metaphysics*, pp. 166-67.

Arnauld saw that Malebranche's doctrines, if "strictly taken, tend[s] to the establishment of a very dangerous Pyrrhonism."¹⁶⁸ A new sceptical challenger, the Abbé Simon Foucher, 1644-1696, tried to prove this claim; showing that the sceptical arguments would annihilate the rationalist contentions of both Malebranche and Descartes by making every truth that we could know a matter of faith. In 1675 Foucher published his *Critique de la Recherche de la Vérité* against Malebranche. Over and over again Foucher maintained that the rationalism of Descartes and Malebranche fails to answer the Pyrrhonian and Academic attack.¹⁶⁹ Their philosophical system never actually shows that there are necessary truths, or that we can recognize them.¹⁷⁰ The alleged truth of mathematical propositions cannot really be proved.¹⁷¹ We can never extend our information about our ideas to a world outside of us.¹⁷² The same sort of reasons that both Descartes and Malebranche gave for doubting sense information, applies equally well to propositions about the so-called "primary qualities" of extension and motion. We are just as much deceived about the size and shape and movement of things as we are about colors and tastes of things. And so, we must become Pyrrhonians about whether objects really are extended and moving, and hence whether the new science describes anything except our own ideas.¹⁷³ Finally, even the truth of God's existence is unnecessary. Why must God make Himself such that He has to exist?¹⁷⁴ If we cannot find any necessary truths, then the quest for certainty is over. Foucher suggested many times that he conceived of the role of modern philosophy as a way of defeating Pyrrhonism and Academic

¹⁶⁸ Quoted in Pierre Bayle, *Dictionnaire*, art. "Zenon," Rem. H, note 98, Vol. XV, p. 51.

¹⁶⁹ Foucher, *Critique de la Recherche de la Vérité*, pp. 17-18, 22, 31, 35; and *Réponse pour la Critique*, pp. 19, 25, 42 and 109.

¹⁷⁰ Foucher, *Critique de la Recherche de la Vérité*, pp. 26-30, and *Réponse pour la Critique*, p. 94.

¹⁷¹ Foucher, *Réponse pour la Critique*, pp. 21-23.

¹⁷² Foucher, *Critique de la Recherche de la Vérité*, pp. 44-50.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 78-80.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

scepticism, and yet, if Foucher's criticisms are valid, the Pyrrhonists and Academics have won.¹⁷⁵

Malebranche offered the rationalist rebuttal to Foucher in the preface to the second volume of *De la Recherche de la Vérité* in 1675.¹⁷⁶ This rebuttal was discussed by Foucher in a second attack against Malebranche written in the same year.¹⁷⁷ The first line of defense that Malebranche offered was to insist that there must be necessary truths, or else nothing is certain. All certainty depends upon there being some necessary truths. Their truth cannot be proved, because these truths are the basic ones.¹⁷⁸ If one asked for proof of these truths, Malebranche could only throw up his hands in despair and confess that "for my part I know not what he wants" and "this is not to philosophize."¹⁷⁹ In the second attack of Foucher, he claimed that what Descartes and Malebranche needed was to find the criterion of truth. With this they could tell when our ideas represented matters as they really are. With the discovery of the criterion we might know that our ideas of extension were true, etc.¹⁸⁰ If the criterion could not be sustained then the Pyrrhonists would conquer. Hence, as Arnauld had observed, the criterion, the principle of clear and distinct ideas, was the ultimate bulwark against the sceptical menace.

But Malebranche had already admitted too much of the Pyrrhonian case. He had admitted that we could not prove with certainty that an external world existed corresponding to our clear and distinct conceptions, and that God could be a deceiver. All that we could be sure of was the truth of our clear and distinct

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 17-18 and 30-31, and *Réponse pour la Critique*, pp. 19, 42 and 109.

¹⁷⁶ Malebranche, *De la Recherche de la Vérité*, 2nd edition, Vol. II, Preface "Pour servir de réponse à la critique du premier volume." This answer to Foucher was omitted in all French editions from the fourth on. It also appears in the first English edition of 1692, translated by Thomas Taylor.

¹⁷⁷ Foucher, *Réponse pour la Critique, à la préface du second volume de la Recherche de la Vérité*.

¹⁷⁸ Malebranche, *De la Recherche*, Preface to Vol. II. The preface is unnumbered. This passage occurs on the seventeenth page.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 17th and 21st pages.

¹⁸⁰ Foucher, *Réponse pour la Critique*, p. 19-20 and 25.

conceptions. Foucher had challenged this by demanding to know why such conceptions had to be true. Malebranche had answered by reasserting that they were true, or nothing else could be.

The Pyrrhonist attack against this modified rationalism of Malebranche was developed by the great "defender of Pyrrhonism," Pierre Bayle, 1647-1706. He was the late 17th century version of a "philosophe," a man who attacked and ridiculed the religious and metaphysical orthodoxy of the day. From his academic chair, first at Sedan, and later at Rotterdam, he challenged the Catholics, the Calvinists, the Cartesians and all other dogmatists of the time. He had early come to the conclusion that the Pyrrhonists were the only sane philosophers in being dubious of everything.¹⁸¹ For a brief time Bayle was a Cartesian, when the Jesuits attacked these doctrines, and then through reading Sextus Empiricus, Gassendi, Foucher and others, he came to see that the sceptics could easily overturn the rationalism of Descartes and Malebranche, and hence Bayle came to advocate his "Pyrrhonisme historique." The best exposition of Bayle's scepticism appears in the footnotes of several of his articles in his monumental *Historical and Critical Dictionary*. In the notes to the articles on Pyrrho and Zeno, Bayle saw modern philosophy as a system built on accepting the Pyrrhonian doubts found in Sextus Empiricus with regard to the real existence of sense objects, and yet trying to maintain that there were no doubts with regard to the real existence of the mathematical qualities of extension and motion. The new philosophers insisted on the Pyrrhonian view that sense qualities like color, heat, etc., were just modifications of our minds, or mere appearances. However, due to the argument of Malebranche that there is no demonstration of the existence of a real world, and Foucher's sceptical attack on the possible real existence of the mathematical qualities, the modern philosophers were now reduced to being complete Pyrrhonists.¹⁸² Once Descartes had accepted

¹⁸¹ Pierre Bayle, letter to Minutoli, January 31, 1673 in Pierre Bayle, *Œuvres diverses*, Vol. IV, pp. 539-43, and *Critique générale de l'Histoire du Calvinisme*, in *Œuvres diverses*, Vol. II, pp. 10-11. (This work was first published in 1682.) Portions of both of these passages appear in *Pierre Bayle*, ed. by Marcel Raymond, pp. 47-51, and 63-68.

¹⁸² Cf. Bayle, *Dictionnaire*, Vol. XII, art. "Pyrrhon," Rem. B, pp. 101-

the Pyrrhonian arguments about the unreliability of sense knowledge, it was only a matter of time until his position would become that of Pyrrhonism. Any doctrine maintaining the real existence of a physical world could be shown to be self-contradictory. Our alleged clear and distinct ideas of mathematics were dubious when considered either as descriptions of reality or as part of a consistent logical structure.¹⁸³

What assurance do we have that we are not deceived when we judge that extension and motion belong to bodies? None, and there is the triumph of Pyrrhonism according to Bayle.¹⁸⁴ Our mathematical ideas are paradoxical.¹⁸⁵ If there is a God, He seems to deceive us all the time, since He makes us believe that the world of our senses is real, when all modern philosophers agree in denying that this is possible.¹⁸⁶ We have no criterion of truth, since the most evident propositions, those that are most clear and distinct, are false if our religion is true.¹⁸⁷ We can only arrive at Pyrrhonism, if we try to understand our world. If we give up trying to understand, and accept matters on faith, this is fine until we try to find evidence for our faith, in which case we arrive back at Pyrrhonism.¹⁸⁸ We either live with an irrational and indefensible faith, or else a Pyrrhonian view that all we know are appearances, and we never know if there is any reality corresponding to them, or any certainty to be found in them.

102; and Vol. XV, art. "Zénon," Rem. G and H, pp. 44-45 and 49-52, and "III^e Eclaircissement, Sur les Pyrrhoniens," pp. 310-11.

¹⁸³ Ibid., art. "Zénon," Vol. XV, Rem. G, pp. 41-49.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., art. "Pyrrhon," Vol. VII, Rem. B, p. 102, and art. "Zénon," Vol. XV, Rem. H, pp. 49-52; Bouiller, *Histoire de la Philosophie cartésienne*, Vol. II, p. 487; François Picavet, "Bayle," in *La Grande Encyclopédie*, Vol. V, p. 951; Jean Delvolvé, *Religion, Critique et Philosophie positive chez Pierre Bayle*, pp. 252-53 and 256; F. Pillon, "Le Scepticisme de Bayle," *L'Année philosophique*, IV, pp. 193-94; and Richard H. Popkin, "Berkeley and Pyrrhonism," this journal, VI, pp. 227-31.

¹⁸⁵ Bayle, *Dictionnaire*, art. "Zénon," XV, Rem. G, pp. 41-49, and Letter to Des Maizeaux, July 3, 1705, in *Œuvres diverses*, IV, p. 859.

¹⁸⁶ Bayle, *Dictionnaire*, art. "Pyrrhon," Rem. B, XII, p. 102.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., art. "Pyrrhon," Rem. B, XII, pp. 102-05, and "Eclaircissement III^e sur les Pyrrhoniens," XV, pp. 310-24.

¹⁸⁸ Bayle, *Dictionnaire*, "Eclaircissement sur les Pyrrhoniens," XV, pp. 313-24.

This scepticism of Bayle was an extremely popular view in the beginning of the 18th century.¹⁸⁹ It is probably the theory that Bishop Berkeley was attacking when he announced that his works were directed against the sceptics.¹⁹⁰ Berkeley believed that he had found the source of all scepticism in the distinction between the real world and the sense world. No evidence could be found for the existence of a real world, or any qualities that could belong to it. Berkeley made great use of the Pyrrhonian arguments to show that all of our knowledge was limited to the appearances or ideas in our minds. But here Berkeley found his answer to the sceptics. The world of appearance is the real world, *esse est percipi*, and we have genuine and certain knowledge.¹⁹¹

The early 18th century rationalists saw Berkeley as one more Pyrrhonist, a worthy man who set out to destroy Pyrrhonism and ended up by advocating it.¹⁹² One of the rationalists, the Chevalier Ramsay, 1686-1743, believed that he had discovered the answer to Pyrrhonism. Ramsay, a Scot, had had a *crise pyrrhonienne* in his youth,¹⁹³ in which all was in doubt, and then was saved by his conversion to Catholicism by the French

¹⁸⁹ The *Dictionnaire* went through many editions in French and English between 1700 and 1750. It appeared in French in 1697, 1702, 1715, 1720, 1730, 1734, 1738, 1740 and 1741, and in English, 1710, 1734-38, 1734-1741. As further indication of Bayle's popularity, in Buhle's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, IV, the section on the history of the new philosophy during the eighteenth century up to Kant begins with a chapter devoting about one hundred pages to Bayle and his influence.

¹⁹⁰ Cf. the evidence cited in R. H. Popkin, *op. cit.*

¹⁹¹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 232-39; and George Berkeley, *Philosophical Commentaries*, in *The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne*, ed. by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, I, entries 79, 411 and 606, pp. 15, 52 and 75; *The Principles of Human Knowledge*, in *Works*, II, pp. 47-48, 57, 79; and *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, in *Works*, II, pp. 167-68, 174-207, 215-17, 226-29, 246 and 258.

¹⁹² This was the view of Andrew Baxter and Jean-Pierre de Crousaz. See following Baxter's *Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, Vol. II, p. 284; Crousaz's *Examen du Pyrrhonisme*, p. 97, and *A New Treatise of the Art of Thinking*, I, p. 42. This interpretation of Berkeley is discussed in Popkin, *op. cit.* David Hume also shared this view in his *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (Oxford, 1951), p. 155.

¹⁹³ Cf. Albert Cherel, "Ramsay et la 'Tolérance' de Fénelon," *Revue du Dix-Huitième Siècle*, V, p. 19.

rationalist theologian Fénelon. According to Ramsay, the reason for the continuing sceptical crisis was that people had not distinguished between the levels of assurance that we could have. The Pyrrhonists demanded demonstrative certainty that a world exists, and that its properties could be known. But Ramsay pointed out such a certainty could only be found regarding mathematical and theological propositions, but not statements about the world around us. The only sort of evidence we could have about the latter were reasons for believing and lack of doubts. We are led or forced to believe that there is a world outside of us, and that it has certain characteristics, because we have clear ideas which lead us to convictions even when we cannot obtain demonstrative certainty. If one insists upon doubting when demonstrative certainty is lacking, one will fall into a Pyrrhonian delirium and conclude that life is a dream, or that all the world is in one's mind. If one is reasonable and accepts convincing views whenever demonstrative certainty is unattainable, then the *crise pyrrhonienne* will be at an end.¹⁹⁴

The scepticism of Pierre Bayle and the answer to Pyrrhonism of people like the Chevalier Ramsay, I believe led to the conclusion of this tale, the decisive Pyrrhonism of David Hume, 1711-1776. Ramsay was a benefactor of Hume's, and there is much evidence that Hume read his works.¹⁹⁵ Bayle was one of Hume's favorite authors, and much material in Hume's writings is borrowed from him.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁴ Cf. Ramsay's, *Voyages de Cyrus*, Book VI, pp. 228-35. This type of answer to Pyrrhonism was also offered by Andrew Baxter in his *Enquiry*, Vol. II, pp. 261-68, 272-76, 301 and 316-18. These views of Baxter and Ramsay are discussed in R. H. Popkin, "David Hume and the Pyrrhonian Controversy," *Review of Metaphysics*, VI, pp. 67-71.

¹⁹⁵ Cf. David Hume, *The Letters of David Hume*, ed. by J. Y. T. Greig, Vol. I, pp. 19-22; *The Natural History of Religion*, in *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects* (London, 1768), II, pp. 497n-499, where Hume quotes from one of Ramsay's works and discusses him; and *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Oxford, 1949), p. 124, where Hume appears to be paraphrasing Ramsay's *Voyages de Cyrus*, pp. 229n-30n. More about Hume's relations to Ramsay is given in Popkin, op. cit., 75-76.

¹⁹⁶ Cf. Hume, *Letters*, I, p. 12; "Hume's Early Memoranda, 1729-1740: The Complete Text," edited with foreword by Ernest Campbell Mossner, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, IX, pp. 494-95, 498 and 500-02; Nor-

Hume saw that rationalists in the tradition of Descartes and Malebranche had "let the cat out of the bag." They had admitted that the Pyrrhonian doubts about the nature and existence of a real world were irrefutable. The whole of modern philosophy, he claimed, was built on denying that sense qualities are real, and insisting that the mathematical ones were the real ones.¹⁹⁷ But if we follow this view about the contents of the real world to its conclusion, "we utterly annihilate all these objects, and reduce ourselves to the opinions of the most extravagant scepticism concerning them."¹⁹⁸ We find that we have no reason or basis for believing there is a real world. If we press these doubts farther we find no reason for believing that a soul or self exists, that there are any causal connections between events, and finally that with regard to none of our ideas are we ever possessed of any certainty. We can find no criterion, no principles and no beliefs that we can accept with certainty. Hume carried the sceptical arguments to their final catastrophic end by his careful and brilliant analysis of human knowledge. The utmost debacle of human reason is that what we believe, and have to believe, is full of contradictions. Our most solid reasonings contradict one another, and nothing is left.¹⁹⁹ Once we can begin doubting, we can find no resting place.

The Cartesian doubt, therefore, were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable; and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject.²⁰⁰

man Kemp Smith, *The Philosophy of David Hume*, pp. 325-38 and 506-16; and David Hume, *Dialogues on Natural Religion*, Kemp Smith's introduction, pp. 80-86.

¹⁹⁷ Hume, *Treatise*, pp. 226-27.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 228.

¹⁹⁹ Cf. R. H. Popkin, "David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and his Critique of Pyrrhonism," *Philosophical Quarterly*, I, pp. 388-94; and references there to Hume's writings. The clearest statements of this debacle of reason occur in the *Treatise*, Part IV, Chaps. 1 and 2, and conclusion, the appendix discussion on personal identity, pp. 633-36, and the last section of the *Enquiry*.

²⁰⁰ Hume, *Enquiry*, p. 150.

What saves us from forever wandering in doubt is that nature compels us to believe various things. This forced belief is not like the criterion of truth of the rationalists; it is no guarantee that what we believe is true. On the theoretical level everything is forever in doubt.²⁰¹ But due to certain psychological factors in human nature we do not doubt. Ramsay's view that we can and must accept indemonstrable matters is correct but does not end the Pyrrhonian menace. We can never know if our forced beliefs in the existence of an external world, a self, a God, etc., are true. We are forced to believe contradictory matters. What we believe and why we believe it are totally different matters than finding out what is true. What we mean by a clear and distinct belief is solely a strong conviction that we have. We can find out the causes of such beliefs, but can never prove whether or not they are true.²⁰² Thus we are told by Hume that all dogmatists must admit that there are absolutely insoluble difficulties with regard to all knowledge, and yet the sceptics, notwithstanding these difficulties, must admit that we have to believe all sorts of matters about various subjects.²⁰³

And so, in the hundred years from Descartes to Hume, a full circle is completed. Modern philosophy begins in a sceptical crisis, which Descartes tried to resolve with his criterion that whatever is clear and distinct must be accepted as true because God would not deceive us. On this basis the attack against the truth of the new science is met. And then a hundred years later, after a constant struggle between the rationalists and the Pyrrhonists, Hume finally reconstituted the sceptical crisis, and showed that ultimately no guarantee of certainty could be found for our knowledge. All we could ever have is a psychological basis for belief, a conviction caused by certain psychological factors, but never a guarantee of truth.

²⁰¹ Cf. Hume, *Dialogues*, p. 135.

²⁰² Cf. R. H. Popkin, *op cit.*, pp. 394-407 for a discussion of this side of Hume's view, and for references to Hume's writings. In the *Treatise* this theory comes out forcefully on pp. 183-84, 187, 218, and the conclusion. See also the last chapter of the *Enquiry*, and *Dialogues*, pp. 132-34.

²⁰³ Hume, *Dialogues*, p. 219n.

Philosophy after Hume would either have to live within its *crise pyrrhonienne*, or find a totally new way of building a bridge to certain knowledge of reality.

State University of Iowa.

NOTES AND OBSERVATIONS

ARISTOTLE'S OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEMS OF FIRST PHILOSOPHY

ROBERT S. BRUMBAUGH

In *Metaphysics* Beta, Aristotle first briefly outlines the problems which metaphysics must resolve, then goes through the outline in more detail, pointing out the difficulties confronting alternative resolutions.¹ If the *Metaphysics* as we have it is a unified and complete work, we would expect it to treat and solve at least all of the major coordinate problems of first philosophy. If these major difficulties are explicitly resolved, the answers to subordinate problems can be derived, and it is not necessary to the unity or completeness of the work that each of these subordinate "knots" be separately and explicitly untied, provided the principal bonds which hinder the progress of our understanding are loosened. Unless we know, then, what major problems metaphysics undertakes to resolve, we are not in a position to judge whether a given system or work (such as Aristotle's *Metaphysics*) is good and complete or not.

There is no agreement at all, however, among translators, editors, and scholars, as to what is the number of problems that Aristotle proposes, nor what are the relations of importance among them. The list is given sometimes as fourteen or fifteen, sometimes as six, as nine, as twelve, as eight, and various other numbers.² To a reader remembering the meticulous detail with which Aristotle told his students just how to construct topical

¹ *Metaphysics*, 994b24-995b17; 995b17-1003a17.

² Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* (2 vols., Oxford, 1924), uses a listing numbered 1 through 14a, presented and discussed below; Tredennick, *Aristotle, the Metaphysics*, I (London, 1936), paragraphs into twelve problems; Hope, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* (New York, 1952), summarizes the book as containing six problems; in his translation, however, Hope's paragraphing stays close to Aristotle's text, and suggests that there are really nine problems. My thesis in the present paper is that there are eight clearly indicated.

notebooks and outlines, it seems quite unthinkable that he could have poured this maze of problems over his audience like a bath-attendant, and left them to shift for themselves in discovering its intended organization.³ *A priori*, therefore, we would expect some indication within Aristotle's text of the coordination and subordination of his set of problems.

The simplest device to indicate coordination would be to use the coordinating particles *men* and *de* to mark off the major problems, reserving other connecting phrases and particles to indicate subdivisions. As a matter of fact, seven problems are singled out by this construction in the earlier list in Beta, while the combination of *peri te* and a verbal in *-teos* pretty clearly marks off an eighth as coordinate. But if we approach the passage with preconceived ideas as to what the problems of "metaphysics" are, based on our more recent works in this field, we have to disregard this simple stylistic sign of intended coordination, because the problems singled out do not seem to us philosophically those most major and coordinate. In this essay, I intend to show that style and content do match in this listing, by establishing the fact that these same problems are singled out stylistically in other lists and referred back to explicitly later in the text and, further, that the outline the *men-de* connectives indicate almost exactly matches the outline of an Aristotelian metaphysics defended by Richard McKeon on higher critical grounds. This result appears to cast some new light on the unity and care of construction of the entire *Metaphysics*, because these problems identified as "major" by the style of Beta, Chaps. 1 and 2, are apparently all resolved in the subsequent discussion, and in six cases out of eight they are the problems explicitly referred back to later in the text. This means not only that the work opens with a clear-cut outline, but also that it sticks to it, and that it is complete. It further means that Mr. McKeon's interpretation exactly fits and is verified by certain elements of style, which occur in four independent sections of the *Metaphysics*.

The following summary of the passage in the opening of

³ See *Topics*, 105b12-15, which shows a typical Aristotelian concern for careful and neat organization.

Beta indicates 1) Ross's numbering of the problems (by Arabic numbers in parentheses, prefixed by R); 2) the connectives and connecting phrases with which Aristotle introduces each of these questions (in brackets, transliterated); and 3) the outline that results from taking the rule that *men* and *de* are the major coordinating connectives (Roman numerals, prefixed by B).⁴ As mentioned above, one problem (B III, R4) is admitted as coordinate on the basis of a different introduction.

The problems are:

- B I. (R1) [*men*] Is the investigation of causes the province of a single science, or more than one?
 (R2) [*kai poteron*] And whether such a science only treats substances, or also studies the first principles of logic?
 (R3) [*ei poteron*] And if it treats substances, whether all substances can be treated within one science?
- B II. (R5) [*kai touto de phateon*] And we must say also whether there are only sensibles, or other substances beside these?
- B III. (R4) [*peri te touton . . . episkepton, kai poteron*] It is necessary that we investigate these problems, and whether only substances or also their essential attributes are to be treated?
- B IV. [*pros de toutois*] And further, what scientist treats same, other, like, unlike, and prior and posterior, and all such concepts of dialectical inquiry?
- B V. [*eti de toutois*] Moreover, what is each essential attribute, and has it one contrary?
 (R6) [*kai poteron*] And are the principles elements, or genera?
 (R7) [*kai ei, poteron*] And if they are genera, are they the first or last; for example, is man or animal more of a principle?

⁴ This locates the coordinate problems in 995b, lines 4-13; 13-18; 18-25; 25-31; 31-996a4 (or, if VI-A is treated as coordinate, 995b31-36, 996a1-4); and in 996a, lines 4-12, 12-15.

- B VI. (R8[?]) * [*malista de zeteteon . . . poteron*] Most of all, we must investigate whether there are any causes other than material causes?
 And [*kai*] separable or not?
 And [*kai*] one or many in number?
 (R8[?]) [*kai poteron*] And whether there is something apart from composite entities (that is, qualified substrata) in all cases, or only sometimes? If the latter, in which cases?
- B VI-A. (R9) [*eti . . . poteron*] Moreover, we must ask whether the principles are determinate either in number or kind?
 (R10) [*kai poteron*] And whether they are the same both for eternal and for perishable things?
- B VII. (R11) [*eti de . . . aporian echon*] Further, there is the problem whether unity and being are themselves the substance of things, or there is some other substratum?
 (R12) [*kai poteron*] And whether the principles are universal or particular?
 (R13) [*kai*] And actual or potential?
- B VIII. (R14) [*pros de toutois, poteron*] And further, whether number, measure, shape, etc. are substances?
 (R14a) [*kai ei poteron*] And if so, whether they are in or apart from sensible things?

* Ross takes the beginning of his problem 8 at B VI, above, but in his analysis seems to proceed as though the *second* question marked (R8[?]) above were the main issue in the problem.

Ross tabulates those of his list of problems which in the subsequent development of the *Metaphysics* he finds to be explicitly recalled or resolved or both. He concludes that his problems 1, 4, 5, 9, 11 and 12 are explicitly referred to or resolved or both, while his 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14 and 14a are not.⁵ Not counting

⁵ Ross, op. cit., notes on Beta, and pp. xxiii-xxiv, where the tabulation cited is given; the explicit references are identified as follows: R1-4 are dealt with explicitly in Gamma; 1004a32 refers explicitly to problem 4; 5 is referred to explicitly by both 1076b1 and 1077a1; 6 and 7 "are not

R8, because its identity with B VI above is unsure, we find that those problems outlined as major and coordinate above coincide with Ross's 1, 4, 5 and 11, while in the case of his 6, 7, 10 and 12 they do not. Where Ross's list would lead one to conclude that the extant text only carries out 2/5 of its announced program explicitly, his tabulation taken in connection with the alternative outline, B, above, would show that 1/2 of the program is carried out.* Of the remaining problems, IV, V, VI and VIII, problem IV seems needed for the complete outline here in Beta, but is actually merged with VII, which presents the same difficulties in a stronger form, and it does not appear as coordinate either in the later list in Beta or in Kappa. Problem VIII is explicitly resolved in Book N (1093b25-29). Problems V and VI are explicitly resolved in Lambda (the treatment of V is at 1071a18-b3, of VI both at 1069b32-1070a30 [a preliminary resolution] and 1075a25-1076a7 [the final resolution]). If we are right in judging that IV disappears because it is combined with VII, the explicit resolutions cover 7 of 7 major problems. (Or, counting VI A as coordinate, 8 out of 8. This is discussed below.)⁷

dealt with expressly anywhere"; 8 is not answered expressly; 9 is answered in M.10 (1086b13-1087a25); 10 is not dealt with expressly; 11 is answered, and 1053b10 refers explicitly to it; 12 is answered, and 1086b15 refers explicitly to it; 13 is not explicitly answered; 14 is answered, though not explicitly referred to; 14a is not expressly dealt with anywhere.

* See pp. 520-21 below.

⁷ Evidently, these problems are interrelated in such a way that their resolution will sometimes require several preliminary stages. For example, R11 is not finally resolved until M, though a preliminary step, accompanied by a reference back to the problem, appears in I. The pattern of resolution suggested above in Lambda, where, in a single book, the preliminary resolution of VI is needed for a final resolution of V, and this, in turn, makes possible the final resolution of VI, is a case in point. A suggested table of explicit references and resolutions is the following (an asterisk indicates explicit reference back):

- I. 1002a18*; 1060b30-1061a30.
- II. 1076b1*; 1077a1*; 1077b33 ff.
- III. 1004a32*; 1069b4-35.
- IV. [assimilated to other problems].
- V. 1071a18-b3.
- VI. 1075a25-1076a7.
- VII. 1053b10*; 1086b15* [reference back to first sub-topic of VII]; 1087a1-25.

We can now check this outline by turning to the more extensive treatment of the problems in the latter part of Beta. Here the first three problems of our list (B I - B III) are all introduced by the phrase *eti de poteron*. Apparently, however, the more complex antinomies of the later problems forced a shift in the method of marking coordination; for after B' III (this later list in Beta will be prefixed by B'), each of the problems V, VI, VI-A, VII and VIII appear introduced by some reference to "problems" (*aporia* is used for the next four problems).⁸ These questions are the only ones introduced by such reference in the B' list. The relation of the outline of this later list and the earlier one is: B I = B' I, B II = B' III, B III = B' II, B IV does not occur in B', B V = B' IV, B VI = B' V, B VI-A = B' VI, B VII = B' VIII, B VIII = B' VII. The appearance of B' VI as coordinate suggests that B VI-A should have been treated as coordinate in our outline of B; perhaps a *de* after *eti* either has dropped out of the text, or should have been, but somehow was not, written there. The equivalence of B' II and B III confirms our notion that the latter belonged in the first outline as coordinate, though an alternative to the *men-de* construction was used in B to show its coordination. This independent stylistic setting off of the same problems in the two lists is very unlikely to be coincidental. These considerations suggest the conclusion that the text of the *Metaphysics* as we have it is a *complete* execution of the program proposed, insofar as it does resolve *every major problem* explicitly.⁹

There are further tests that can be applied. So far, it has been suggested 1) that a set of problems is singled out stylistically in the first part of Beta, 2) that these same problems are also singled out stylistically in the latter part of Beta, 3) that these

VIII. 1093b25-29.

VI A. 1086b13-1087a25.

This is based on the first list in Beta (B I-VIII).

⁸ The division into problems here occurs at 996a17, 997a25 (where *eti de poteron* introduces it), 997a34 (again with *eti de poteron*), 998a20 (*peri te . . . aporia*), 999a24 (*aporia*), 1000a5 (*aporia*), 1001b26 (*aporia*), 1002b12 (*aporeseien*).

⁹ Accepting assimilation of IV to VII in the later list, and admitting B VI-A as a genuine coordinate problem.

are the problems explicitly referred back to or resolved later in the *Metaphysics*. Does the outline as we reconstruct it in this way make sense philosophically? This is the most important question that can be asked, and the crucial test of the significance of the observed matters of style. Paraphrased and compressed, the outline takes the following form:

[*Problems about language: Metaphysics as Science*]

1. Is this science one or many?

[*Problems about the kind of knowledge involved*]

2. Is this limited to sensation and sensible substances?
3. Or is it restricted to substances, as opposed to attributes, so that the faculty involved is intellectual intuition?
4. To resolve this issue, dialectic must be employed; is this discipline, and are its concepts, proper to metaphysics?

[*Problems about the entities involved*]

5. Are proper principles elements, genera, or species?
6. Are the causes involved solely material, or are others also needed?
7. Are the principles and causes of such a kind as to be applicable to both eternal and sensible substances, or are two sets required?

[*Problems of entities posited by the Platonists*]

8. Are unity and being substances of things?
9. Are mathematical objects substances?

The reader may recognize that this outline is the same (except for the subordination of the sub-problems in I) as the outline of the *Metaphysics* constructed by Mr. McKeon, and defended by him on philosophical grounds. The resemblances to the *Posterior Analytics* suggest that the outline is thoroughly Aristotelian in its topics and order (with the exception, which McKeon notes, of the need to investigate two posited realms of substance which Aristotle does not believe to have full substantial being; this accounts for the inclusion of the two final problems).¹⁰ The

¹⁰ See, for example, Richard McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, New York, 1941, pp. xvi-xxvi. It is doubtful however, that McKeon would accept the present outline, since its subordination of Ross's problems 2 and 3 under B I contradicts the coordinate emphasis of words-thoughts-things that McKeon's analysis of the work employs.

progression words-thoughts-things, and the subdivision of subject-matter into principles, causes, and substances, as well as the subdivision of knowledge into indemonstrable grasp of natures and sensations, the relation of these being bridged by dialectical demonstration, can be cited to substantiate the parallel of this order and the outline of other Aristotelian writings on logic and psychology. We conclude that the outline makes philosophic sense, though it is not typical of the works on "metaphysics" which are written in the twentieth century. Probably the fact that in some way Aristotle's position is an alternative to, not simply an anticipation of, our more familiar contemporary metaphysical thought, helps to explain both its difficulty and its fascination.

A further test we can apply is to see how the problems singled out above as major and coordinate compare with those given in the very compressed listing of *Metaphysics* Kappa. Without trying to decide when Kappa was written in relation to Beta, or to what extent it is Aristotle's own composition, and to what extent someone else's transcription, we will ask whether there is any stylistic indication of certain problems as coordinate in Kappa, and, if so, whether the organization of these agrees with, or differs from, the lists in Beta. The first main problem, at 1059a20, opens with three devices any of which could be used to show coordination. There is a reference to problems (*aporeseie*), a *de*, and the term "whether" (*poteron*). In the maze of compressed text that follows, it is at once clear that *de* alone is *not* being used to set off the main outline. If the reference to "problems one might raise" is being used for this purpose, the section divides into seven parts wholly different from the lists in Beta, and seemingly not by any philosophical criterion coordinate. But there is a marked reserve in the use of *poteron* here as contrasted with Beta 1, and the combination of this with a *de* marks off the following questions as coordinate:

K1. (1059a20-29) Is metaphysics a single science?

K2. (1059a29-38) Is it concerned with substance alone, or also with essential attributes?

K3. (1059a38-1060a2) Is our present inquiry concerned with sensible substances or not with these, but certain others?

K4. (1060a2-1060b23) Is it necessary to posit any things other than individuals, or is metaphysics a science of these?

K5. (1060b23-29) Does something exist separate from composites, and if so, in which cases?

K6. (1060b29-30) Are the principles one in kind or in number?

Returning to the list in Beta, we see at once that K1 = B I = B' I. Further, K2 = B' II = B III. K3 clearly equals B II, and B' III. K4 seems a revised formulation of the same problem as B VI = B' V, and K6 clearly = B VI-A = B' VI. Kappa 5, however, equals R8 and the following subdivisions of B VI through B VII in the outline above. Since the evidence in Beta was not conclusive as to whether VI-A should or should not be coordinate, we can perhaps take the fact it is explicitly referred back to as confirming its intended coordination. In that case, five of the coordinate problems in Kappa coincide with problems set off as major in the earlier list in Beta. But from the text of Kappa, as is recognized in Ross's summary of the problems there stated, K5 is actually developed into the equivalent of B VII = B' VIII = R11 (see the statement of what this problem entails, 1060a36, and the discussion to 1060b23).¹¹ In other words, the major problems identified in Beta and in Kappa are substantially the same, though the lists in Beta are slightly more extensive.

Philosophically, the same outline will represent this list in Kappa as the one used in Beta, and if that list makes sense on philosophic grounds as representing coordinate major problems of an Aristotelian metaphysics, the present one will also.

We can summarize the result of this inquiry by re-stating our outline of problems which, on higher critical grounds, have been put forward as proper to an Aristotelian first philosophy, indicating for each the evidence in the structure of Aristotle's text which

¹¹ Ross, op. cit., I, 224. The reader skeptical of the suggestion that the combination of *de* and *poteon* is meant to mark off the coordinate problems in Kappa should note that in Ross's analysis of the list, five of the seven problems he finds coincide with problems identified above as coordinate and major in the lists of Beta, and that there is ground for challenge of his third and fourth problems as not possibly coordinate in importance with the other five he identifies.

shows that he did or did not regard the problem as a major one for the metaphysician.¹²

I. Problems about the character of metaphysics as a science.

1. Is such a science one or many? (This = B I, B' I, K1, and is explicitly referred to in the opening of Gamma.)

II. Problems about the kind and ground of knowledge involved, if such a science is possible.

2. Is the relevant knowledge solely empirical, based on sensation and having as its object sensible substances? (This = B II, B' III, K3, and it is explicitly referred back to at 1076b1 and 1077a1).

3. Is the relevant knowledge restricted to substances apart from attributes (in which case it must be intuitive, not discursive)? (This = B III = B' II = K2, and it is referred to explicitly in 1004a32.)

4. Is the study of dialectic and its key concepts (by use of which questions concerning principles must be resolved) also a part of metaphysics? (This appears only as B IV; while it seems needed here in the general outline, the issues it raises are the same as those of B VII = B' VIII, where the difficulties can be put more strongly, in terms of being.)

III. Problems about the subject-matter of first philosophy.

A. Principles (starting-points of the science).

5. What is each essential attribute, has each one contrary, and are our principles elements or rather genera? (This = B V = B' IV = K4; it is resolved, though not explicitly referred back to, in Book Lambda.)

B. Causes (which will serve as middle terms of demonstration).

6. Are there any causes other than material cause? (This = B VI = B' V; it seems not to appear as coordinate in Kappa; it is solved but not referred back to explicitly in Lambda.)

C. Substances (the entities studied by our science, and

¹² The one item apparently left over, explicit reference back to R12 (see note 5, above) is accounted for if we assume that the final resolutions of major problems are given in order, so that there are actually two references back to B VII.

explained by demonstrations in which causes connect them to principles).

6a. Are the principles themselves substances? (This seems the basic question underlying B VI-A, which = B' V, and = K6. Ross treats this problem as "explicitly answered in M.10.")

7. Are unity and being themselves the substance of things? (This = B VII = B' VIII = K5; it is answered, and 1053b10 refers explicitly to it.)

8. Are mathematical objects substances, or causes or principles? (This equals B VIII = B' VII, and it equals one subdivision of K5; it is explicitly answered, in Nu; since it is the final major problem resolved, we have suggested that there would be no particular reason for explicit reference back to it.)

Except for 4, it is clear that this outline fits the tests we have used to see if it is the intended key to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

Whether we choose to follow an analysis of the *Metaphysics* such as McKeon's or one more like Jaeger's, or a combination of both (which is certainly not impossible, since a lecturer may draw on his own earlier works to construct a unified outline), it is advantageous to be able to begin with the outline of the work which Aristotle intended.

Yale University.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The *Stechert-Hafner Book News* of October 1953 recommends the *Zentralblatt für Bibliothekswesen* as the best East German periodical devoted to librarianship and bibliography. *Book News* says that "although the *ZfB* occasionally publishes articles reflecting Communist viewpoints, it still maintains the highest standards of scholarship, and the articles on library administration and bibliography are equalled in quality by only three or four other journals in the world. The checklist of current bibliographies and library literature are particularly useful."

The prize winners of the Franklin Matchette Foundation's contest for essays on aesthetics or philosophy of art are Van Meter Ames, of the University of Cincinnati, John H. Mueller, of Indiana University, and Iredell Jenkins, of the University of Alabama.

The Polish Embassy calls attention to the commemoration, in 1953, of the 410th anniversary of the death of Nicholas Copernicus. Among the events in commemoration is the publication of a new edition of *De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium Libri VI*. The edition will be published in Latin and Polish, and will be based on an original manuscript.

At the last meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Professor James Collins was elected Association President. Charles J. O'Niel was elected Vice-President. Lawrence Lynch and Sister M. Ann Ida, B.V.M. are new members of the Executive Council.

The Mountain-Plains States Philosophical Association held its seventh annual meeting at the University of Utah on October 15-17, 1953. Papers were presented by James L. Jarret, Cecil Miller, and Francis Moriarty.

An International Augustinian Congress is to be held in Paris on September 21-24, 1954. The occasion of the Congress is the sixteenth centenary of the birth of St. Augustine. Mgr. H.-X. Arquillière, M. le Chanoine G. Bardy, P. Camelot, O. P., M. P. Cayre, A. A., M. Pierre Courcelle, P. Henry, S. J., and

M. H.-I. Marrou constitute the Committee of the Congress. They have not yet announced a detailed program.

The Third South African Congress for the Advancement of Philosophy will take place at Stellenbosch in 1955. Inquiries about the Congress should be directed to the Secretary, Professor H. J. de Vleeschauwer. His address is University of South Africa, P. O. Box 1513, Pretoria, South Africa.

The fifth annual meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America will be held on March 19 and 20th at Harvard University. Professors F. S. C. Northrop, Eliseo Vivas, and John Wild will read papers at the first day's session. Professors Warner Wick and Lawrence Lynch will present papers at the second day's session. At that session there will also be a panel discussion on The Nature of Cognition. Professors Peter Bertocci, W. Norris Clark, Abraham Edel, and Francis Parker will be the participants. Further information may be obtained from the Secretary, Professor Oliver Martin, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- Aebi, Magdalena: *Kants Begründung der 'deutschen Philosophie'*. Basel: Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft, 1947. xix, 107, 525 pp.
- Agar, W. E.: *A Contribution to the Theory of Living Organism*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1952. 235 pp. 27/6.
- Augustin, San Aurolio: *La Inmortalidad del Alma*. Ciudad Eva Peron: Universidad Nacional de la Ciudad Eva Peron, 1953. 87 pp.
- Alessio, Franco P.: *Studi sul Neospiritualismo*. Milan, Rome: Fratelli Bocca, 1953. 256 pp. 1600 lire.
- Aristotle: *Constitution of Athens and related texts*. New York: Hafner, 1950. xii, 233 pp. Paper \$.95, cloth \$1.90.
- Ashby, W. Ross: *Design for a Brain*. New York: J. Wiley & Sons, 1952. ix, 259 pp. \$6.00.
- Auerbach, Erich: *Mimesis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953. 563 pp. \$7.50.
- Blackmur, R. P.: *Language as Gesture*. New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1952. vi, 440 pp. \$5.75.
- Bloomfield, Morton W.: *The Seven Deadly Sins*. East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State College Press, 1952. xiv, 482 pp. \$7.50.
- Caracciolo, Alberto: *Arte e Pensiero nello Loro Istanze Metafisiche*. Milan, Rome: Fratelli Bocca, 1953. 196 pp. 1000 lire.
- Cassirer, Ernst: *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume I, Language*. Tr. by Raphl Manheim. Int. by Charles W. Hendel. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953. xiv, 328 pp. \$5.00.
- Chaiz-Buy, Jules: *Les Dimensions de l'Etre et du Temps*. Paris: E. Vitte, 1953. 315 pp.
- Collins, James: *The Mind of Kierkegaard*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953. xiv, 304 pp. \$4.50.
- Datta, Dharendra Mohan: *The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy*. Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press. 541 pp. 10/8.

- Field, G. C.: *Plato and his Contemporaries*. Second edition. New York: British Book Centre, 1953. 242 pp. \$3.50.
- Foerster, F. W.: *Christ and the Human Life*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. ix, 333 pp. \$5.00.
- Fridrichsen, Anton: *The Root of the Vine: Essays in Biblical Theology*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. 160 pp. \$4.75.
- Graubard, Mark: *Astrology and Alchemy; Two Fossil Sciences*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. xi, 382 pp. \$5.00.
- Heidegger, Martin: *Kant et le Problème de la Métaphysique*. Tr. into French by Alphonse de Waelhens and Walter Biemel. Paris: Gallimard, 1953. 308 pp.
- Heim, Karl: *Christian Faith and Natural Science*. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1953. 256 pp. \$3.50.
- Herrigel, Eugen: *Zen in the Art of Archery*. Tr. by R. F. C. Hull. New York: Pantheon Books, 1953. 109 pp. \$2.00.
- Johnson, Martin: *Time and Universe for the Scientific Conscience*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952. v, 42 pp. \$.50.
- Kleene, Stephen Cole: *Introduction to Metamathematics*. New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1952. vi, 550 pp. \$8.75.
- Kroeber, A. L., and Kluckhohn, Clyde: *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*. Cambridge, Mass.: Peabody Museum, 1952. viii, 223 pp.
- Landsberg, Paul-Louis: *The Experience of Death: The Moral Problem of Suicide*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. xii, 102 pp. \$2.50.
- Langmack, Holger Christian: *God and the Universe*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. 173 pp. \$4.75.
- Laucks, Irving F.: *A Speculation in Reality*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. 154 pp. \$3.75.
- Levinson, Ronald B.: *In Defense of Plato*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953. xii, 674 pp. \$10.00.
- Kwee Swan Liat: *Methods of Comparative Philosophy*. Leiden: University Press of Leiden, 1953. x, 217 pp.

- Lodge, Rupert C.: *Plato's Theory of Art*. New York: Humanities Press, 1953. viii, 316 pp. \$5.00.
- Lossky, Nicolai O.: *History of Russian Philosophy*. New York: International Universities Press, 1951. 416 pp. \$10.00.
- MacCallum, Reid: *Imitation and Design*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953. xvii, 209 pp. \$5.00.
- Marias, Julian: *Miguel de Unamuno*. Buenos Aires: Emece Editores, 1953. 255 pp.
- Mariotti, Scevola: *Livio Andronico e la Traduzione Artistica*. Milan: Giovanni de Silvestri, 1952. 110 pp.
- Martindale, C. C.: *The Life of Mère Anne-Marie Javouhey*. New York: Longmans, 1953. vii, 140 pp. \$2.00.
- Massolo, Arturo: *Il Primo Schelling*. Florence: G. C. Sansoni, 1953. 179 pp. 1000 lire.
- Mayne, Melinda: *The Beginning is the End*. New York: Exposition Press, 1953. 938 pp. \$6.00.
- Miller, Perry: *The New England Mind; From Colony to Province*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953. 513 pp. \$6.50.
- Moody, Ernest A.: *Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic*. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1953. viii, 113 pp. \$3.25.
- Moore, G. E.: *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1953. xiii, 380 pp. \$4.50.
- Notcutt, Bernard: *The Psychology of Personality*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. 259 pp. \$4.75.
- Passmore, J. A.: *Hume's Intentions*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1952. ix, 164 pp. \$3.75.
- Passmore, J. A.: *Ralph Cudworth; An Interpretation*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1953. x, 120 pp. \$3.00.
- Patterson, Edwin W.: *Jurisprudence; Men and Ideas of the Law*. Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, 1953. xiii, 649 pp. \$7.50.
- Polin, Raymond: *Politique et Philosophie chez Thomas Hobbes*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953. xx, 267 pp. Fr 980.

- Pontifex, Dom Mark, and Threthowan, Dom Illtyd: *The Meaning of Existence*. New-York: Longmans Green & Co., 1953. 186 pp. \$2.75.
- Raison, Jacob S.: *Gentile Reactions to Jewish Ideals*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. 892 pp. \$7.50.
- Raju, P. T.: *Idealistic Thought of India*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953. 454 pp. \$6.50.
- Rapoport, Anatol: *Operational Philosophy; Integrating Knowledge and Action*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953. xi, 258 pp. \$3.75.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul: *Existential Psycho-analysis*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. viii, 275 pp. \$4.75.
- Schuon, Frithjof: *The Transcendent Unity of Religions*. Tr. by Peter Townsend. New York: Pantheon Books, 1953. 199 pp. \$3.50.
- Steinberg, Wilhelm: *Grundfragen des menschlichen Seins*. Munich, Basel: Ernst Reinhardt Verlag, 1953. 116 pp. Fr 5.00.
- Strauss, Leo: *Natural Right and History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. x, 327 pp. \$5.00.
- Van Laer, P. Henry: *Philosophico-Scientific Problems*. Tr. by Henry J. Koren. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1953. xi, 168 pp. Cloth \$3.25, paper \$2.50.
- von Varga, Alexander: *Einführung in die Erkenntnislehre*. Munich, Basel: Ernst Reinhardt Verlag, 1953. 144 pp. Fr 7.80.
- Wallis, Louis: *Young People's Hebrew History*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. ix, 117 pp. \$2.50.
- Westacott, E.: *Roger Bacon in Life and Legend*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. xii, 140 pp. \$3.75.
- Zenkovsky, V. V.: *A History of Russian Philosophy*. Two volumes. Tr. by George L. Kline. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953. xiv, viii, 947 pp. \$15.00.
-
- Aristoteles' Werk und Geist* By Joseph Zürcher. Paderborn: F. Schoeningh, 1952. 456 pp.

- Academic Freedom, Logic, and Religion.* American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1953. 161 pp. \$2.75.
- The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas: Representative Selections.* Edited by Dino Bigongiari. New York: Hafner, 1953. xxxviii, 215 pp. Cloth \$2.50, paper, \$1.25.
- Philosophical Periodicals: An Annotated World List.* Prepared by David Baumgardt. Washington, D. C.: Library of Congress Reference Department, 1952. vi, 89 pp.
- The Protestant Credo.* Edited by Vergilius Ferm. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. xi, 241 pp. \$5.00.
- Puritan Sage: Collected Writings of Jonathan Edwards.* Edited by Vergilius Ferm. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. xxvii, 640 pp. \$7.50.
- Dictionary of Mysticism.* Edited by Frank Gaynor. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. 210 pp. \$5.00.
- The Works of Archimedes.* Edited by T. L. Heath. New York: Dover, 1953. clxxxvi, 326 pp. Cloth \$4.95, paper \$1.95.
- Psychological Reflections, an Anthology from the Writings of C. G. Jung.* Selected and edited by Jolande Jacobi. New York: Pantheon Books, 1953. xxvii, 342 pp. \$4.50.
- The Works of George Berkeley: Volume VI.* Edited by T. E. Jessop. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1953. viii, 256 pp. 30/.
- Christian Faith and Communist Faith.* Edited by D. M. Mackinnon. New York: St. Martins Press, 1953. xiv, 260 pp.
- The Study of Culture at a Distance.* Edited by Margaret Mead and Rhoda Metraux. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. x, 480 pp. \$5.00.
- The Religion of the Hindus.* Edited by Kenneth W. Morgan. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1953. xii, 434 pp. \$5.00.
- Alfred North Whitehead, An Anthology.* Edited by F. S. C. Northrop and Mason Gross. New York: Macmillan, 1953. 928 pp. \$12.50.

- Symphilosophiein.* Edited by H. Plessner. Bern: Francke, 1950. 368 pp. Fr 22.50.
- The Resources of Leonardo da Vinci.* Edited by George K. Plochmann. Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1953. 39 pp. \$1.00.
- African Folktales and Sculpture.* Edited by Paul Radin. New York: Pantheon Books, 1952. xvi, 355 pp. \$8.50.
- Vision and Action: Essays in Honor of Horace Kallen.* Edited by Sydney Ratner. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1953. xviii, 278 pp. \$5.00.
- Developments in Psycho-Analysis.* Edited by Joan Riviere. London: The Hogarth Press, Ltd., 1952. viii, 368 pp. 30/.
- Newton's Philosophy of Nature, Selections from his Writings.* Edited by H. S. Thayer. New York: Hafner, 1953. xvi, 207 pp. Cloth \$2.25, paper \$1.15.
- Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Volume II.* New Orleans: Tulane University Press, 1953. 122 pp. \$2.00.
- The Teaching of Philosophy, an International Enquiry of UNESCO.* Paris: UNESCO, 1953. 230 pp.
- Readings in Philosophy of Science.* Edited by Philip P. Weiner. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953. x, 646 pp. \$5.50.

MIND

January 1954

- I. Wittgenstein's lectures in 1930-33: G. E. MOORE.
- II. The Concept of Evolution: T. A. GOUDGE.
- III. How Specious is the 'Specious Present'? C. W. K. MUNDLE.
- IV. On the Project of a Universal Character: J. COHEN.
- V. Discussions:
The Paradoxes of Derived Obligation: A. N. PRIOR.
A Note on Meaning and Verification: A. R. WHITE.
- VI. Critical Notices:
L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*: P. F. STRAWSON.
J. H. Woodger, *Biology and Language*: S. TOULMIN.
- VII. New Books.
- VIII. Notes.
- IX. List of Officers and Members.

Published for the Mind Association by

THOMAS NELSON & SONS LTD.

Parkside Works Edinburgh 9

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

*(Published by The University of St. Andrews
for The Scots Philosophical Club)*

The policy of this journal is to publish work of a high academic standard in all branches of philosophy. Special attention is given to the critical surveying of recent philosophical literature, and to book reviewing over a wide field.

Contributors in 1954 will include: A. Child (California), G. E. Davie (Belfast), J. Ebbinghaus (Marburg), A. S. Ferguson (Oxford), I. Jenkins (Alabama), H. D. Lewis (Bangor), W. G. MacLagan (Glasgow), B. Mayo (Birmingham), C. W. K. Mundle (Dundee).

The annual subscription is £1 or \$3.00 for orders placed direct with the Editor. Orders placed through a bookseller or agent will be charged at the full retail price of £1.4s or \$4.00. Single issues are sold at 6s. or \$1.00. Drafts should be made payable to The Philosophical Quarterly a/c, Royal Bank of Scotland, St. Andrews, Fife. MSS and all other communications, including those from prospective subscribers, should be addressed to the Editor, T. M. Knox, Principal of the University of St. Andrews, Scotland.

LOGICAL choices...

Irving M. Copi's

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

For those who stress the informal development of notations and methods for their use in appraising arguments, or for those who place main emphasis on the development of systems of symbolic logic, this book is adaptable and extremely useful in its presentation of principles and methods of symbolic logic.

The first half develops, in an intuitive and informative way, notations and methods as they are required for the appraisal of increasingly complex systems of argument. The second half of the book provides a more systematic treatment of the principles used in the first half. A great many exercises covering all parts of the material presented help the student to acquire a practical mastery of the methods.

To be published in January.

INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC

This modern approach to logic begins with problems in which the student is already interested, and leads him gradually to the more systematic and general aspects of logic as methods for effective solution of those initial problems. The entire book revolves around argument—first acquainting the student with the principles that distinguish correct from incorrect argument, providing him with methods for appraising the correctness of arguments, and thus inculcating in him the habit of critical thinking. It contains enough of both traditional and symbolic logic to make it usable in any type of general introductory course.

1953

472 pp.

\$4.00

The Macmillan Company

60 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 11

YALE BOOKS

THE COURAGE TO BE

Paul TILlich. "Profound as always, Tillich here addresses himself to an issue so presently urgent (how to live boldly in an age of despair) and carries through his argument so connectedly and lucidly, that psychologists, educators, and parents will be as interested as philosophers and theologians." *Religious Education*.

\$3.00

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SYMBOLIC FORMS

Volume I, Language. Ernst CASSIRER. Long considered by many who knew it in the original German as Cassirer's greatest work, this notable contribution to 20th-century thought has now been translated into English. Foreword by Charles W. Hendel.

\$5.00

AT YOUR BOOKSTORE
YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS
NEW HAVEN 7 CONN

IMPRIMERIE

Georges Thone

Specialist in the printing of periodicals.

Careful and speedy execution
of works in English, French,
and other languages.

Quotations on request.

*

The Review of Metaphysics is printed by the:
IMPRIMERIE GEORGES THONE, Liege (Belgium).

11-15, RUE DE LA COMMUNE, LIEGE (BELGIUM)

"This book is not merely brilliant, it is important."

WENDELL JOHNSON.

OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

Integrating Knowledge and Action

By **ANATOL RAPOPORT**

Assistant Professor of Mathematical Biology, The University of Chicago;
Author of "Science and the Goals of Man"

A leading figure in the field of General Semantics here provides the first penetrating statement of the illuminating interrelations of logic, semantics, science and ethics in the frame of an operational as contrasted with a traditional philosophy. Specifically, from the viewpoint of semantics it offers a new bridge between the perennial problems of philosophy and modern scientific ideas. Building on the theories of reconstruction as formulated by John Dewey, Professor Rapoport constructs a new system he calls "operational"—in which the logic and symbols of traditional approaches are united with the pragmatic approaches of scientific thinking today on philosophic questions.

In Part I the author analyzes traditional frameworks of thought from this operational point of view. Part II applies the operational methods identified in Part I to ethical questions, emphasizing that such questions have meaning only where they involve actual, not merely theoretical courses and choices of action. The last part surveys the frontier of operational philosophy and evaluates the new role of the philosopher in our own day.

"An excellent book, clear, challenging, exciting, and constructive."—CHARLES MORRIS, Department of Philosophy, The University of Chicago.

"I believe his passages demonstrating that ethical first principles should be regarded as given and not as something to be argued about are a brilliant and original contribution."—S. I. HAYAKAWA, Editor, ETC.: *A Review of General Semantics*.

\$3.75 at your bookstore or from

HARPER & BROTHERS, N. Y. 16

A NEW CRITIQUE OF THEORETICAL THOUGHT

In Four Volumes

By HERMANN DOOYEWEERD

Volume 1 translated by David H. FREEMAN, Chairman of Philosophy Department, Wilson College and William YOUNG, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Butler University.

A special grant from the Dutch government through the Netherlands Organization for Pure Research (Z. W. O.) has made it possible for the H. J. Paris Publishing Company of Amsterdam, in collaboration with our non-profit organization, to publish the main work of Professor Dooyeweerd, founder of the new school of philosophy, "The Philosophy of the Idea of Law". In the Netherlands the Free University of Amsterdam, the Universities of Utrecht, Leiden and Groningen, the Technical School of Delft, and the School of Economics at Rotterdam have special chairs held by members of this school.

EXCERPTS FROM EUROPEAN REVIEWS OF DOOYEWEERD'S

DE WIJSBEGEERTE DER WETSIDEE

(from which *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought*
has been enlarged and revised)

"The scientific and philosophical world is greatly indebted to Prof. Dooyeweerd for his numerous illuminating philosophical and scientific insights. While unattractive to dilettantes, those seriously interested in philosophy will be drawn to this work by its seriousness and originality."—*Netherland's Journal for Philosophy and Psychology*.

"The author is master of scientific method, and a master in expositing his ideas in opposition to divergent points of view."—*Themis*.

"In spite of our differences we cannot help but pay our respects and can only admire the energy and erudition displayed by Dooyeweerd in his work."—H. ROBBERS, University of Nijmegen.

Sold in sets only, \$30.00. Price will be increased to \$36.00 following publication of Volume II. Full trade discount to libraries and teachers. May be ordered on approval. Descriptive brochure sent upon request.

PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED PUBLISHING CO.

525 LOCUST STREET, PHILADELPHIA 6, Pa.



RECOMMENDATIONS

THE RECOMMENDATIONS

By the Board of Directors of the
General Electric Company, Inc.

RECOMMENDATIONS

By the Board of Directors of the
General Electric Company, Inc.

RECOMMENDATIONS

By the Board of Directors of the
General Electric Company, Inc.

RECOMMENDATIONS

By the Board of Directors of the
General Electric Company, Inc.

RECOMMENDATIONS

By the Board of Directors of the
General Electric Company, Inc.

SUSTAINING INSTITUTIONS

BRANDIS UNIVERSITY
DIE WIESE UNIVERSITÄT, BERLIN
FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
HEBREW UNIVERSITY
INDIANA UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE FOR PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH
INSTITUTE FOR RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL STUDIES
JERUSALEM UNIVERSITY
SANDHILL CENTER
THE CENTER FOR ADVANCED STUDY
TULANE UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY
YALE UNIVERSITY